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The required level of operating reserve to be maintained by an  electric 
power system can be determined using both deterministic and probabilistic 
techniques. Despite the obvious Oisadvantages of deterministic approaches 
there is still considerable reluctance to apply probabilistic techniques due to 
the difficulty of interpreting a single numerical risk index and the lack of 
sufficient information provided by a single index. A practical way to overcome 
these difficulties is to embed deterministic considerations in the probabilistic 
indices in order to monitor the system well-being. System well-being can be 
designated as healthy, marginal or at risk. The concept of system well-being 
is examined and extended in this thesis to cover the overall area of operating 
reserve assessment. 
Operating reserve evaluation involves the two distinctly different aspects 
of unit commitment and the dispatch of the committed units. Unit 
commitment health analysis involves the determination of which unit should 
be committed to satisfy the operating criteria. The concepts developed for unit 
commitment health, margin and risk are extended in this thesis to evaluate 
the response well-being of a generating system. A procedure is presented to 
determine the optimum dispatch of the committed units to satisfy the 
response criteria. The impact on the response well-being of variations in the 
margin time, required regulating margin and load forecast uncertainty are 
illustrated. The effects on the response well-being of rapid start units, 
interruptible loads and postponable outages are also illustrated. 
iii 
System well-being is, in general, greatly improved by interconnection with 
other power systems. The well-being concepts are extended to evaluate the 
spinning reserve requirements in interconnected systems. The interconnected 
system unit commitment problem is decomposed into two subproblems in 
which unit scheduling is performed in each isolated system followed by 
interconnected system evaluation. A procedure is illustrated to determine the 
well-being indices of the overall interconnected system. Under normal 
operating conditions, the system may also be able to carry a limited amount 
of interruptible load on top of its firm load without violating the operating 
criterion. An energy based approach is presented to determine the optimum 
interruptible load carrying capability in both the isolated and interconnected 
systems. 
Composite system spinning reserve assessment and composite system 
well-being are also examined in this research work. The impacts on the 
composite well-being of operating reserve considerations such as stand-by 
units, interruptible loads and the physical locations of these resources are 
illustrated. It is expected that the well-being framework and the concepts 
developed in this research work will prove extremely useful in the new 
competitive utility environment. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
Electric energy is an essential ingredient in the development of a modern 
society. Almost all aspects of daily life depend on the use of electrical energy 
and the performance of a power utility can be measured in terms of the 
quality and reliability of the supply. Electric power utilities have invested a 
substantial amount of capital in generating stations, transmission lines and 
distribution facilities to supply electrical energy to their customers as 
economically as possible and with a reasonable assurance of continuity, 
safety and quality. This creates the difficult problem of balancing the need 
for continuity of power supply with the costs involved. However, no matter 
how much money, time and effort are invested, and no matter what advanced 
technologies are utilized, it is impossible t o  totally eliminate the possibility of 
equipment outages and the need to remove equipment from service to 
perform preventive maintenance [I]. It is, therefore, not feasible economically 
and technically to attempt to design and operate a power system with one 
hundred percent reliability. Power system engineers have always attempted 
to  respond to societies' expectations and to achieve the highest possible 
reliability at  an affordable cost. A high level of customer reliability can only 
be attained by incorporating reliability considerations in all aspects of power 
system planning, design and operation. 
1.2. Power System Reliability 
System reliability is an important consideration for planners, designers 
and operators. Reliability can be defined as the probability of a system 
performing its required b c t i o n  for the period of time intended under the 
operating conditions encountered [2]. The concept of power system reliability 
is extremely broad and covers all aspects of the ability of the system to satisfy 
the consumer requirements [3-61. Due to the wide ranging implications of the 
term reliability, it is necessary to subdivide it into more specific segments. A 
simple but reasonable subdivision of the term "system reliability" can be 
made by considering the two basic and fimdamental aspects of system 
adequacy and security as shown in Figure 1.1 [2,3,7,8,9]. 
Sys tern Reliability 
System Adequacy System Security 
Figure 1.1: Subdivision of system reliability. 
1.2.1 Adequacy and Security 
Adequacy and security are major concerns for power system planners and 
operators. System adequacy relates to the existence of sufficient facilities 
within the system to  satisfy the consumer load demand. This includes the 
necessary facilities to generate sufficient electrical energy and the associated 
transmission and distribution required to  transfer the energy to the. customer 
load points. Adequacy is therefore concerned with static conditions which do 
not include system disturbances. System security, on the other hand, relates 
to the ability of the system to cope with perturbations arising within it. These 
include the conditions associated with both local and widespread 
disturbances and the loss of major generation and transmission facilities. It is 
clear that adequacy assessment and security analysis deal with quite 
different reliability issues and involve different assessment techniques. The 
evaluation of Loss Of Load Expectation (LOLE) and Loss Of Energy 
Expectation (LOEE) reside in the area of adequacy (10-121. Quantification of 
spinning or  operating capacity requirements, which is the subject of this 
thesis, falls in the domain of security assessment. 
1.2.2 Functional Zones and Hierarchical Levels 
The evaluation techniques used in reliability analysis of power systems 
can be categorized in terms of their application to the three basic functional 
zones of generation, transmission and distribution. These functional zones 
can be combined t o  create Hierarchical Levels (HL) for the purpose of 
conducting system reliability analysis [2]. Reliability assessment at the 
different hierarchical levels and functional zones has undergone continous 
development and application since the 1930s. The development can be seen 
from the bibliographies [13-171 published in the IEEE which contain many 
papers on reliability assessment of power systems. The functional zones and 
hierarchical levels are shown in Figure 1.2. Hierarchical Level I (HLI) is 
concerned only with the generating facilities. Reliability evaluation at  HLI 
provides a quantitative assessment of the ability of the generating system to 
satisfy the total system demand. Both generation and the associated 
transmission facilities are considered in HLII reliability evaluation. The 
combination of generation and transmission is known as a composite or bulk 
system. Composite system reliability evaluation techniques, therefore, 
include the ability of the transmission system to deliver the generated energy 
to the major load points. HLIII studies are concerned with the overall 
assessment of the three functional zones. HLIII adequacy assessment 
involves the consideration of all the three functional zones in order to 
evaluate customer load point adequacies [6]. 
The reliability indices calculated at each hierarchical level are physically 
different. System reliability is usually predicted using one or more indices 
which quantify expected system reliability performance and implemented 
using criteria based on acceptable values of these indices. This research 
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Figure 1.2: Hierarchical levels for reliability analysis. 
project, is concerned with operating reserve assessment at KLI and HLII, 
which is in the domain of system security. 
1.3 Power System Operation 
The total problem of power system reliability evaluation at HLI can be 
divided into the two conceptually different areas of static and operating 
reserve assessment. The static capacity area relates to the long-term 
evaluation of the overall system requirements. Operating reserve assessment, 
on the other hand, is related to the short-term evaluation of the actual 
capacity required to meet a given load demand Dl. Considerable efforts have 
been devoted to static capacity assessment [9-161. There is, however, 
relatively little published material in the area of operating reserve 
assessment. This research work is restricted to the axa of operating reserve 
assessment. 
A power system operator is continuously faced with the problem of making 
good decisions rapidly. This imposes many burdens in order to ensure the 
system is operated economically and with an acceptable level of reliability. 
Operation of a power system involves short term load forecasting and the 
subsequent scheduling of sufficient generating capacity. Operating reserve 
must also be scheduled in order to account for unanticipated load changes 
and/or sudden outages of generation plant. Once this capacity is scheduled 
and in operation, the dispatcher is committed for the period of time needed to 
start up and synchronize additional generating plant. This delay, known as 
lead time, depends on the type of generating units available for service [3,18]. 
It may be quite short for hydraulic or gas turbine units and much higher for 
conventional thermal units [19]. The system reliability can be improved by 
increasing the system generating reserve. This, however, will increase the 
system operating cost. The reserve in the system, therefore, should be 
scheduled in such a way that both reliability and economic constraints are 
satisfied. 
The traditional deterministic approaches used for reserve scheduling, 
impose operating constraints where the loss of a single circuit o r  generator 
must be tolerated. This is commonly referred to as an "N-1" criterion [%)I. 
The essential weakness of these approaches is that they do not assess the 
actual system risk as they ignore the probabilistic o r  stochastic nature of 
system behavior and component failures. Power systems therefore sometimes 
are operated under constraints imposed by events which are low in 
probability of occurrence or severity of consequence even when the constraint 
imposes significant opportunity cost, such as limiting economic interchanges 
between power system participants [21,22]. Considerable attention has been 
devoted in the literature to the problem of unit commitment where the basic 
objective in determining the required spinning reserve is to minimize the 
total operating cost [23-311. Under this condition, a system faces different 
degrees of risk throughout the day. The deterministic methods obviously do 
not respond to, nor they reflect, the probabilistic o r  stochastic nature of 
system behavior [3,22]. They lead to inconsistent decisions and variable 
operating risk levels. 
Probabilistic techniques, however, can  provide a comprehensive and 
realistic evaluation of the risk by incorporating the stochastic nature of 
system components. The first major probabilistic technique for operating 
reserve assessment, known as the PJM method, was proposed in 1963 by the 
Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland power pool [321. This method evaluates 
the probability of the committed generation just satisfying or failing to satisfy 
the expected demand during a specified time into the future, known as the 
lead time. The lead time required before a generating unit can be put into 
service depends on a number of factors including the type of unit in question. 
The delay time associated with a thermal generating unit can be several 
hours while rapid start and hot reserve units can usually be made available 
in a relatively short time. The original PJM method utilized a fixed lead time 
into the future. Modifications were subsequently made to the original PJM 
method to consider more detailed generation unit models [33]. This method 
has been extended to include rapid start and hot reserve units in [19]. A two 
state model was used for generating unit representation in the original PJM 
method. The concept of including a single generating unit derated state in the 
analysis was introduced in [34]. Reference 35 included multiple outages for 
large generating units. Spinning and non-spinning reserve such as rapid 
start and hot reserve form the operating reserve of a system. The term 
spinning reserve refers to unloaded generation which is already synchronized 
and therefore ready to serve additional demand L36.371. The delay associated 
with a thermal unit can be reduced by maintaining the boiler in a banked 
state. Units in this operating mode are usually available within an hour, and 
are known as hot resenre units [3,18,19]. In addition to generating capacity, 
some utilities consider interruptible load as a part of their operating reserve. 
This load can be curtailed within an allowable time period in order to assist 
in keeping the system risk less than or  equal to a specified value [38-401. 
System reliability is normally improved by interconnecting a system with 
another power systems. Each interconnected system can then operate at a 
given risk level with a lower reserve than would be required without the 
interconnection. This concept is discussed in References 3 and 41-44 in a 
planning context. The PJM method was extended by application to 
interconnected system evaluation in [45-473. Reference 47 developed a unit 
commitment technique for interconnected systems based on the "two risk 
concept" where an interconnected system must satisfy the single system risk 
a t  the isolated level and also the interconnected system risk a t  the 
interconnected level. A technique called the "expected energy assistance 
approach" is described in [48] to assess spinning reserve requirements in 
interconnected systems. This technique can be used to estimate an index for 
expected energy assistance between interconnected systems [49-501. 
1.4 Objective and Scope of the Thesis 
Probabilistic approaches generally base the design and operating 
constraints on the criterion that the risk of certain events must not exceed 
preselected limits. Many utilities still prefer to use a deterministic technique 
due to the difficulty in interpreting the numerical risk index and the lack of 
sufficient information provided by a single index [51]. There is considerable 
utility interest in including deterministic considerations in probabilistic 
indices [52]. A practical way to overcome these difficulties is to  embed 
deterministic considerations into the probabilistic framework in the form of 
system well-being analysis. The system well-being is described by a set of 
mutually exclusive, exhaustive operating states designated as healthy, 
marginal and at risk. The concepts of system health, margin and risk in a 
system planning context for a composite generation and transmission system 
are presented in [53]. The events leading to each operating state can be 
identified and the probabilities associated with these operating states 
evaluated. The probabilities associated with the healthy and risk states can 
be considered as operating criteria. Reference 54 presents a probabilistic 
technique which extends the concepts of system operating health, margin and 
risk proposed in  [53] to operating reserve assessment. The technique 
overcomes some of the difficulties in interpreting the risk index and also 
provides the system operator with important information on the degree of 
system welI-being. 
The basic objectives of this research work are to extend the concepts of 
system operating health, margin and risk 
in spinning reserve evaluation and allocation at HLI, 
in unit commitment in interconnected systems and 
in unit commitment in composite generation and transmission systems. 
Operating reserve evaluation involves two distinctly different aspects. The 
first is unit commitment, in which the system operator decides which units 
and how many should be committed to satisfy the operating criteria. The 
second aspect is associated with the dispatch decisions regarding those units 
that have been committed [33. Both sets of studies are necessary to obtain a 
complete picture of operating reserve assessment, i.e. these studies 
complement rather than substitute for each other. The question that is not 
answered in the unit commitment evaluation is as follows: Given that there 
are several subsets of the complete set of N generating units that would 
satisfy the expected demand, which of these subsets should be used in order 
to provide the minimum operating cost as well as an acceptable level of 
reliability. I t  is obvious that the difference between the operating capacity 
and the load is not a valid indicator of the ability of the system to respond to 
a loss of capacity 155-571. Spinning reserve represents the remaining 
generating capacity of a unit and is considered to be independent of time. A 
certain portion of a system's spinning reserve must be available within a 
given time period for the purpose of protection in the event of a sudden loss of 
generating capacity or  system load fluctuation [58]. The time period is 
referred to as the margin time and its actual value can vary from system to 
system [59]. The available generation change that can be achieved within a 
margin time is known as regulating margin. The concept of system operating 
health, margin and risk is extended to unit commitment evaluation in 
[60,61]. Once the number of committed units is determined, the next step is 
to make dispatch decisions regarding these units. Starting from an economic 
schedule 125,621, not only must the reserve be sufficient to make up for 
generating unit failures, but the reserve must be allocated among fast- 
responding and slow-responding units such that the specified system health 
and risk probabilities are satisfied. The system well-being framework has 
been extended in this research project to include response concepts. 
The reliability of a power system is, in general, greatly improved by 
interconnection with other power systems [63-661. Assessment of operating 
reserve requirements in an interconnected generating system should include 
not only the generation and load models of the participating systems, but also 
the tie-line model and the agreement between the interconnected systems. 
The problem of interconnected system unit commitment is decomposed into 
two subproblems. Unit scheduling is first performed in each isolated system 
in accordance with the specified operating criterion. Once the required 
number of committed units in each area is determined, the next step is to  
satisfy the operating criterion associated with  the overall interconnected 
system. The criterion could be a specified interconnected system risk, an 
acceptable interconnected healthy state probability or both. 
Composite system reliability evaluation is an important aspect of power 
system reliability evaluation. Operating reserve assessment in composite 
systems was examined in the final stage of th is  project. In a conventional HLI 
operating reserve assessment, the committed units are usually assumed to be 
connected to a common bus and serve the total system demand a t  that bus. 
The effect of transmission lines and the actual physical location of the 
generating units are neglected. In an actual power system, however, the 
generating capacity and loads are usually dispersed throughout the system 
and are not connected to a single bus. The committed capacity should 
therefore satisfy the operating criteria a t  HLI and also at HLII. Only the 
generating units are considered in a .  HLI operating reserve assessment and 
therefore the security constraints refer to the generation and total load 
demand. Operating reserve evaluation at HLII, however, can consider a 
number of additional constraints such as acceptable voltages at load buses, 
transmission line load carrying capabilities and real and reactive power 
considerations [73,74]. All of these constraints can be included in HLII 
operating reserve assessment. Operating reserve evaluation a t  HLII, 
therefore, includes the ability of the transmission system to deliver the 
generated energy to the major load points. 
In conclusion, the concepts developed and the new quantitative indices 
should prove very useful to the system operator by providing information on 
the degree of system well-being, in addition to the system risk. This 
quantification cannot be achieved using deterministic techniques. The system 
well-being framework has also been applied in reliability evaluation of 
general engineering systems, small isolated electric power systems and 
HVDC transmission systems [75-791 
1.5 Summary of the Thesis 
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 describes the hasic concepts 
of well-being analysis. An overview of the available deterministic and 
probabilistic techniques used for operating reserve assessment is presented. 
The system well-being framework is examined in this chapter. The 
probabilistic techniques currently used for operating reserve assessment are 
compared with the proposed technique. The well-being framework is utilized 
in this chapter for unit commitment in which generating units are committed 
to the system to satisfy the operating criterion. The operating criterion could 
be a specified healthy state probability, a specified risk or both. The basic 
technique is illustrated in this chapter by determining the required amount 
of spinning reserve and the associated operating state probabilities for a 
given load level. 
Chapter 3 presents an approach to evaluate the degree of system well- 
being in the responding capability of a generating system. The overall well- 
being of the system is identified as being healthy, marginal and at risk. A 
risk criterion designated as the Generating System Response State Risk 
(GSRSR) is used to determine the generating unit loading schedule. The 
committed units are loaded such that a specified GSRSR, a n  acceptable 
response health probability or both are satisfied. The operating cost varies 
with the different response criteria. An algorithm is described in this chapter 
to determine the unit commitment and optimum dispatch of the committed 
units based on the specified commitment and response criteria. The effects on 
the response health, margin and risk of factors such as margin time, required 
regulating margin and load forecast uncertainty are illustrated in this 
chapter. 
The impacts of stand-by units, interruptible load and postponable outages 
on the response well-being of a generating system are illustrated in Chapter 
4. The superposition of the unit commitment and response health, margin 
and risk are pictorially illustrated in this chapter in order to make these 
concepts more understandable. Reliable power system operation requires that 
a generating system has a high healthy state probability in both the unit 
commitment and response domains. A procedure is presented which utilizes a 
least costly adjustment to determine how far the acceptable load dispatch 
must be displaced from the most economic one. An important benefit of rapid 
start units and interruptible loads is that a system, which is in the marginal 
response state because of insdlicient responsive resenre, can  transfer to  the 
healthy state when these elements are present. 
Chapter 5 extends the concepts of unit commitment health analysis to 
evaluate the spinning reserve requirements in interconnected systems. The 
problem of interconnected systems unit commitment is decomposed into two 
subproblems. Unit scheduling is first performed in each isolated system in 
accordance with the specified operating criterion. Once the required number 
of committed units in each area is determined, the next step is to satisfy the 
operating criterion associated with the overall interconnected system. An 
approach is illustrated in this chapter to determine the required operating 
state probabilities. The magnitude of the operating reserve depends on 
factors such as operating criteria, generating unit failure rates, tie-line 
failure rates and load levels. A number of sensitivity studies are presented in 
this chapter to illustrate the impact of these factors on the single and 
interconnected system health, margin and risk probabilities. 
A probabilistic technique is presented in Chapter 6 to evaluate the 
Optimum Interruptible Load Carrying Capability (OILCC) in both isolated 
and interconnected generating systems. A generating system with a given 
number of committed units can serve a target firm load level designated as 
the Firm Load Carrying Capability (FLCC). A set of ILCC can be determined 
for this number of committed units and the associated FLCC, which contains 
the interruptible load levels and the corresponding interruption times. The 
ILCC level which maximizes the expected energy supplied is taken fmm the 
set and designated as the OILCC of the generation system. The OILCC for 
two interconnected systems is determined by combining the two sets 
associated with the isolated systems. The intemption times are modified 
using an energy based approach to satisfy the interconnected system 
operating criteria. 
Only the generating units are considered in an HLI operating reserve 
assessment and therefore the security constraints refer to the generation and 
total load demand. Operating reserve evaluation at HLII, however, involves a 
number of additional constraints such as acceptable voltages a t  load buses, 
transmission line load carrying capabilities and real and reactive power 
considerations. The concepts of system operating health, margin and risk for 
operating reserve assessment of a generating system is extended to composite 
operating reserve assessment in Chapter 7. 
The basic concepts associated with unit commitment health analysis in 
composite generation and transmission systems are discussed in Chapter 7, 
assuming that the operating reserve in the system is only spinning reserve. 
System operating reserve can, however, include spinning and stand-by 
reserves and interruptible load. These additional elements can have 
considerable effect on composite system operating reserve assessment. The 
impact on the composite system well-being indices of variations in the size 
and locations of rapid start and hot reserve units are examined in Chapter 8. 
A procedure has been developed to determine the required number of units 
for a given load level and the associated well-being indices. This is then 
followed by a more detailed description of the proposed procedure to include 
stand-by units and interruptible load in composite system evaluation. The 
impacts of having generating capacity at different locations in a system 
should be of considerable interest in the new competitive environment. 
The developed methods and techniques presented in this thesis have been 
applied to two reliability test systems, the Roy Billinton Test System (RBTS) 
and the EEE-Reliability Test System (IEEE-RTS). The results obtained by 
utilizing the IEEE-RTS are illustrated in Chapters 2,3,4,5,6,7 and 8. The 
initial concept developments were done using the RBTS. Appendix A presents 
a wide range of results obtained using the RBTS. The required reliability 
data associated with the two test systems are given in Appendixes B, C and 
D. 
Chapter 9 presents a summary and the conclusions to this research work. 
2. BASIC CONCEPTS OF WEU-BEING ANALYSIS 
2.1 Introduction 
In a practical power system, the load demand varies considerably between 
weekdays and on-peak and off-peak hours. It is, therefore, not economical to 
continuously keep all the generating units on-line. The task of forecasting the 
load for a short time in the future and scheduling the appropriate and 
necessary operating capacity is complex. Sufficient capacity should be 
scheduled in order that the system is capable of handling deviations in 
customer demands and the possible loss of operating generating units. The 
system reliability can be improved by increasing the system generating 
reserve. This, however, will increase the system operating cost. The reserve 
in the system, therefore, should be scheduled in such a way that both 
reliability and economic constraints are satisfied. 
Both deterministic and probabilistic techniques can be utilized to 
determine the required level of capacity reserve to be maintained by a system 
180-841. Deterministic approaches do not specifically recognize the probability 
of component failures in the assessment of operating reserve. Probabilistic 
techniques can be used to take into account the random outages of system 
components and other stochastic component behavior. The basic goal of a 
probabilistic technique is to maintain the system risk as close as possible but 
lower than an dlowable risk at all times. Deterministic criteria are still 
widely used by many utility companies [51]. The reason for this is that these 
criteria are easier for system planners and operators to understand and apply 
than probabilistic approaches. A practical way to overcome these difficulties 
is to combine probabilistic indices with deterministic criteria to reflect the 
degree of power system well-being. The ability of a power system to supply 
load and to withstand disturbances can be described by a set of mutually 
exclusive exhaustive operating states designated as normal, alert, emergency 
and extreme emergency [52,85]. This £kamework is examined in this chapter 
for application to unit commitment in a generating system. The system well- 
being, as designated by the accepted deterministic criteria, can also be 
categorized as healthy, marginal or  at risk. The probabilities associated with 
the healthy and risk states can be used as unit commitment criteria. A 
procedure for unit commitment and system risk evaluation is presented in 
this chapter. The benefits of the proposed method are compared with those of 
the current probabilistic methods. 
2.2 Methods Used in Operating Reserve Assessment 
There are a number of methods in general use to evaluate the operating 
reserve requirements in a power system. These methods can be classified into 
the two categories of deterministic and probabilistic approaches. 
2.2.1 Deterministic Approaches 
Deterministic techmques such as those shown below, recommend that the 
reserve capacity in a system should be equal to: 
i) a percentage of system load or operating capacity, 
ii) a fixed capacity margin, 
iii) the largest unit contingency, o r  
iv) any combination of the above methods. 
The most common deterministic criterion relates the reserve margin to the 
size of the largest unit or to some percentage of the peak load. Most Canadian 
utilities use the "largest unit contingency" method and some utilities 
complement this reserve assessment technique with an additional margin of 
some form [43. The basic objective of deterministic approaches in determining 
the required operating reserve is to minimize the total operating cost [5,6,7,81 
and in doing so a system faces different degrees of risk throughout the day. 
The essential weakness of deterministic approaches is that they do not assess 
the actual system risk as they ignore the probabilistic or  stochastic nature of 
system behavior and component failures [9]. 
2.2.2 Probabilistic Approaches 
In the operational phase, deterministic rules lead to over scheduling 
which, although more reliable, is uneconomic, or to under scheduling which, 
although less costly, can be very unreliable. A more consistent and realistic 
approach is one which recognizes the stochastic nature of system components 
and incorporates these factors in the assessment in a consistent manner [3]. 
The probabilistic techniques which have been developed in the area of 
operating capacity assessment can in general be divided into two categories, 
the PJM method and the security function approach. 
2.2.2.1 Pennsylvania - New Jersey - Maryland Interco~ected System 
Method ( P a )  
The first major probabilistic technique for operating reserve assessment, 
is known as the PJM method and was proposed in 1963 by the Pennsylvania- 
New Jersey-Maryland power pool 1321. This method determines the 
probability of the committed generation just satisfying or  failing to satisfy the 
expected demand during a specified time into the future, known as the lead 
time. This is the time during which no additional units can be placed in 
senrice [3]. In other  word^, during this period, the on-line capacity can not be 
replaced or added to in the case of an increase in the system load demand o r  
the loss of some generating capacity. The lead time can be a few minutes to 
several hours depending on the type and the size of the units to be brought 
into service. 
One of the problems faced by a system operator is to make on-line 
decisions based on the available information. The system condition is 
deterministically known at time t=O. The system risk is either zero or  one 
depending o n  whether the load is less than or greater than the on-line 
capacity. The system operator therefore must calculate the risk for the period 
of time into the future needed for starting up and loading additional 
generating units. This risk is defined as the probability of the system 
generation just satisfying or failing to satisfy the load demand during the 
lead time [3]. This risk index is known as the unit commitment risk, and can 
be calculated using a capacity outage probability table [3]. The risk is given 
by Equation 2.1. 
where, 
R ( t )  System risk at time t ,  
Pi(t) Individual probability that the generation system is in state i at 
time t ,  
Qi(t) Probability that the system load will be equal to or greater than 
the generation in state i at time t , 
N Total number of generation states. 
In operating reserve assessment, Qi(t) is either zero or unity. 
Q i W  = 0 when load < Ci( t )  
Where, 
C i ( t )  = TOM spinning capacity of the generation system in state i. 
By arranging the capacity states in descending order as in a conventional 
capacity outage probability table, Equation 2.1 can be expressed as : 
Where n is an integer such that : C,_*(t) > load 2 C, ( t )  and R ( t l  is the 
cumulative probability of the nth state in the capacity outage probability 
table [3]. 
2.2.2.2 Security Function Approach 
The security function approach is a general technique which was proposed 
in terms of various breaches of security [86-881. The first step in an 
assessment of system security is the development of a set of events whose 
occurrence would be considered to be a breach of security. A breach of 
security is defined as an intolerable or undesirable operating condition. such 
as an inadequacy of spinning capacity, unacceptable low system voltage, 
transmission-line over-load or  system instability. The probability of 
insecurity is displayed as a time function called the "security function". The 
general form of the securiw k c t i o n  is : 
where, 
Pi(t 1 Individual probability that the system is in state i at time t . 
Qi ( t  i Conditional probability that state i constitutes a breach of 
system security at time t , 
M Number of all possible system states. 
The security function, SO), can be calculated and compared with a 
maximum tolerable insecurity or risk level to determine if and when some 
control action is required to maintain the risk of system insecurity a t  an 
acceptable level. The major problem in the application of this method to 
operating capacity assessment is that i t  is a time-consuming and exhaustive 
evaluation process particularly for a large system with many possible 
operating states. The literature does not show any practical application of the 
general method. 
In an  operating reserve evaluation a t  ELI, a breach of security can be 
defined to be inadequate spinning reserve capacity. In this constrained 
application, the security function approach, therefore, is identical to the PJM 
method and S( t )  is the unit commitment risk. The two techniques are, 
however, not the same when applied to operating reserve assessment in 
composite systems as the operating constraints and the number of states are 
different. This is discussed in more detail in Chapters 7 and 8. 
It can be seen 
system operator 
from the above discussion that using these methods, the 
c a n  make a decision regarding the required operating 
capacity based on the calculated risk, the forecast load and the specified risk 
criterion. A survey described in Reference [51] and continuous discussion 
within the Canadian Electrical Association indicate that no Canadian utility 
actively uses probabilistic techniques to assess operating reserve 
requirements. The two most important reasons for this lack of use are 
difficulty in interpreting the risk index and the minimal system operating 
information contained in a single risk value. These difficulties can be 
alleviated by including accepted deterministic considerations in the 
probabilistic indices, as described in the next section. 
2.3 Classification of System Operating States 
The control objectives of a power system are related to the level of 
security, and as this level decreases below an acceptable value, preventive 
controls must be taken to  restore the system to a robust state. However, 
before such controls can be taken, the general system operating states should 
be recognized [85]. 
Overall power system performance can be divided into several operating 
states in terms of the degree to which reliability constraints are satisfied. A 
power system operating state Framework was presented in an EPRI report 
[52]. This h e w o r k  was modified in 1741 and is illustrated in Figure 2.1. 
The original definitions of the system operating states in [52] are related to 
security constraints in composite system reliability evaluation. The 
constraints are directly related to the purpose behind the study. Composite 
system security constraints are discussed in 1743. In HLI operating reserve 
assessment the constraints refer only t o  the generation and total load 
demand. The operating states are redefined in [60] to make them applicable 
to operating reserve assessment in HLI. The redefined states are as follows. 
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Figure 2.1: System operating state diagram. 
Normal 
The definition of the normal state is : 
In the normal state, the generation is adequate to supply the existing total 
load demand. In this state, there is sufftcient margin such that the loss of 
any generating units, specified by some criterion, will not result in load 
curtailment. The particular criterion, such as  the loss of  any single 
generating unit will depend on the planning and operating philosophy of 
the particular utility. 
The specified criterion used in the research described in this thesis is that 
the loss of any single unit can be tolerated. It can be seen from the above 
definition that in the normal state, the system not only has the ability to 
supply the load, but also has enough reserve such that the loss of any single 
unit will not result in load curtailment. The deterministic criterion embedded 
in the normal state definition can be changed to suit the particular utility 
operating philosophy. 
The definition of the alert state is : 
If a system enters a condition where the loss of generating capacity covered 
by the operating criteria will result in lard curtailment then the system is 
in  the alert state. The alert state is similar to the normal state in that the 
constraint is satisfied, but there is no longer sufficient margin to withstand 
some outages. The system can enter the alert state by the outage of 
generation unit($, or by growth in the system load. 
The definition of the emergency state is : 
If a contingency occurs or the load changes before a corrective action can be 
(or is) taken, the system will enter the emrgenq  state. There is no reserve 
margin and no load is curtailed in the emergency state. 
In this state, the operating capacity is exactly equal to the load. If control 
measures are not taken in time to restore the system to the alert state, the 
system will transfer from the emergency state to the extreme emergency 
state. 
The definition of the extreme emergency state is : 
In this state, the system constraint is violated and some portion of the 
system load is curtailed. 
The system operator should commit additional generation into service to 
transfer the system from the extreme emergency state to the normal or alert 
state and reconnect the curtailed load through the restorative state. 
For a given set of generating units and considering all possible 
contingencies: 
In (I), P, , Pa , P,, and P,, are the probabilities of the normal, alert, 
emergency and extreme emergency states, respectively. These probabilities 
can be calculated from the probabilities of the different contingencies. A 
contingency is defined as a combination of generating unit outages. Each 
contingency can be associated with one of the operating states. Once the 
probability of each contingency is calculated, the next step is to  determine 
which operating state it belongs to according to the different operating state 
definitions. 
2.4 Generating System Operating State Risk 
From the system operating state definitions discussed in the previous 
section, it can  be seen that no constraint is violated or  load curtailed in either 
the normal or the alert state. A system operating objective is therefore to 
operate the system with a high probability of being in these two states. The 
summation of the two probabilities of the normal and the alert states 
provides an assessment of the favorable conditions associated with the 
system. The complement of the sum of these two probabilities represents the 
unfavorable conditions and therefore constitutes the system risk. A risk index 
designated as the Generating System Operating State Risk (GSOSR) can be 
calculated using Equations 2.5(a) and 2.5(b). 
GSOSR = I -  Pn -Pa 
GSOSR = P,, + P, 
This risk index is identical to the unit commitment risk obtained in the 
PJM method and can be identified as the probability that the system will fail 
to meet the load o r  just be able to meet the load for a given lead time. The 
GSOSR is used in this chapter as the basic system risk criterion. 
2.5 System Well-being Model 
The concepts of the basic probabilistic method designated as the PJM 
method are illustrated in detail in Section 2.2.2.1. For a given load and set of 
committed units, system performance can be identified using this method as 
being in either the comfort or at risk domains. The system operating domains 
are shown in Figure 2.2. In the comfort domain the operating capacity is 
greater than the load, whereas in the risk domain it  is less than o r  equal to 
the load. In the PJM method there is no information o n  the  degree of system 
comfort. Unit commitment risk and its complementary value, i.e. probability 
of system comfort, are the only information available to the system operator. 
Deterministic criteria are easier for the system operator to understand than a 
risk index determined using only probabilistic techniques. In order to  
alleviate the difficulty in interpreting the risk index and provide more 
applicable information for the system operator, accepted deterministic 
considerations can be included in the probabilistic assessment. 
The main advantage of the proposed technique compared to the basic PJM 
method is that it combines deterministic considerations wi th  probabilistic 
indices to monitor the system well-being. This combination is achieved by 
recognizing that the system operating states created by incorporating the 
system deterministic criteria can be categorized as being healthy, marginal o r  
at risk [60]. These system operating divisions create the 
framework shown in Figure 2.2 and can be quantified 
system well-being 
using the system 
Comfort domain 
Figure 2.2: System operating domains. (a)PJM method, (b)Well-being model. 
operating state probabilities. In the context of system well-being, the term 
healthy, marginal and a t  risk are substituted for normal, alert, emergency 
and extreme emergency [60]. A system operates in the healthy (normal) state 
when it has enough margin to withstand the deterministic criterion, i.e. any 
single unit outage. In the marginal (alert) state the system no longer has 
sufficient margin that it can withstand outages in excess of the specified 
deterministic criterion. In the at risk (emergency and extreme emergency) 
state the system load is greater than or  equal to the operating capacity. The 
healthy and marginal states both reside in the comfort domain as shown in 
Figure 2.2 and indicate the degree of comfort. The risk domain is identical in 
both cases. The well-being framework is used throughout this thesis. 
It can be seen from the above definitions that the proposed technique 
provides more information to the power system operator than the basic PJM 
method. The proposed state classification not only informs the operator of the 
system risk but also provides information on the degree of system well-being 
based on the accepted deterministic criterion. This cannot be achieved using 
the basic PJM method. The system well-being is increased by scheduling or 
committing additional generating unit(s). If the system operates with a high 
probability in the marginal state, this is a warning to the system operator to 
start up additional unit(s) in order to push the system into the healthy state. 
Thls warning is not available in the basic PJM method because the individual 
probabilities of the healthy and marginal states cannot be recognized. 
2.6 Unit Commitment and Evaluation Procedure 
Once an operating criterion is adopted, the goal is to satisfy the criterion 
throughout the various stages of system operation. The operating criterion 
could be an acceptable level of risk, an acceptable probability of the healthy 
state o r  both, depending on the required level of reliability. As noted earlier, 
the system risk is identical to the risk evaluated by the PJM method. If unit 
commitment is performed using a specified risk then the number of 
committed units and the corresponding risk will be identical to those 
obtained by the basic PJM method, provided that the specified risk and all 
other system parameters are the same. The operating criterion might be to 
operate the system such that the probabilities of the healthy state and the 
system risk state are both at acceptable levels. In this case, units should fist 
be committed to satisfy the specified risk. The number of committed units 
may or may not meet the acceptable healthy state probability in which case 
additional unit(s) should be committed until the probability of the healthy 
state exceeds o r  equals the specified value. The required number of units 
therefore depends on the desired healthy state probability and the specified 
risk. The system health probability is an additional index which reflects the 
system well-being. The concept of satisfying multiple criteria provides a more 
comprehensive appraisal of the system well-being and therefore more comfort 
for the system operator who has to make the required decisions. 
2.7 Description of the IEEE Reliability Test System 
The single line diagram of the IEEE-RTS is shown in Figure 2.3. This 24 
bus system was established by an IEEE Task Force in 1979 [89]. It is a 
relatively large power system in which sufficient complexity and detail have 
been included to make the test system representative of an actual utility 
system. This system has 11 generator buses, 13 load buses, 33 transmission- 
lines and 5 transformers. The total number of generating units is 32, ranging 
from 12 MW to 400 MW. The total system generation is 3405 MW and the 
annual peak load is 2850 MW. The generation data and the system priority 
loading order for the IEEE-RTS are given in Table 2.1. 
2.8 Application to the IEEE Reliability Test System 
The concepts described in the previous sections have been applied to the 
IEEE-RTS. A unit commitment schedule has been developed using a seven 
step load model, assuming that the system lead time is four hours. 
Each generating unit is represented by a two-state model which includes 
an operating state and a failed state [3]. The repair process is not considered 
in determining the time dependent availabilities and unavailabilities of the 
generating units. Applying this approximation, the probability of the unit 
failing during a short interval of time T is Dl: 
Figure 2.3: Single line diagram of the IEEE-RTS. 
Table 2.1: Generating unit data for the IEEE-RTS. 
Priority Unit Failure Connected 
loading size rate at 
order Bus 
E l L T < < l ,  
P t  down) = hT =Outage Replacement Rate =O.R.R 
Table 2.2 shows the required number of committed units and the 
corresponding probabilities of the different operating states when a specified 
risk of 0.01 is selected as the unit commitment criterion. It can be seen that 
the healthy state probability is zero for some load levels. The reason for this 
is that the system with the designated number of committed units and at the 
corresponding load level does not have suflicient spinning reserve to tolerate 
specific single unit outages. If an acceptable level of healthy state probability 
Table 2.2: Unit commitment at a specitied risk of 0.0 1. 
Load level I No. of I Probability of 
is required then the number of committed units must be increased. Table 2.3 
shows the number of committed units and system operating state 
probabilities when the system is required to satisfy both a specified risk and 
a specified healthy state probability. The selection of specific values for the 
healthy state probability (e.g. 0.9) and risk (e-g. 0.01) depends on the desired 
degree of system well-being and the conditions under which the system is 
being operated. Assuming that the risk should be less than or equal to 0.01 
and the probability of the system being in the healthy state should be greater 
Table 2.3: Unit commitment at a specified risk of 0.01 and a desired 
healthy state probability of 0.9. 
Load level I No. of I Probability of 
CMW] I units I Health Risk 
than o r  equal to 0.9, it can be seen from Table 2.3 that the system should 
commit more units in addition to the previously committed units to satisfy 
both criteria. In this study, the required number of units is dominated by the 
desired level of healthy state probability rather than the specified risk. If a 
single specified risk of 0.001 is selected as the criterion for unit commitment. 
the results will be the same as those given in Table 2.3. If a sufficiently low 
risk value is selected as the operating criterion, i t  then drives the unit 
commitment process and in doing so creates an acceptable healthy state 
probability. This is a general observation and actual d u e s  for any specific 
systzm can only be obtained by detailed analysis. 
It should be appreciated that the probabilities of the healthy and marginal 
states cannot be calculated using a capacity outage probability table and 
therefore the computing time required for this method is more than that 
needed for the basic PJM method. In order to reduce the CPU time, the 
required number of generating units for a specified risk is first determined 
using a capacity outage table. The system operating state probabilities are 
then calculated for the committed units by classifying contingency states, as 
explained earlier. If a specified healthy state probability is not satisfied, it is 
obtained in a second step by adding further generating units. 
The required number of units and the probabilities associated with the 
system operating states depend on many factors such as system lead time, 
system load, generating unit failure rates and the acceptable risk level [60]. 
System lead time is one of the most important factors in the assessment of 
unit commitment. In the results presented in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 , it is 
assumed that the system lead time is fixed at 4 hours. The number of 
committed units, system operating state probabilities and corresponding risk 
for a load level of 1995 iMW, i.e. 70% of the peak load of 2850 MW, are shown 
in Table 2.4. The system lead time was varied fiom 0.5 hour to 15 hours and 
the unit commitment made using a specified risk value of 0.001. In actual 
practice, the load will not remain constant at the specified level and units will 
be added and removed to meet the forecast demand [3]. The number of 
committed units for this range of lead times varies from 13 to 15. With this 
commitment schedule, the system is not only able to satisfy the specified risk 
of 0.001 but also satisfies a healthy state probability of 0.9 even though this 
value was not used as a unit commitment criterion. 
Table 2.4: Unit commitment and system operating state probabilities 
2.9 Conclusions 
for m e r e n t  lead times. 
An approach to operating reserve assessment is illustrated in this chapter 
using system operating states. The state definitions permit the inclusion of 
the deterministic criteria used by most operating utilities. Operating system 
health, margin and risk are designated and defined using the system 
operating states. The technique provides the opportunity for the system 
operator to quantify the degree of system well-being in addition to the system 
Lead time 
Chr 1 
0.5 
1 
L 
2 
3 
b 
4 
5 
10 
I 
15 
No. of 
Units 
13 
13 
13 
13 
13 
13 
14 
15 
Probability of 
Risk 
0.00000573 
0.00002288 
0.00009123 
0.00020458 
0.00036247 
0.00056446 
0.00084793 
0.00072963 
Health 
0.99451896 
0.98906549 
0.97824074 
0.96752474 
0.95691649 
0.94641501 
0.94158662 
0.95496327 
Margin 
0.00547531 
0.0 1091 162 
0.02166803 
0.03227069 
0.04272104 
0.05302054 
0.05756545 
0.04430710 
risk. This quantification cannot be achieved using the basic PJM method. The 
conventional risk index is designated as the GSOSR and defined as the 
probability of residing in an undesirable system operating state. Generating 
units can be committed to the system at  a particular load level in order to 
satisfy a specified risk or a specified probability of the system being in the 
healthy state. The application of the proposed technique is illustrated using 
the IEEE-RTS. The study results presented illustrate the effect of variations 
in the operating criteria and the system lead time on the required number of 
units and system operating state probabilities. 
Operating reserve evaluation involves two distinctly different aspects of 
unit commitment, in which the system operator decides which units and how 
many should be committed to satisfy the operating criteria and the dispatch 
decisions regarding those units that have been committed [3]. Both sets of 
studies are necessary to obtain a complete picture of operating reserve 
assessment, i.e. these studies complement rather than substitute for each 
other. The second aspect is discussed in the next two chapters. 
3. SPINNING RESERVE ALLOCATION USING 
RESPONSE HEALTH ANALYSIS 
3.1 Introduction 
Operating reserve provides an electric power system with the ability to 
respond to unforeseen load changes and sudden generation outages and a 
wide range of techniques have been used to determine operating reserve 
requirements. Operating reserve evaluation involves two distinctly different 
aspects. The first is unit commitment, in which the system operator decides 
which units should be committed to satisfy the operating criteria. The second 
aspect is associated with unit dispatch decisions and the evaluation of 
response capability of the committed units [3]. Both aspects are necessary to 
obtain a complete appraisal of the operating reserve requirement, i.e. these 
activities complement rather than substitute for each other. The probabilistic 
technique developed for unit commitment and assessment of generating 
system operating health, margin and risk in 1601 is briefly discussed in 
Chapter 2. The operating state probabilities are calculated in this approach 
based on the total amount of spinning reserve in the system, where spinning 
reserve is defined as the difference between the total operating capacity and 
the system load. The utility of this reserve depends on  many factors of which 
the response rate of the committed units and the location of the spinning 
reserve are the most important [go]. An assigned amount of the spinning 
reserve must be available within a given period of time in 
sudden loss of generating capacity, unforeseen changes in the 
the event of a 
system load or 
any other contingency which results in loss of capacity [55,91-1001. Most 
utilities use a fixed percentage of their spinning reserve as  the required 
response within a specified period of time. This percentage and the time 
period varies fkom system to system [51]. 
The operating state fkamework proposed in [52] was examined in [60] for 
application to unit commitment in a generating system and is discussed in 
Chapter 2. This framework is further modified and redefined in this chapter 
to evaluate the response capability of a generating system within a given 
period of time and is referred t o  as the response state framework. A risk 
index designated as the Generating System Response State Risk (GSRSR) is 
used as the criterion for loading the committed units. This chapter illustrates 
the evaluation of the degree of system well-being in responding capability of 
the committed units. The overall well-being of a generation system in terms 
of its responding capability is identified as being healthy, marginal and at 
risk. Once the number of committed units is determined, the spinning reserve 
should be allocated among the committed units to satisfy the response 
criterion. This criterion could be a specified GSRSR, an acceptable response 
health probability or both [loll. The operating cost, however, varies with 
different response criteria. An algorithm is developed in this chapter to 
determine the required number of units and optimal load dispatch of the 
committed units based on the unit commitment and response criteria. The 
developed concepts are illustrated in this chapter by application to the IEEE- 
RTS . 
3.2 Spinning Reserve Allocation in a Power System 
Unit commitment involves determining which units should operate in 
order to supply a particular load level while satisfying a stated operating 
criterion as discussed in Chapter 2. The question that is not answered in this 
analysis is as follows: Given that there are a number of subsets of the power 
outputs of a complete set of N committed generating units which would 
satisfy the unit commitment criteria, which of these subsets should be used in 
order to provide the minimum operating cost as well as an acceptable level of 
reliability. In other words, the unit commitment analysis does not indicate 
how these committed units should be dispatched, i.e. which unit and how 
much of each unit should generate power or be held as spinning reserve. It 
is, therefore, obvious that the difference between the operating capacity and 
the load is not a valid indicator of the ability of the system to respond to a 
loss of capacity. 
Spinning reserve represents the unloaded generating capacity of a unit 
and in unit commitment assessment it is defined as reserve which is 
synchronized and immediately ready to pick up load [3]. Unit commitment is 
based o n  this assumption and the system health, margin and risk 
probabilities are directly related to the amount of spinning reserve. In a 
practical power system, the reserve cannot be utilized instantaneously and is 
restricted by the ramp rate characteristics of the committed generating units. 
A system may have a large amount of spinning reserve at a particular 
generatiodoad condition but the actual responding capability may be quite 
inadequate for reliable system operation. An assigned amount of spinning 
reserve must be available within a given time period to provide protection in 
the event of a sudden loss of generating capacity, an unanticipated load 
change or any other power system disturbance. This time period is referred to 
as the margin time (MT) and its actual value may vary from system to 
system. The margin time is defined as the time required t o  make necessary 
changes in generating unit output. The available generation change that can 
be achieved within a margin time is known as the regulating margin 1581. 
The margin time and the regulating margin are the two most important 
parameters in evaluating the response capability of a generation system. 
Different utilities have different policies regarding the amount of required 
responsive reserve and the margin time. Table 3.1 shows the load pickup 
periods and the associated required regulating margin (RRM), as a percent of 
operating reserve, employed by some Canadian electric power utilities. This 
summary is based on surveys conducted by the CEA Power System 
Reliability Subsection [5 11. 
Table 3.1: Utility margin times and required regulating margins. 
AIS: Alberta Interconnected System, 
HQ: Hydro-Quebec, 
N.B.P: The New Brunswick Electric Power Commission, 
OH: Ontario Hydro, 
RRM: Required Regulating Margin as a percent of operating reserve. 
3.3 Response Model Description 
The operating state framework proposed in [52] is modified and examined 
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commitment assessment, the security constraint is that the total maximum 
capacity of the committed units must be greater than the system load. The 
state definitions based on unit commitment are given in Chapter 2. In the 
assessment of response capability, the constraint is that the total available 
response capacity of the committed units within a certain margin time must 
be greater than the required regulating margin. The definitions of the system 
response healthy, marginal and risk states are as follows. 
The definition of the healthy state is : 
In the healthy s i ~ t e ,  the spinning reserve is allocated among the committed 
generators such that the available responding capacity is  adequate to 
satisfy the response requirements within the margin time. h this state 
there is sufficient response capability such that the loss of any generating 
units, specified by some operating criteria, can be responded to within the 
margin time, without requiring load curtailment or committing additional 
unit($. 
The particular criterion such as the loss of any single generating unit and 
also the amount of required regulating margin will depend on the operating 
philosophy of the particular utility. The required regulating margin within 
the margin time varies from system to system and may be a certain 
percentage of the spinning reserve. 
The definition of the marginal state is : 
The marginal state is similar to the healthy state i n  that the required 
regulating margin is  met, but there is no longer suficient response capacity 
to pick up  the curtailed loud due to the loss of  some single generating unit 
outages. The system can transfer to the healthy state by making the 
necessary changes in  the load dispatch or by starting u p  additional unit($. 
The definition of the risk state is : 
Restorative 
=52%? 
4 Healthy 
+ 
Marginal ii 
Figure 3.1: Diagram of (a)system response states, (b)system 
response well-being. 
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If a contingency occurs or the load changes before a corrective action can 
be(is) taken, the system will enter the risk state. In this state, the amount of 
responding generation is equal or less than the required regulating margin. 
If control measures such as  changes in the load dispatch or starting up  
additional unit(s) are taken the system will be restored to the marginal 
state. 
'* 
It can be seen from the state definitions that the security constraints are 
within limits in both the healthy and marginal states. The response state 
probabilities are calculated using contingency enumeration of the committed 
units. A contingency is defined as a combination of generating unit outages. 
Considering all contingencies, 
where Pi, Ph and P,' are the probabilities of the response healthy, marginal 
and at risk states, respectively. The Generating System Response State Risk 
(GSRSR) is defined as shown in Equation (3.2): 
The system operating objective should be to operate the system with high 
probability of being in either the healthy or marginal state from both a unit 
commitment and a response point of view. A system a t  a particular load level 
with a high unit commitment healthy state probability, may not have a high 
response healthy state probability depending on how the spinning reserve is 
allocated. Such a system does, however, have the potential ability to have a 
high response healthy state probability depending on the margin time. 
Having a high marginal state probability is a ~ivaming to the system operator 
to adjust unit loadings to transfer the system from the marginal to the 
response healthy state. 
3.4 Load Dispatch With Response Criterion 
The load dispatch task is to assign the system demand to the committed 
generating units. Starting from an economic load dispatch [25], the unit 
loadings are adjusted by moving in the direction required to  satisfy the 
response criterion. This criterion could be a specified GSRSR, an acceptable 
response health probability or both. The load dispatch for which the response 
criterion is satisfied is referred to as the optimum load dispatch. The selection 
of the specified GSRSR and response health probability depends on the 
system operating philosophy, the desired level of reliability, the 
comesponding cost and the optimum benefit. 
The system response state probabilities can be calculated by simulating 
all possible contingencies for the set of committed units. Each contingency 
event causes the system to reside in one of the response states based on the 
accepted definitions. Out of the total possible contingencies, most of them 
cause the system to be in the risk state and only a few are associated with the 
healthy and marginal states. Evaluation can require a considerable 
computation time particularly for systems with a large number of committed 
units. In order to overcome this difficulty, the GSRSR is first determined for 
each load dispatch using a capacity outage probability table (COPT). The 
COPT is obtained by combining all the committed units. The unit capacity Ci 
is given in Equation 3.3. 
where 
A& = M ~ ~ [ ( G ~ - ~ ) , R c ~ ]  , and 
RCi = R R , x M T .  
Li Loading of unit i in the considered load dispatch, 
Gi Maximum capacity of unit i , 
R e  Response rate of unit i , 
A& Actual response output of the ith unit in MW, 
RCi Response capability of the ith unit in MW. 
Each unit is represented by a two-state model as shown in Figure 3.2. 
This is the simplest possible generating unit model and assumes that the unit 
resides in either the up state or the down state. The parameter h (failure 
rate) is the state transition rate from the up state to the down state. The 
GSRSR for n committed units and a t  a margin time of MT can be expressed 
as; 
Figure 3.2: Simplified two-state model used in operating reserve evaluation. 
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Where, 
NC = 2" Total number of possible contingencies for n two-state model 
units and 
Pj  (MT) Probability of contingency j occurring at margin time of MT , 
(0 when L o a d + R R M < C M i  
.I 
1 when Load + RRM 2 CAP; 
Where RRM is the required regulating margin and CAPj is the total capacity 
available with contingency j. For  contingency j ,  where m units are in 
service and n - m units are out of service, CAPj is calculated using Equation 
By arranging the COPT in descending order, i.e. C q  > C q + I  for 
j = 1 ,2 ,  .. . , NC - I, Equation 3.6 is modified as: 
Where k is an integer such that CAPk-I > LOAD + RRM 5 CAPk. If ARR is 
the acceptable response risk, then the GSRSR should be such that; 
GSRSR c ARR. (3.10) 
If the GSRSR is not satisfied, the load dispatch must be adjusted. The &st 
step in reloading the units is to divide the dispatched units into three groups 
in which their spinning reserve (Gi -&) is equal, less than or greater than 
their response capability ( RCi) as expressed below [102,103]. 
Gi - Li = RCi Group I 
G j - L j  c RCj Group II 
Gk - Lk > RCk Group III 
The goal here is to increase the actual response output of those units 
whose spinning reserves are more than their response capabilities. In order 
to achieve this goal, the unit in Group II whose incremental running cost is 
the highest and the unit in Group 111 whose incremental running cost is the 
lowest must be identfied. Once these two units are found, an incremental 
load is taken away from the unit in Group II and given to the unit in Group 
111. The incremental running cost can be obtained using a basic economic 
dispatch formulation. The simplified cost model of the & unit Fi is expressed 
[104,105] as shown in Equation 3.12 where Pi is the power output and 4, Bi 
and Ci are the cost parameters of the i f i  unit. 
The total fuel cost F, before reloading the units is given by Equation 3.13. 
The incremental running cost of unit k for an increasing load of hP and 
that of unit j for a decreasing load of AP are shown in Equations 3.14 and 
3.15 respectively. 
This procedure is continued until the GSRSR is satisfied. Once the GSRSR 
is satisfied, the system response health and margin probabilities are 
calculated by considering each contingency individually. Each contingency 
must be evaluated to determine which response state it belongs to according 
to the different response state definitions. For the case of multiple response 
criteria, adjustments of the unit loadings must be continued until a specified 
response health probability is satisfied. The reserve in the system can be in 
the form of spinning reserve, stand-by reserve, interruptible load or  
assistance from interconnected systems. In the above procedure, the reserve 
in the system is considered to be in the form of spinning reserve. The method 
c a n  also be extended to include stand-by equipment and other types of 
reserve. The proposed approach is summarized in the flowchart shown in 
Figure 3.3. In some cases, a system cannot satisfy the response criteria even 
after adjusting the units. In these cases, the procedure can be continued by 
committing one more unit as shown by the dashed lines in the flowchart. 
3.5 Application to the IEEE Reliability Test System 
The concepts developed in the previous sections have been applied to the 
EEE-RTS. The generating unit data and the associated cost parameters are 
shown in Table 3.2. The basic results for unit commitment in the IEEE-RTS 
Table 3.2: Generation unit and cost data for the TEEE-RTS. 
Priority Pmax. 
a 
*RR= Response f: 
- 
Pmin. RR* k . Cost parameter 
Eryr A I B I C 
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read all units data F5 
I 
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I I 
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, 1 I 
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Figure 3.3. Flowchart of unit commitment and response health analysis. 
are given in Chapter 2. In these studies, two different cases are considered in 
which the required number of committed units for single or  multiple criteria 
are determined. 
3.5.1 Basic Results 
Consider that unit commitment is done for the IEEE-RTS at a load level of 
70% of the peak load of 2850 MW, i.e. 1995 MW. The system lead time is 
assumed to be 4 hours and a specified risk of 0.01 is selected as the unit 
commitment criterion. The number of committed units is 13 and the system 
operating health, margin and risk probabilities are 0.95691649, 0.04272104 
and 0.00036247 respectively. The total spinning reserve is 411 MW. The 
system with this number of committed units has a high healthy state 
probability based on a unit commitment point of view. It may or  may not be 
in the healthy state in terms of system responding capability as that is 
extremely dependent on how the spinning reserve is distributed among the 
committed units. Only 240 MW of the total 411 MW spinning reserve is 
available within a margin time of 10 minutes based on the economic load 
dispatch for which the total operating cost is $19381.l/hr. Using the 
procedure described in the previous section, the generating units are reloaded 
to provide more response capability. A discrete load change of 1 M W  was used 
to obtain the loading schedules. The response capability, therefore, changes 
with each step of 1 MW. The results are more accurate when a small discrete 
load change is used than when a large value is used. The computation time, 
however, increases when the reloading incremental value is decreased. The 
variation in power outputs of the committed units and the total operating cost 
versus the system response are shown in Figure 3.4. The first 6 units are at 
their maximum capacity. Their outputs do not change through the reloading 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
units 11,12 and 13 ! 
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Figure 3.4: Unit outputs and operating cost versus response. 
steps and are not shown in Figure 3.4. The operating costs of these units, 
however, are included in the total operating cost. The system response 
health, margin and risk probabilities were calculated using the developed 
procedure. 
Consider a required regulating margin of 40% of the spinning reserve, i.e. 
164 MW, and an acceptable GSRSR of 0.001. For the case of economic load 
dispatch, the system response risk is 0.0014943 which is greater than 0.001. 
In order to satisfy the acceptable GSRSR of 0.001, the system requires that a 
response output of 320 MW become available within the margin time of 10 
minutes. Figure 3.4 shows a vertical line at a response output of 320 MW and 
the optimum load dispatch for this condition. Under these circumstances, the 
system response health, margin and risk probabilities are 0.0, 0.999026 and 
0.000974 respectively. All different load dispatches on the right hand side of 
this line meet the response criterion but this point has the cheapest cost, i.e. 
$20,133.9. The second vertical line is the optimum load dispatch if the system 
is required to satisfy a specified response healthy state probability of 0.9 in 
addition to satisfying an acceptable response risk of 0.001. At this load 
dispatch, the total response output is 401 MW and the system operating cost 
is $20,929.3. The system response health, margin and risk probabilities 
under this condition are 0.99816992, 0.00138165 and 0.00044844 
respectively. This system could have a total response output of 411 MW 
within the margin time, but the system operating cost would increase to 
$21,030.3/hr. 
Table 3.3 shows the response health, margin and risk probabilities for 
seven load steps of the IEEE-RTS at the economic load dispatch obtained by 
dynamic programming. The unit commitment has been done such that the 
system with the designated number of committed units and for the 
Table 3.3: Response indices for economic load dispatch. 
RRM I SR I Probi bility of re: 
Maren 
ponse 
GSRSR MW MW I Health 
I 
corresponding load level satisfies the unit commitment healthy state 
probability of 0.9 in addition to satisfying a specified risk of 0.001. The 
required regulating margin (RRM) is assumed to be the integer value of 408 
of the spinning reserve (SR) at each load level and the margin time is 10 
minutes. From the results shown in Table 3.3, it can be seen that the system 
has high response risk at  some load levels due to inadequate response 
capacity. The spinning reserve has to be allocated among the committed units 
to provide more response within the margin time. Table 3.4 shows the 
response indices when the system with the designated number of committed 
un i t s  and at the corresponding load level has to satisfy an acceptable GSRSR 
of 0.001. The results show that the response healthy state probability is zero 
for all load levels even though the spinning reserve provides a unit 
commitment healthy state probability in excess of 0.9 for all load levels (Table 
2.3). The reason for this is that the system with the available regulating 
margin (RlM) cannot respond within the margin time to certain specific single 
unit outages. Most of the spinning reserve is allocated among the thermal 
units which have lower response rates. The hydro units which have higher 
response outputs are almost fully loaded. The economic reallocation of the 
Table 3.4: Response indices with single criterion. 
h a d  No. of RRM SR Probability of response RM. 
MW u n i t s  MW MW ' Health M a ~ g i n  1 GSRSR MW 
generating units in order to maintain a sufficient responsive reserve margin 
can be done using the procedure explained in the previous section. 
Table 3.5 shows the results when the system is required to satisfy an 
acceptable response healthy state probability of 0.9 in addition to satisfying 
an acceptable response risk of 0.001. The margin time is assumed to be 10 
minutes. The available response capability is higher when the system must 
satisfy multiple criteria than when the system is required to satisfy only a 
single risk criterion as shown in Figure 3.5. The system operating cost also 
increases as illustrated in Figure 3.5. It should be noted that the system 
cannot satisfy an acceptable response health probability of 0.9 at the load 
level of 1140 MW with 8 units. Only 350 M W  of the total spinning reserve of 
407 MW is available within 10 minutes. This is the maximum available 
response within the margin time and cannot be increased by adjusting the 
units. One more unit must be committed, and with 9 units the response 
criteria are satisfied. It should also be noted that if the number of committed 
units are such that the system has a high margin state probability based on 
unit commitment, it can never have a high response healthy state probability 
because of insufficient spinning reserve. Having a high response margin state 
probability is a warning to system operators to adjust the unit loadings to 
provide more response capability and push the system to the response 
healthy state. The available response capability is higher when the system 
should satisfy multiple criteria than when the system is required to satisfy 
only a single risk criterion. The system health probability is an additional 
index which reflects the system well-being. The idea of satisfying multiple 
criteria gives more information to the system operator and a more physical 
approach to unit commitment and load dispatch [60,101]. 
Table 3.5: Response indices with multiple criteria. 
Tables 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8 show the individual unit loadings for the three load 
dispatch cases. The regulating margin and the total operating cost for each 
case are shown in Figure 3.5. It should be noted that the unit commitment 
health, margin and risk probabilities are identical for all three cases. The 
required number of steps to reload from the optimum economic load dispatch 
and the system response health, margin and risk probabilities depend on 
many factors such as the number of committed units, the unit response rates, 
the unit failure rates, the required regulating margin, the margin time and 
the load forecast uncertainty. The effects of some of these 
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Figure 3.5: Variation in regulating margin and system operating cost. 
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factors on the GSRSR, the system operating well-being and the operating cost 
are illustrated in the following subsections. 
3.5.2 Effect of Required Regulating Margin 
Regulating margin (RM) is the available response output of the committed 
units for a given dispatch within a certain margin time. The required 
regulating margin (RRM) is usually expressed as  a percent of the total 
operating reserve and varies from system to system. In the studies presented 
in this section, the margin time is fixed at 10 minutes and the RRM varies 
from 10% to 60% of the total spinning reserve. Table 3.9 presents the 
response indices associated with the economic load dispatch of 13 units at the 
load level of 1995 MW. The GSRSR increases as the RRM increases and 
varies from 0.00044843 to 1 as the RRM is increased from 10% to 60% of the 
total spinning reserve of 411 MW. A specified GSRSR of 0.001 can be satisfied 
at the economic load dispatch if the RRM is less than 20% of the spinning 
reserve. 
Table 3.9: Response indices for various RRM. 
3.5.3 Effect of Margin Time 
The margin time is one of the most important factors which influence the 
system response well-being. Consider a system peak load of 1995 MW and 13 
committed units. The required regulating margin is assumed to be 40% of the 
system spinning reserve, i.e. 163 MW. The load dispatch has to  be such that a 
specified GSRSR of 0.001 and an acceptable response health probability of 0.9 
must be satisfied. The response health, margin and risk probabilities are 
calculated for various margin times and are presented in Figure 3.6. It can be 
seen from the results that the response health probability decreases as the 
margin time increases. The response margin and risk probabilities, however, 
increase as the margin time increases. The optimum Ioad dispatch varies for 
different margin times. Table 3.10 shows the load dispatch for the three 
margin times of 5, 10 and 15 minutes. The operating cost is calculated using 
Equation 3.12 . 
The operating cost decreases as the margin time increases as illustrated 
in Figure 3.7. The reason for thls is that for small margin times most of the 
response is provided by the hydro units which are cheaper and have higher 
response rates. For larger margin times, the response output is mostly 
provided by slow responding expensive units and the lower cost hydro units 
are more fully loaded. 
Table 3.10: Load dispatch for different margin times. 
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Figure 3.6: Response health, margin and risk probabilities versus margin 
time. 
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Figure 3.7: Operating cost versus margin time. 
3.5.4 Effect of Load Forecast Uncertainty 
Operating reserve assessment in a power system is normally based on an 
advance estimate of the hourly load variation within a short period of time. 
The prediction of future load is normally done on the basis of past data and 
weather forecasts. A certain degree of uncertainty exists between the forecast 
and the actual load due to the random nature of system loads, the non-linear 
relationship between the load and weather changes and inaccuracies in 
weather forecasting. Load forecast uncertainty can be reasonably 
approximated by a normal distribution 131. The mean of the distribution is 
the forecast load. For computational simplicity, the normal distribution can 
be discretised into several class intervals. The probability associated with a 
class interval can be assigned to the load representing the class interval mid- 
point. In the studies presented in this paper a seven-step approximation of a 
normal distribution is used as shown in Figure 3.8. 
Number of standard deviations from the mean 
Figure 3.8: Seven step approximation of the normal distribution. 
The effects of load forecast uncertainty on the unit commitment health, 
margin and risk probabilities are illustrated in [60]. The effects of load 
forecast uncertainty on the response health, margin and risk probabilities 
can be obtained using the following procedure. The number of committed 
units are  determined, following which the economic load dispatch is done for 
each load step of the seven-step approximation. The response health, margin 
and risk probabilities are calculated for each load step. The economic 
reallocation of generating units to maintain an adequate response reserve 
while satisfying an acceptable response health and risk probabilities is done 
for each load step. For a given forecast load, the equivalent response health 
and risk must be acceptable. The equivalent response health, margin, risk 
probabilities and the expected operating cost are calculated using the 
following equations. 
where, 
Equivalent response healthy state probability, 
Eequivalent marginal state probability, 
Equivalent response risk probability, 
Probability of the ith load step in the normal distribution, 
Expected operating cost in $, 
Expected Regulating Margin in MW, 
Expected output of the jth unit, 
Expected load demand, 
Number of steps in the normal distribution, 
Number of committed units, 
Regulating margin of the ith step. 
Table 3.11 shows the response indices for a forecast load of 1995 MW 
when load forecast uncertainty (LFU) is included. An additional unit to that 
shown in Table 2.3 must be committed to the system when the forecast load 
has a standard deviation of 4% of the forecast mean. The system with 14 
committed units and at the load level of 1995 M W  can satisfy a specified unit 
commitment risk of 0.001 and an acceptable healthy state probability of 0.9 
[60]. The spinning reserve is allocated among the committed units using the 
above procedure such that a specified response risk of 0.001 and an 
acceptable response healthy state probability of 0.9 are satisfied. The 
Required Regulating Margin (RRM) is assumed to be 40% of the spinning 
reserve. 
Table 3.11:System response indices for a load level of 1995 MW and a 
margin time of 10 minutes. 
[NO. of1 Load I Prob. of 
SD level 1 load level 
I Index including LFU 
SD = Standard Deviati 
Cost 
[$I 
16905.86 
17743.01 
ponse 
Risk 
Table 3.12 shows the response indices for a seven step load model of the 
IEEE-RTS. The system, with the number of committed units and at  the 
corresponding load level, can satisfy a spetified unit commitment risk of 
0.001 and an acceptable healthy state probability of 0.9 [60].In comparison 
with the results shown in Table 3.5 it can be seen that the required number 
of committed units increases at some load levels when including load forecast 
uncertainty. The response healthy state probability decreases at each load 
level, given that the number of committed units are the same [106]. The 
response risk, however, increases by including load forecast uncertainty. 
Table 3.1 2: Response indices including load forecast uncertainty. 
No. of 
units Risk 
3.6 Conclusions 
This chapter illustrates a technique developed to determine the optimum 
load dispatch for a set of committed generating units. The concepts of unit 
commitment health, margin and risk proposed in [60] are extended in this 
chapter to include the response capability of the committed units. A risk 
index designated as the GSRSR is defined as the load dispatch criterion. The 
dispatch should be such that specified system response criteria are satisfied. 
An algorithm is described in this chapter to  determine the unit commitment 
and optimum dispatch of the committed units based on the specified 
commitment and response criteria. The results show that if a system has a 
high unit commitment healthy state probability it also has the potential to 
have a high response healthy state probability. This, however, depends upon 
the margin time, the response rate of the units and how the spinning reserve 
is allocated among the committed units. 
The ability of a system to respond to sudden changes and pick up load 
depends on the type of units within the system. Interruptible load can also be 
considered as part of response reserve. The effects on the response health, 
margin and risk probabilities of factors such as stand-by units, interruptible 
load and postponable outages are illustrated and presented in the next 
chapter. 
4. RESPONSE EIEALTH CONSTRAINTS IN 
ECONOMIC LOAD DISPATCH CONSIDERING 
STAND-BY UNITS, INTERRUPTIBLE LOADS AND 
POSTPONABLE OUTAGES 
4.1. Introduction 
Adequate operating reserve is required in an electric power system in 
order to maintain a desired level of reliability through a given period of time 
[3]. The overall operating reserve can be generally categorized into two 
classes of unit reserve and system resenre. Generating unit operating reserve 
may be in the form of synchronized or non-synchronized units such as rapid 
start facilities. Synchronized and non-synchronized reserve are also referred 
to as spinning and stand-by reserve. Some utilities include in system reserve 
elements such as under frequency relaying, load shedding and interruptible 
load. System reserve is not as common among utilities as unit reserve. 
As previously noted in Chapter 3, operating reserve assessment involves 
studies of both the unit commitment and dispatch of the committed units. 
These two aspects are conceptually different and deal with different 
reliability issues. A basic framework for unit commitment was proposed in 
[60] which focuses on the degree of system well-being, in the form of unit 
commitment heaIth and margin, in addition to the more conventional 
analysis of risk. This technique was extended in [61] to incorporate stand-by 
equipment, interruptible load and postponable outages. On the basis of this 
technique, a system with high healthy s t a t e  probability has  sufficient 
spinning reserve to tolerate any single unit outage. 
The basic concepts of response health, margin and risk are presented in 
Chapter 3 in which it  was assumed that the response is provided only by the 
spinning units. Reliable power system operation requires that the  system 
generation has  high healthy state probabilities for both unit commitment and 
response requirements. The Load dispatch should be such tha t  the  system 
should have sufficient response within a certain margin time to withstand 
system disturbances. The ability of a system to respond to sudden changes 
and pick up load depends on its unit types [107]. Thermal units can pick up 1- 
3% of their full output capacity in one minute. Hydro units can normally pick 
up load up to 30% of their full output capacity in approximately one minute. 
Rapid start gas turbine units can also pick up  load in a very short period of 
time and the lead time associated with starting, synchronizing and loading 
these units could be in the order of five minutes. Rapid s tar t  units, therefore, 
can participate i n  the response health, margin and risk constrained load 
dispatch if their lead time is less than the specified margin time. A procedure 
is illustrated in this chapter to determine how far  the acceptable load 
dispatch must  be from the  economic load dispatch in  order to  satisfy the 
response requirement. The effects on the response health, margin and risk 
probabilities of factors such as stand-by units, interruptible load, postponable 
outages and margin time are illustrated and presented in  this chapter. 
4.2 Overall Philosophy of Operating Health, Margin and Risk 
As previously noted, operating health analysis involves the  two different 
phases of unit commitment and response health analysis. The concept of unit 
commitment health, margin and risk are illustrated in Chapter 2 where the 
system performance is identified as being in either the comfort or at risk 
domains. The comfort domain consists of the healthy and marginal zones. In 
the healthy zone, a system has sufficient spinning reserve and is well 
removed from the risk zone and is relatively safe. A system with inadequate 
spinning reserve is in the marginal zone, in which the outage of a specific 
single unit will result in load curtailment or entrance into the risk zone. 
A complete picture of operating health (H), margin (MI and risk (R) is 
shown in Figure 4.1 where the comfort zone is divided into areas HlH2, 
HlM2, M1M2 and M1H2 in which unit commitment and response are 
designated by 1 and 2 respectively. The risk zone consists of the three areas 
HlR2, M1R2 and R1R2. Two different cases are examined in order to make 
Figure 4.1 more understandable. 
Unit Commitment 
1 I Does not exist 
1 
Figure 4.1: Complete picture of operating health analysis 
- 
-.--------- 
Does not exist 
4.2.1 Reserve in the System is Ody Spinning R e ~ e ~ e  
Spinning reserve is the rotating capacity in excess of the system load 
which is synchronized and immediately available to take up load [3]. In area 
HlH2, the system not only has sufficient spinning reserve but is also capable 
of responding to the loss of any single dispatched unit within a certain 
margin time. This is the safest area and the system operating objective is to 
operate the system with a high probability of being in this area. The system 
does not have adequate response capability in area HIM2 even though the 
amount of spinning reserve is identical to that of the HlH2 area. Having a 
high probability of being in this area is a warning to the system operator to 
make the necessary changes to the unit loadings and to transfer the system 
to the H1H2 area. In area MlM2, the spinning reserve is insufficient to 
produce a suitable response. The system can never come to the M1H2 area if 
the reserve in  the system is only spinning reserve. 
4.2.2 Including Stand-by Units and Interruptible Loads 
Unit commitment health, margin and risk analysis including stand-by 
units and interruptible loads are considered in [61]. Reference 61 notes that 
stand-by units and interruptible loads cannot transfer the system to the 
healthy state if it is initially in the marginal state. These units, however, can 
increase the response capability of the generating system and move the 
system to the response healthy state from the marginal state provided that 
their lead time is less than the margin time. The system can transfer from 
HIM2 and M1M2 to H1H2 and M1H2 respectively by including rapid start 
units and interruptible loads; The area M1H2 can exist if stand-by units and 
interruptible loads are part of the operating reserve. 
4.3 ModeIing of Stand-by Units 
4.3.1 Rapid-start Unit Model 
One of the most important requirements in a meaningful quantitative 
reliability evaluation is correct modeling of the basic system components 
[108-1101. In the basic two-state model presented in Section 3.4, it is assumed 
that once a unit is called for senrice, the probability of failing to come into 
operation is zero. This is not generally true in the case of rapid start units 
and therefore the possibility of their failure to start must be included. A 
convenient and practical model [19,111] for a rapid start unit is shown in 
Figure 4.2. The various transition rates can be obtained from the number of 
transitions between the states divided by the residence times in the various 
states [112]. 
Fail to Start Failed 
" 12 
Ready for Senrice In Service 
Figure 4.2: Four-state model for rapid start units. 
The time dependent state probabilities can be evaluated using a matrix 
multiplication [I] technique. This is a very powerful method for obtaining 
time dependent probabilities of complex systems and is illustrated using the 
model of Figure 4.2. 
Where, 
[ P ( t ) ]  Vector of state probabilities at time t , 
[ P W ]  Vector of initial probabilities, 
P I  Stochastic transitional probability matrix, 
n Number of time steps used in the discretisation process. 
The stochastic transitional probability matrix for the model shown in 
Figure 4.2 is as follows: 
The number of matrix multiplications, i.e. n ,  is equal to the time of 
interest t divided by the time interval At .  During the start-up time, a unit is 
not able to take up load and resides in the ready-for-service state with a 
probability of unity. However, at the time when the unit may contribute to 
the system generation, the unit can be in either state 1 or state 4. Therefore, 
the vector of initial probabilities is: 
where, 
total number of times unit failed to take up load 
P4(0)= total number of starts 
The probability of finding the unit on outage given that a demand has 
occurred is given by [31 : 
4.3.2. Hot Reserve Unit Model 
When a thermal unit is removed from service it can be leR in one of two 
states; hot reserve and cold reserve. In a cold reserve state, both the unit and 
its boiler are completely shut down 133. In a hot reserve state, however, the 
boiler is maintained in a banked state. A hot reserve unit can be represented 
by the five-state model shown in Figure 4.3. The time dependent state 
probabilities can be calculated using the same technique described for a rapid 
start unit. The vector of initial probabilities is [3]: 
where P4(0) and P1(0) are calculated using Equations 4.5 and 4.6 
respectively. The probability of finding the unit on outage given that a 
demand has occurred is given by [3]: 
Fail to Take 
up Load Failed 
Figure 4.3: Five-state model for hot reserve units. 
P W p )  = I - P(Down).  (4.1 t )  
The corresponding transition rates of the rapid start and hot reserve units 
are given in Appendix D. 
4.4 Model for Postponable Outages 
When a unit is removed from service due to equipment failure, it can be 
either removed immediately or the removal postponed for a certain limited 
period of time. The conventional definition of a forced outage includes both 
sudden and deferrable 
concept of both sudden 
or non-sudden unit removal £?om service [113]. The 
and deferred unit removal from service does not pose 
any difficulty in a planning study but causes some problems in operating 
reserve evaluation. In practice, many of the failures that occur can be 
tolerated for a short period of time and the removal of the unit for repair can 
be postponed [3]. In these cases, the unit may still be capable of production if 
it is considered necessary to the system. This is obviously not true for all unit 
failures as some failures require immediate unit removal. The two-state 
model has been modified in [I131 to include postponable outages as shown in 
Figure 4.4. 
POSTPONED 
OUTAGE 
2 I 
Figure 4.4: Postponable outage model. 
Where, 
kl Rate of outages that can be postponed, 
k' Rate of outages that can not be postponed, 
3c Total failure rate = )c '+ )cl , 
h f  Rate at which postponed outages are forced into the 'Failed and 
removed from service' state, .I 
A1 p Proportion of )c that can be postponed =- 3c 
The probability of the unit being in the down state considering postponable 
outages can be calculated using Equation 4.12 [113,114]. 
P(down) m 1'MT = ( I  - P ) M T  = Modified O.R.R. (4.12) 
Since is between zero and 1, the modified 0.R.R is always less than the 
original O.R.R. f3=0 corresponds to the conventional two-state unit model and 
P = 1  represents to the case where all forced outages can be postponed [113]. 
4.5 Evaluation Technique 
Once the number of committed units are determined with a specxed unit 
commitment criterion, the next step is to determine the power outputs of the 
committed generators such that the operating cost is minimized. The actual 
operating ranges of all the committed units are restricted by their ramp rate 
characteristics. This represents additional constraints in the dispatch 
problem. Starting from an economic schedule, not only must the reserve be 
sufficient to make up for a generating unit failure, but the reserve must be 
allocated among the fast-responding and slow-responding units. 
Given the available response output, the associated system response 
health, margin and risk probabilities for the designated load dispatch can  be 
determined. This is done using the contingency enumeration technique. For a 
given contingency, the committed units are arranged in two sets. In set 1, r n ~  
units are in service and in set 2, m2 units are on outage. The probability 
associated with the contingency is calculated using Equation 4.13. 
Each contingency must be evaluated to determine which response state it 
belongs to based on the state definitions given in Section 3.3. This is 
determined using the following equations; 
Where, 
Number of spinning units, 
Probability of occurring the contingency c, 
Failure rate of & unit in f r  / min., 
Margin time in minute, 
Response output of the Kth unit in M W ,  
Loading of the i, unit in MW, 
Required regulating margin in MW, 
Total available response at  contingency c in MW. 
If both Equations 4.15 and 4.16 are satisfied, the contingency lies in the 
healthy state. If only Equation 4.15 is satisfied, it belongs to the marginal 
state. If Equation 4 is not satisfied, the system is in the state of risk. By 
varying mp from 0 to  n, all possible contingencies can be considered. 
The total available response is provided by the on-line spinning units, 
stand-by units, interruptible load, etc.. Stand-by equipment can increase the 
amount of response magnitude, provided that their lead times are less than 
the margin time. The lead time associated with hot reserve units is such that 
these units do not contribute to the response output of the generation system. 
Rapid start units, however, can respand extremely quickly and hence 
significantly decrease the response risk and increase the response magnitude. 
The response characteristics of typical rapid start  units are  illustrated in 
Figure 4.5 and evaluated in Equation 4.17. 
Figure 4.5: Response characteristic of typical rapid start  units. 
Res, = O  
Res, = Min[(MT-t,)xRR,,P,,I 
Res r 
I 
where, 
Re s, Rapid start unit response output, 
RRr Rapid start unit response rate, 
P,, Maximum capacity of the rapid start unit, 
t r Lead time of rapid start units. 
The response health, margin and risk probabilities including rapid start 
units  a re  obtained using the conditional probability approach [I]. The 
probability of a rapid start unit being available at the  margin time is 
calculated using the matrix multiplication technique [I] and the probability 
P(Ak ) that  event ( A k )  occurs, is determined using the binomial distribution 
where, 
Response health, margin and risk indices, 
Total number of rapid start units, 
k out of NR rapid start units are in service at the 
margin time, 
Expected response from rapid start units, 
Response healthy state probability given that k 
rapid start units are available a t  the margin time 
in addition to the on-line spinning units, 
Response marginal state probability given that k 
rapid start units are available at the margin time 
in addition to the on-line spinning units, 
Response risk given that k rapid start units are 
available a t  the margin time in addition to the 
on-line spinning units. 
In addition to the generating capacity adjustments, some utilities have 
loads which can be curtailed within a short period of time. The magnitude of 
the curtailable load and the corresponding time of interruption depend on the 
.agreements between the utility and its consumers. The costs associated with 
the interruptions vary for different loads. Interruptible load can increase the 
available response in the system provided that the time of load intemption 
is less than the margin time. Interruptible load can be considered for 
computational purposes as an equivalent rapid start unit having a lead time 
of TI, a capacity of W and with a failure rate equal to zero. The response 
indices can therefore be calculated using Equations 4.18 to 4.21, in which the 
probability of having LI MW of load interrupted at the lead time of TI, if 
required, is considered to be unity. The overall system response characteristic 
is shown in Figure 4.6, in which the total response in the system is provided 
by on-line spinning units, rapid start units and interruptible load. 
response due to 
interruptible load 
response by 
rapid start units 
response by 
spinning units 
0 t, TI  ntr time 
Figure 4.6: Overall system response characteristic. 
Once the system response state probabilities are calculated, the response 
indices are compared with the specified values. When the response criteria 
are not satisfied, the load dispatch must be adjusted. For reloading, the 
dispatched units are classified into three groups in which their spinning 
reserve (SP) is equal to, less than, or greater than their response capability 
(RC). The response characteristic associated with each group is shown in 
Figures 4.7, 4.8 and 4.9. In the next step, an incremental load is taken away 
from the unit in Group II whose incremental running cost at the respective 
load point is the highest, and given to the unit in Group I11 whose 
incremental running cost is the lowest. This procedure should be continued to 
provide sdticient responsive reserve to satisfy a specified response risk, a 
specified response health probability or both. Adjustments to the unit loading 
Figure 4.7: Response characteristic of an on-line spinning unit (SP = R C ) .  
1 
I 
0 MT 
Figure 4.8: Response characteristic of an on-line spinning unit ISP < RC). 
Figure 4.9: Response characteristic of an on-line spinning unit (SP > RC). 
cannot be continued if all the units are in Group I o r  if there is no unit in 
Groups I1 or  III. In this case, if the response criterion is not satisfied then 
more unit(s) must be committed in addition to those already in senrice. 
4.6 Application to the IEEE Reliability Test System 
The IEEE-RTS has been used to demonstrate the application of the 
proposed method. In the studies presented in this section, the abbreviations 
ELD, LDS and LDM are used to designate the studies with an economic load 
dispatch, load dispatch with a single response criterion and load dispatch 
with multiple response criteria. For the single response criterion, the load 
dispatch is based upon a specified GSRSR of 0.001. The additional response 
healthy state probability of 0.9 is used for load dispatch with multiple 
response criteria. 
4.6.1 Unit Commitment Including S tand-by Units and Interruptible 
Load 
The EEE-RTS has a number of 25 MW gas turbines [I151 and several 100 
MW hot reserve units. The lead time associated with rapid start and hot 
reserve units are assumed to be 5 minutes and one hour respectively. The 
rapid start and hot reserve units are represented by the four state and five 
state models shown in Figures 4.2 and 4.3 respectively . The corresponding 
transition rates are given in Appendix D. In addition to stand-by units, some 
utilities consider interruptible load as a part of the operating reserve [51]. 
Table 4.1 shows the unit commitment health, margin and risk probabilities 
for a load level of 1710 MW and 11 units when the system lead time is 4 
hours. Case 1 is the unit commitment assuming that the reserve in the 
system is only spinning reserve. In Case 2, the system has two rapid start 
and one hot reserve unit in addition to the I1 on-line committed units. In 
Case 3, it is assumed that 50 MW of the system load can be curtailed within 5 
minutes. The system has a zero healthy state probability at  the load level of 
1710 MW in Case 1 and does not improve considerably by including stand-by 
units or interruptible load [61,116]. 
Table 4.1: Unit commitment in the IEEE-RTS. 
In order to demonstrate the effects of stand-by units and interruptible 
loads on the response well-being, the three cases are individually illustrated 
as follows. For the studies presented n this section, it is assumed that the 
required regulating margin is 40% of the spinning reserve (SP) and the 
margin time is 10 minutes. 
4.82 Response Indices Without Stand-by Units (Case 1) 
Response constrained economic load dispatch considering only spinning 
reserve was illustrated in detail in Chapter 3. Table 4.2 shows the economic 
load dispatch (ELD) and load dispatch with single (LDS) and multiple 
response criteria (LDM) for a load level of 1710 MW with 11 units. The 
response indices associated with each load dispatch are shown in Table 4.3. 
Table 4.2: Load dispatch for a load level of 1710 MW and 11 units. 
Table 4.3: Response indices for the load dispatches of Table 4.2. 
It c a n  be seen from Table 4.3 that the economic load dispatch cannot 
satisfy a specified GSRSR of 0.001 because of insuflicient response capacity. 
More response is available by adjusting the unit loadings and the single 
response criterion can be satisfied. The system is in the marginal state (MI) 
at a load level of 1710 MW and 11 units based on unit commitment and 
therefore cannot satisfy a specified response health probability of 0.9 even 
though all the spinning reserve, i.e. 386 MW, is available within the margin 
time. In other words, the system cannot come to the MlH2 area because of 
insufficient response capability. In this case, one more unit must be 
committed. With 12 units the unit commitment health, margin and risk 
probabilities change to 0.9687194, 0.0310479 and 0.0002327 respectively. 
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 show the load dispatches and the associated response 
indices for the load level of 1710 llMW and 12 units. 
Table 4.4: Load dispatch for a load level of 1710 MW and 12 units. 
Table 4.5: Response indices for the load dispatches o f  Table 4.4. 
4.6.3 Response Indices With Stand-by Units (Case 2) 
The lead time and the response rate of the rapid start units are assumed 
t o  be 5 minutes and 5 MW/min. respectively. The expected response from the 
two 25 MW units is 40.17 MW, based on Equation 10. Table 4.6 shows the 
results including two rapid start units. The response indices are presented in 
Table 4.7. Compared to the results shown in Table 4.3, the system can satisfy 
multiple response criteria by including rapid start gas turbine units. The 
response healthy state probability at a load level of 1710 MW and 11 spinning 
units increases from zero (Table 4.3, LDM) with no rapid start unit to 
Table 4.6: Load dispatch considering stand-by units. 
LDS 
LDM 
1710 
1710 
16474.31 
18190.46 
50 
0 
- 50  
44 
50 
50 
50 
50 
400 
400 
400 
400 
284 
260 
95 
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95 
134 
95 
133 
141 
105 
Table 4.7: Response indices for the load dispatches of Table 4.6. 
0.80217881 and 0.9599109 (Table 4.7, LDM) with one and two rapid start 
units respectively. The system operating zone now changes from MlM2 to 
MlH2. 
The operating cost also varies with the situation. For load dispatch with 
multiple response criteria, the system operating cost is $16766.30 (Table 4.4, 
LDM) for 12 spinning units with no stand-by units and increases to  
$18190.46 (Table 4.6, LDM) for 11 spinning units and two rapid start units. 
Both operating conditions satisfy multiple response criteria but the latter is 
more expensive. Figure 4.10 shows the variation in the operating cost versus 
the number of rapid start units for load dispatch with a single response 
criterion. The system operating cost can be decreased to  a minimum value or 
the cost associated with the most economic load dispatch. At this point, the 
cost remains constant as the number of rapid start units increase. The 
operating cost at  a load level of 1995 MW and 13 units is $20133.88 with no 
stand-by units and decreases to $19381.05, which is the cost associated with 
economic load dispatch with 4 rapid start units. Figure 4.11 shows the 
number of spinning units and the required number of rapid start units such 
that the economic load dispatch can satisfy both single and multiple response 
criteria. 
Figure 4.10: 
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Figure 4.11:Required number of spinning and rapid start units for different 
load levels. 
4.6.4 Response Indices Including Interruptible Load (Case 3) 
Table 4.8 shows the economic load dispatch and load dispatch with single 
and multiple response criteria for a load level of 1710 MW and 11 spinning 
units when 50 MW of load is considered as intermptible load. The associated 
response indices are shown in Table 4.9. Compared to the results shown in 
Tables 4.2 and 4.3, the system can transfer to the healthy state from the 
marginal state when interruptible load is included in the analysis. For a 
single response criterion. operating cost decreases from $16955.76 when the 
system has only spinning reserve, to $16464.87 when intermptible load is 
considered. 
Table 4.8: Load dispatch considering interruptible load. 
Table 4.9: Response indices for the load dispatches of Table 4.8. 
4.6.5 Discussion 
From these studies, it can be concluded that for reliable and economic 
operation, unit commitment including stand-by units and interruptible loads 
should be done such that the system has a high healthystate probability 
[60,61]. Load dispatch should then be done to provide a high response healthy 
state probability a t  minimum cost. Using this approach, the response is 
mostly provided by rapid start units and interruptible load, if available, and 
the system operates economically in the area H lH2 [1l7]. 
4.6.6 Effect of Postponable Outages 
In a practical power system, many failure events can be tolerated and the 
outage of a failed unit can be postponed for a limited period of time without 
creating additional damage. The degree to which the outage of a failed unit 
can be postponed depends on the time period considered. The time 
consideration in a unit commitment study is the lead time and that of 
response analysis is the margin time, which is considerably less than the lead 
time. The possible influence of postponability is, therefore, higher for the 
second aspect than for the first. The effects of the degree of unit 
postponability on the unit commitment health, margin and risk probabilities 
were examined in [61] where it was assumed that the 350 MW and 197 MW 
units of the IEEE-RTS can have some outages postponed with different 
values of p . 
Figure 4.12 shows the variation in the GSRSR for the economic load 
dispatch of 13 and 12 units at load levels of 1995 MW and 1710 MW 
respectively. It can be seen that the GSRSR decreases as the degree of 
postponability P, increases. A specified GSRSR of 0.001 can be satisfied at P 
equal to 0.75 and 0.48 for load levels of 1995 and 1710 MW respectively. The 
system operating cost, therefore, decreases for the same response criterion by 
including outage postponability. 
Consider the unit commitment and the load dispatch of the IEEE-RTS 
such that both unit commitment and response health probabilities are 
greater than 0.9. Figure 4.13 shows the variation in the response health 
P 
Figure 4.12: Variation in GSRSR versus P . 
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Figure 4.13: Variation in response health probability for different load 
levels. 
probability for different values of P. It can be seen f?om Figure 4.13 that for a 
given load level the response health probability increases as P increases. 
4.7 Conclusions 
The concept of unit commitment health, margin and risk described in 
Chapter 2 is extended in this chapter t o  evaluate the response well-being of a 
generating system. The superposition of the unit commitment and response 
health, margin and risk are pictorially illustrated in this chapter in order to 
make these concepts more understandable. A procedure is presented to 
determine the load dispatch required to satisfy the response criterion. The 
study results presented illustrate the effects of variation in the margin time 
on the response health, margin and risk probabilities by application to the 
IEEE-RTS. 
The effects of including rapid start units, interruptible loads and 
postponable outages on the response well-being are also illustrated. An 
important impact of rapid start units and interruptible loads is that a system 
which is in the marginal response state because of insufficient responsive 
reserve can transfer to the healthy state when they are included. This cannot 
happen in a unit commitment assessment [61]. The results also show that for 
a given load dispatch, the response risk decreases when the degree of 
postponability increases. The degree to which the outage of a failed unit can 
be postponed is more important in response analysis than in unit 
commitment assessment. 
System well-being can be considerably improved by interconnection with 
another system. Each system can operate at either the same or at a higher 
operating state level with a lower reserve than would be required without 
interconnection. The concepts of unit commitment health analysis are 
extended in Chapter 5 to evaluate the spinning reserve requirements in 
interco~eded systems. 
5. UNIT COMMITMENT HEALTH ANALYSIS FOR 
XN'TXRCONNECTED SYSTEMS 
5.1 Introduction 
Most electric power utilities operate as members of an interconnected 
system. Interconnection to one o r  more other systems provides a definite 
improvement in system adequacy and security [118-1241. System 
interconnections permit the participating companies to export and/or import 
electrical energy for mutual benefit. In addition, due to the diversity of load 
demands and the forced outages of generating equipment, each area can 
operate with less spinning reserve than would normally be required for 
isolated operation [120]. The actual assistance received through an 
interconnection is limited by the tie-line capacity and governed by the 
agreements among the participating organizations (124-1281. 
As noted above, system reliability is normally improved by 
interconnecting a system with another power system. Each interconnected 
system can then operate a t  a given risk level with a lower reserve than would 
be required without the interconnection [31. This concept is discussed in 
Reference 3 in a planning context. The PJM method was extended by 
application to interconnected system evaluation in operational studies in 
146,471. Billinton and Chowdhury developed a unit commitment technique 
for interconnected systems based on the "two risk concept" where an 
interconnected system must satisfy the single system risk at the isolated 
level and also the interconnected system risk at the interconnected level. A 
technique called "expected energy assistance" is described in [48,49] to assess 
spinning reserve requirements in interconnected systems. This technique 
provides a feasible index for assessing assistance between interconnected 
systems. 
A probabilistic technique is described in [60,61] for unit commitment in an 
isolated system and is presented in Chapter 2. This technique provides the 
system operator with measures of system well-being in the form of system 
health and margin in addition to the more conventional risk index. This 
chapter extends the concepts of unit commitment health analysis proposed in 
[60] to evaluate the spinning reserve requirements in interconnected systems. 
In order to determine the unit commitment in interconnected systems, the 
problem is decomposed into two subproblems corresponding to unit 
scheduling in each area in the isolated and interconnected modes. For the 
isolated mode, each area should commit generating units to satisfy its own 
operating criterion as described in Chapter 2. Once the required number of 
committed units in each area is determined, the next step is to satisfy the 
operating criterion associated with the overall interconnected system. An 
approach is illustrated in this chapter to determine the operating state 
probabilities to perform this task. Several factors affect the well-being of an 
interconnected system including the system peak loads, tie-line capabilities 
and system lead times. The IEEE-RTS is utilised in this chapter to provide 
numerical examples. 
5.2 Representation of Interconnected System Well-being Model 
The operating state framework is extended in this chapter to evaluate the 
required spinning reserve in an interconnected system. System well-being is 
considerably improved by interconnection with another power system. Each 
system can then operate at either the same or  at a higher operating state 
level with a lower reserve than would be required without interconnection, as 
shown in Figure 5.1. 
The overall interconnected system can be in the state of health if in 
addition to supplying the total demand, the outage of any single element, 
including any single generating unit and tie-line will not result in load 
curtailment in any of the pool members. In the interconnected marginal state, 
the total system demand is supplied, but the outage of any specific single 
element, i.e. a generating unit or a tie-line, will result in load curtailment in 
at least one of the areas. Some part of the total demand is curtailed in the 
interconnected risk state. 
System X 
1 HorM I H o r M  
interconnected system - 
Figure 5.1: Possible operating states of the interconnected system. 
It can be seen from Figure 5.1, that having the overall interconnected 
system in a specific operating state does not mean that all the pool members 
will be in this state when they are isolated. If both systems are initially 
operating in the marginal state, they can transfer to healthy state operation 
by virtue of being interconnected. This is an important benefit of 
interconnected systems. The performance of the overall interconnected 
system is quantified based on the three reliability indices designated as the 
interconnected healthy, marginal and risk state probabilities. 
Unit commitment in an interconnected system can be done such that the 
specified operating criteria in both isolated and interconnected modes are 
satisfied. 
5.3 Evaluation of Unit Commitment in Interco~ected Systems 
The interconnected systems unit commitment problem is decomposed into 
two subproblems in which unit scheduling is performed in each isolated 
system followed by interconnected system evaluation. The following notation 
is used: 
Specified healthy and risk state probabilities for 
isolated System X, 
Actual healthy, marginal and risk state probabilities 
for isolated System X, 
Actual healthy, marginal and risk state probabilities 
of interconnected System X, 
Load demand in System X and 
Lead time of additional generating units in System 
X. 
Similar notation is used for System Y. The unit commitment procedure is 
explained in more detail in the following subsections. 
5.3.1 Unit Commitment in Isolated Systems 
In this phase, generating uni ts  are committed to each isolated system to 
satisfy each operating criterion. The basic objective is to satisfy Equation 5.1. 
p y  spiS" t (5. la) 
p:*y s p y  (5.  lb) 
If multiple criteria are used for each isolated system, then the probability 
of the healthy state in each system must also be at an acceptable level as 
shown in Equation 5.2. This will result in committing Nx and N,, units at 
isolated Systems X and Y respective1 y. 
5.3.2 Unit Commitment in Interconnected Sys terns 
Once the required number of committed units in each isolated system is 
determined, the next step is to satisfy the operating criteria associated with 
the overall interconnected system. The operating state probabilities of each 
interconnected system are then calculated using the area risk curve concept 
[3]. Figures 5.2a and 5.2b show the area risk cunre for Systems X and Y 
respectively assuming that System X has a smaller lead time than System Y 
( t ,  < ty ). The area risk curves for the two systems are discussed individually 
in the following two subsections. 
isolated area X risk 
interconnected area X risk 
0 time 
isolated area Y risk 
interconnected area 
0 time 
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Figure 5.2: Area risk curves for Systems X and Y. 
5.3.2.1 Operating Indices of Interconnected System X 
The analysis of interconnected System X can be represented by the area 
risk curve shown in Figure 5.2a. The tie-line model is represented by 
Equation 5.3, where h and p are the failure and repair rates of the tie-line 
respectively. The repair time r is the reciprocal of p. 
where P&) and P, (t,) are the probabilities of the tie-line being in the 
down or up state at time t,. Using the number of committed units in isolated 
System Y, the tie-line constrained assistance model [3] of System Y to System 
X at the time t, is determined. This model is indicated by vectors CF and 
Py, in which C b  and P k  are the ith capacity available state and its 
associated probability. 
where 1 is the number of capacity states in the tie constrained assistance 
model. The operating state probabilities of interconnected area X can be 
expressed as: 
where ( P: J IL, - c;~) is the healthy state probability of the isolated system 
X with load of L, - C& and Nx units and 4 is the incremental decrease in 
the risk of system X due to interconnection with Y. 
It should be noted that additional units are available to System X after 
the lead time of t, and therefore the risk is negligible a t  that time (Figure 
5.3.2.2 Operating Indices of Interconnected System Y 
In this case, System X is the assisting system and System Y is the assisted 
one. The area risk curve for System Y is shown in Figure 5.2b which is 
divided into two different partial risks of R, and & and three periods, i.e. 
1,2 and 3. 
The total interconnected area Y risk is the summation of the two partial 
risks, which are determined using operating state probabilities of different 
periods. The operating state probabilities in each period are calculated using 
N,, committed units in System Y and the available assistance from System 
X The available assistance from System X to Y varies from period to period. 
In the first period ( t i ) ,  the assistance is determined based on N, on-line 
committed units. In the second period ( t z ) ,  additional units become available 
in System X and therefore the assistance is found considering all available 
units a t  System X The amount of assistance from System X to  Y in the third 
period ( t i )  is identical to that of the second period but the associated 
probabilities are different. All the calculations in the first two periods should 
be done at time t, and those of the third period at time t,,. The operating 
state probabilities of interconnected System Y can be calculated using the 
following procedure. 
where Prk is the probability of the risk state in period k of the area risk 
curve and is calculated using Equation 5.15. The tie-line constrained 
assistance model of System X to Y in each period is indicated by vectors C$ 
and pk where~f i  and P: are the ith capacity available state in the tie 
xy 
constrained assistance model and its associated probability a t  the kth period 
in the area risk curve. 
where ( P P ~ Y I L ~  - c:) is the probability of the risk state calculated for Ny 
units in System Y and a load level of (Ly 4:) and Ik is the number of 
capacity states in the tie constrained assistance model in the kth period. 
From the area risk curve shown in Figure 5.2b, it can be seen that the 
incremental decrease in the risk of System Y due to interconnection with 
System X has the two parts of D ; and D '>. D ; is the incremental decrease 
in the risk in System Y due to the assistance from System X based on only 
Nx on-line committed units. When t, is less than ty,  additional units are 
available in System X after t, and before tY and therefore additional 
assistance is provided to System Y. The system risk further decreases by D'; 
due to  this additional assistance. The two parts of the incremental decrease 
in the risk and also the probabilities of the healthy and the marginal states of 
interconnected System Y can be calculated as follows. 
pFsy = % + Rb + D L  +Dl> 
Define; 
where P j, and P*m are the probabilities of the healthy and marginal states 
calculated for Ny units in System Y including the assistance from System X 
due to only N, committed units and at the time ty . 
Adding and subtracting ( P  j, + P 'm )D'> in the right side of Equation 5.19 
and rearranging gives: 
5.3.3 Overall Interconnected Operating State Probabilities 
The operating state probabilities for the overall interconnected system are 
determined using the operating state probabilities of each interconnected 
system. 
where ~ f ,  P: and P: are the overall interconnected healthy, marginal and 
risk state probabilities respectively. 
Equations 5.23 and 5.24 are valid only if the total scheduled capacity in 
each system is greater than its own load. The number of committed units in 
both systems are adequate to satisfy a specified interconnected risk SPF if 
P: 5 S P Y .  Otherwise; 
The criterion of satisfying a specified interconnected healthy state 
probability S P ~  can also be added to the previous operating criterion. If 
PP 2 SP?, then the number of generating units committed in Systems X 
and Y are considered to be adequate. Otherwise; 
The procedure is continued until both the isolated and interconnected 
operating criteria are satisfied [129]. 
5.4 Application to the IEEE Reliability Test System 
Table 5.1 shows the unit commitment for an isolated IEEE-RTS for two 
different cases. The lead time [3] is assumed to be 4 hours. In the first case, 
the system has to satisfy only a specified risk of 0.01, while in the second case 
multiple criteria are used in which the system is required to satisfy an 
acceptable healthy state probability of 0.9 in addition to satisfying a specified 
risk of 0.01 [60]. The isolated system results presented in Table 5.1 are 
provided to facilitate comparison with those of Table 5.3. 
Table 5.1. Unit commitment in an isolated EEE-RTS. 
CASE 2 
Health I Risk 
The technique proposed in the previous section was applied to two 
interconnected IEEE-RTS to evaluate the required spinning resenre in the 
interconnected system. The two identical BEE-RTS have been designated as 
System X and System Y and are connected through the two tie-lines 
described in Table 5.2. 
Table 5 m 2 m  Tie-line data. 
Table 5.3 shows the unit commitment in the two interconnected systems 
when additional units in each system have a lead time of 4 hours. In addition 
to the previously noted isolated system operating criterion, a specified 
interconnected risk of 0.001 and an acceptable interconnected healthy state 
probability of 0.9 are applied. The load demand in both systems are identical 
and therefore the operating state probabilities of each system in the 
interconnected mode are identical to those of the overall interconnected 
system. 
Table 5.3. Unit commitment and operating state probabilities of the 
interconnected system. 
Load* No. of Overall interconnected indices 
lMWl units* Health Margin Risk 
1140 8 0.98914764 0.01081275 0.00003960 
1425 10 0.98922569 0.01073530 0.0000390 1 
The nwnber of committed units in Table 5.3 is identical to that shown in 
Case 1 of Table 5.1, where the probability of the healthy state is zero for some 
load levels due to insdlicient spinning reserve. By interconnecting the two 
systems, the overall system has an acceptable healthy state probability 
without committing any additional generating units. The required number of 
committed units usually decreases when two systems are interconnected. 
This can clearly be seen by comparing Table 5.3 with Case 2 in Table 5.1. An 
isolated IEEE-RTS should commi t  at least 28 units at a load level of 2850 
MW to satisfy a healthy state probability of 0.9. It, however, needs only 24 
units at the same load level when connected to an identical system. 
Figures 5.3 and 5.4 show the required number of committed units and the 
operating state probabilities for three different studies. In the first study 
(Sl), unit commitment is done in an isolated IEEE-RTS such that a specified 
risk of 0.01 and healthy state probability of 0.9 are satisfied. In the second 
study (S2), two identical IEEE-RTS are interconnected where unit 
commitment is done such that each system satisfies a single criterion, i.e. a 
specified risk of 0.01, in the isolated mode and multiple criteria, i.e. a 
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Figure 5.3: Number of committed units for the three studies, S1, S2, S3. 
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Figure 5.4: Unit commitment and operatkg state probabilities for the 
three studies, S1, S2, S3. 
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specified risk of 0.001 and healthy state probability of 0.9, in the 
interconnected mode. Multiple criteria are applied in both the isolated and 
interconnected modes in the third study (53). It can be seen 60m Figure 5.4 
that, the highest healthy state probabilities occur in the third study for all 
the load levels . The benefits derived by interconnection can be recognized by 
comparing the results of S1 with those of S2 in which higher healthy state 
probabilities and lower risks are achieved with lower spinning reserves. 
Unit commitment health analysis in intercomected systems depends on 
different factors such as operating criteria, system peak loads, lead times, tie- 
line carrying capabilities, failure rates, load forecast uncertainty and 
postponable outages etc.. The impact of some of these factors is discussed in 
the following subsections. 
5.4.1 Effect of Load Variation 
In the studies presented in the previous section, it was assumed that both 
systems have the same load level. Table 5.4 shows the operating indices of 
interconnected Systems X and Y where System X has a fixed load level of 
2280 MW while the load in System Y varies from 1140 MW to 2850 MW. Both 
systems should satisfy a single and multiple operating criteria in the isolated 
and interconnected modes respectively. Compared to the results shown in 
Table 5.3, it can be seen that the operating state probabilities are affected as 
the load in the two interconnected systems varies. This is due to the changes 
in the available assistance between the two systems. 
5.4.2 Effect of Tie Line Transfer Capability 
One of the most important factors influencing interconnected system 
operating state probabilities is the tie-line capabilities. Figure 5.5 shows the 
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Figure 5.5: Effect of tie-line capability. 
variation in the operating state probabilities of System Y when it is connected 
to System X with two tie-lines. The transfer capability of each tie-line varies 
from 50 MW to 250 MW. System X has a fixed load of 1995 MW with 13 
committed units, while the load in System Y is changed from 1140 to 2850 
MW. The required number of committed units in System Y are the same as 
those shown i n  Table 4.4. The degree of well-being in System Y is 
significantly improved by increasing the tie-line capabilities. System X has a 
total spinning reserve of 411 MW and virtually no gain is obtained by 
increasing the total tie-line capability to more than 400 MW. 
5.4.3 Effect of Lead Time Variation 
In the previous studies it was assumed that both systems have the same 
lead time of 4 hours. Table 5.5 shows the results when lead times of 
additional generation in Systems X and Y are 2 and 4 hours respectively. The 
required number of committed units in System X decreases compared to that 
shown in Table 5.3. Systems X and Y with 20 and 24 units respectively and at 
the load level of 2850 MW have an isolated healthy state probability of zero. 
They, however, have acceptable healthy state probabilities without 
committing any additional units when interconnected. 
5.4.4 Effect of Load Forecast Uncertainty 
The basic concepts of load forecast uncertainty are illustrated in Section 
3.5.4. Assume that the load forecast deviation in Systems X and Y is normally 
distributed with n and m discrete load steps respectively. In order to 
determine the operating state indices there are n* m health, margin and risk 
probability levels for Systems X and Y where n and m are the discrete load 
steps in the uncertainty models for Systems X and Y respectively. The 
Table 5.4: Impact of load variation on the unit commitment and operating state probabilities. 
No, of units Spin. ros. System X indices in Interconnected System Y indices in Interconnected 
mod0 mode 
m 
X Y Health Margin I Risk Health Margin Riak 
1 
Table 5.6: Unit commitment and operating state probabilities in the two interconnected IEEE-RTS with 
unequal lead times. 
Units Iso, Units Int. System X i 
X I Y  X 1 Y  Health 
 dices in Interconnected 
mode 
Marein I Risk 
System Y indices in Interconnected 
mode 
Health I Marnin 1 Risk 
operating state indices in each case are weighted by the probability of the 
simultaneous load conditions and the summations of these indices are the 
expected health, margin and risk probabilities for each system in the 
interconnected mode. 
Expected healthy state probability in System X. 
Probability of the healthy state in the interconnected 
system X for ith load step of the load distribution in 
system X and jth load step of the load distribution in 
system Y. 
Probability of the ith load step of the load distribution in 
system X. 
Probability of the /th load step of the load distribution in 
system Y. 
interconnected marginal and risk state probabilities are T h e  expected 
calculated using the same method. A similar expression can also be written 
for the operating indices of interconnected System Y. 
Unit commitment and the associated operating state probabilities in 
Systems X and Y for zero load forecast error are shown in Table 5.4. Table 5.6 
shows the results assuming that the load forecast deviation in System X is 
normally distributed with a standard deviation of 4% of the forecast peak 
load using the 7 step histogram shown in Figure 3.8. The peak load in System 
Y was varied from 40% to 100% of the system peak load of 2850 MW with 
zero uncertainty. The overall interconnected system indices are shown in 
Table 5.7. Comparing the results shown in Table 5.4 with those shown in 
Table 5.6, it can be seen that the interconnected healthy state probability 

decreases for both systems with load forecast uncertainty in System X This 
change is more obvious for System X. The interconnected risk state 
probabilities, however, increase in both systems. The overall interconnected 
system health indices decrease by including load forecast uncertainty. 
5.4.5 Effect of Postponable Outages 
Table 5.8 shows unit commitments and the associated operating indices in 
two isolated Systems X and Y. In these studies, the committed generating 
units in System X have a degree of postponability of 0.5 and the degree of 
postponability in System Y is considered to be zero. By comparing the results 
shown in Table 5.8 with those of Table 5.1 (Case I), it can be seen that the 
number of committed units in System X decreases from 15 to 14 for the same 
operating criterion. Table 5.9 shows the unit commitment and operating 
health, margin and risk probabilities for both systems when they are 
interconnected. The operating criterion is that a specified risk of 0.001 and an 
acceptable healthy state probability of 0.9 must be satisfied in the 
interconnected mode in addition to satisfying a specified risk of 0.01 in the 
Table 5.8. Operating indices of isolated Systems X and Y with P of 0.5 in 
System X and 0 in System Y. 
isolated mode. In this case, System X is required to commit 15 units to satisfy 
the operating criteria. By comparing the results shown in Table 5.9 with 
those in Table 5.4, it can be seen that the healthy state probabilities increase 
and the system risk decreases due to the inclusion of postponable outages. 
The required number of committed units and also the operating state 
probabilities are affected by the degree of postponability. Table 5.10 shows 
the effects on the unit commitment and the operating state probabilities of 
variation in the degree of postponability. System X has a load level of 2565 
MW and the load level in System Y is considered to be 1995 MW. It  can be 
seen from Table 5.10 that for the same number of committed units, the 
system health probability increases and the system risk decreases as the 
degree of postponability increases. 
5.4.6 Effect of Derated States 
In order to illustrate the effect of generating unit derated states, the 400 
MW and the 350 MW units in each system were given 50% derated states. 
The identical systems are interconnected. The required number of committed 
units in the isolated and interconnected modes and the overall interconnected 
system operating state probabilities are shown in Table 5.11. The system 
well-being for a given load level, is improved by considering derated states. In 
general, the required number of committed units decreases by including 
derated states. This can be seen by comparing the results shown in Table 5.3 
with those of Table 5.11. 

Table 6.11:Required number of committed units and the overall 
interco~ected indices considering derated states in 
both Systems X and Y. 
 - 
~ J Y I  Iso. J Int. Health Margin Risk 
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5.5 Conclusions 
This chapter extends the concepts of unit commitment health analysis 
presented in Chapter 2 to evaluate the spinning reserve requirements in 
interconnected power systems. Unit commitment is done such that the 
operating criteria a t  both the isolated and interconnected modes are satisfied 
by the pool members. A procedure is illustrated in this chapter to  determine 
the operating state probabilities for the overall interconnected system. The 
results presented show that system well-being can be considerably improved 
by interconnection with another system. Each system can operate at either 
the same or at a higher operating state level with a lower reserve than would 
be required without interconnection. A number of studies using the IEEE- 
RTS are illustrated to  evaluate the impact on the interconnected system well- 
being of factors such as peak load, lead time and tie-line capabilities, load 
forecast uncertainty, degree of postponability and derated states. 
Under normal operating conditions, the generating capacity in operation 
is greater than the firm load and with this number of committed units, the 
system may also be able to carry a limited amount of interruptible load on top 
of the firm load without violating the operating criterion. The concepts 
associated with the determination of this additional interruptible load in both 
isolated and interconnected systems are presented in the next chapter. 
6. OPTIMUM INTERRUPTIBLE LOAD CARRYING 
CAPABILITY IN ISOLATED AND INTERCONNECTED 
SYSTEMS 
6.1 Introduction 
Considerable attention is being devoted to  demand side options, such as 
interruptible loads, as alternatives to constructing new power plants. This 
ability to interrupt load is sometimes referred to as direct load control 
[36,130-1351. Reference 36 defines interruptible load as a demand that can be 
interrupted within a specified period of time by direct action of the supplying 
system in accordance with contractual provisions. A relatively short notice is 
normally issued by the operator prior t o  the power interruption. This time 
period is designated as the interruptible lead time. In this process, the 
designated loads can normally be disconnected for up to a certain number of 
times and/or an aggregate length of time in a year. It may also be necessary 
to curtail Load due t o  sudden operating unit outages [38,39], in addition to 
production cost optimization requirements 1136-1391. The monetary impacts 
of interruption are lower for some customers than for others. In these cases, 
there are economic benefits for both the utility and the customer which lead 
to equitable tariff reductions [134]. Interruptible loads are sometimes 
considered by utilities as part of the operating reserve and included as 10- 
minute reserve in the system operating plan [51,140]. 
A power system must commit a certain number of available generating 
units to satisfy the system load. The system operator must determine what is 
the maximum load level that can be supplied by the given number of 
committed units. This is referred to as the £inn load carrying capability 
(FLCC) of the committed generation. Under normal operating conditions, the 
generating capacity in operation is greater than the minimum requirement 
and with this number of committed units, the system may also be able to 
carry a limited amount of interruptible load on top of the firm load without 
violating the operating criterion. Under these conditions, a larger system load 
can be served without committing additional units other than those required 
to carry the firm load. This additional load must be capable of interruption at  
short notice if required. The capability of a system to serve the additional 
interruptible load is designated as the system interruptible load carrying 
capability (ILCC). This chapter presents a probabilistic technique to evaluate 
the ILCC in both isolated and interconnected generation systems. A set of 
ILCC is determined for a given number of committed units and the associated 
FLCC, which consists of different amounts of interruptible load and the 
associated lead times. The condition is then formulated as an optimization 
problem. The optimum ILCC (OILCC) is selected from the set of system ILCC 
levels. The objective in this formulation is to determine the amount of 
interruptible load and the associated lead time that will maximize the 
expected energy supplied within the system lead time while satisfying the 
operating criteria [141]. The operating criteria are defined using the system 
well-being framework presented in Chapter 2. 
6.2 Well-being Indices Including Interruptible Load 
Interruptible load can be incorporated in operating reserve assessment 
using the area risk curve technique [3]. The inclusion of interruptible load in 
operating reserve assessment in isolated generating systems is illustrated in 
[61]. Unit commitment in interconnected systems is examined in Chapter 5 
considering only spinning reserve. Interruptible load can be included as part 
of the interconnected system operating reserve using area risk curve 
concepts. Typical area risk curves for isolated and interconnected systems are 
shown in Figure 6.1 using the following symbols. 
additional units available in Sys. X * 
0 is inlermpred in Sys. Y 
I[ additional units available,in Sys. Y 
I I 0 
o T~ t, time 
* 
time 
Figure 6.1: Isolated (is) and interconnected (in) area risk curve of 
Systems X and Y. 
FP (R) ,  F: (R) Interconnected area risk function of Systems X and Y 
respectively, 
F;(R), ~ $ ( ~ ) ~ s o l a t e d  a rea  risk function of Systems X and  Y 
respectively, 
Tx, TY Interruption times in Systems X and Y, 
0, Interruptible loads in Systems X and Y, 
~ X Y  5 Lead time of additional generating units in Systems X and 
Y respectively, 
Decreased risk in interconnected System X due  to the 
inclusion of interruptible load in Systems Y and X 
respectively, 
Decreased risk in interconnected System Y due to the 
inclusion of interruptible load in  Systems Y and X 
respectively, 
Decreased risk in interconnected System Y due to the 
availability of additional assistance from System X, 
Figure 6.lc shows the interconnected area risk of System X in detail, in 
which System X is assisted by System Y. This figure contaks three different 
partial risks, Rz, Ri and R: and five periods. The partial risks are  
determined using the operating state probabilities associated with the 
different periods. The operating state probabilities in each period depend on 
the  assisted system load, the available assistance from the other system and 
the  time associated with that period. All the calculations in each period must 
be done a t  the corresponding time. In Period 1, System X has a load of L, and 
the assistance from System Y is determined based on a load level of L,, . The 
system risk decreases by DF as By MW of load is interrupted in System Y for 
Period 2. The reason for this is that  the available assistance fkom System Y to 
X increases compared to that for Period 1. The conditions for Period 3 are the 
same as those for Period 2 except for the time of calculation. The system risk 
further decreases by D; as 8, MW of load is interrupted in System X for 
Period 4. The conditions for Period 5 are identical to those for Period 4 except 
for t he  time of calculation. At t ime t z ,  additional generating units are 
available in System X and the system risk is considered to be negligible after 
this time. 
Consider that  the tie-line constrained assistance model of System Y to X 
for the  kh period is indicated by vectors C& and P&. The partial risk at 
each period PFk is calculated using the  conditional probability approach. c;' 
is determined based on L,, and L,, - e,, MW load in System Y at Periods 1 
and 2 to 5 respectively. 
where ( P : ~ X I L P ;  - c;) is the probability of the risk state calculated for N, 
committed units in System X and a load level of (LP; - c:' ). L P ~  is equal to 
L, for Periods 1, 2 and 3. It is, however, decreased to L, -0, for Periods 4 
and 5. The healthy and marginal state probabilities of interconnected system 
X are calculated as  follows: 
where 
& capacity state and its associated probability in the tie- 
lie constrained assistance model of System Y to X for the 
kth period of area risk curve F: (R ) , 
Number of capacity states in the tie-line constrained 
assistance model of System Y to X for the kth period of 
area risk curve F: (R ) , 
Healthy, marginal and risk state probabilities of 
interconnected System X calculated at lead time of t,, 
Nx units in System X, N y  units in System Y and 
considering no interruptible load in the two systems, 
Healthy, marginal and risk s tate  probabilities of 
interconnected System 
Load level in Systems X at  the kfh period. 
Total decreased risk in System X, 
The interconnected area Y risk c w e  is shown in more detail in Figure 
6.ld, where System Y is assisted by System X. It c a n  be seen from the figure 
that the system risk decreases by D: and D; due to the inclusion of 
interruptible load in Systems Y and X respectively. The system risk further 
decreases by D{ for Period 6. The reason for this is that additional units 
become available in System X at the lead time of t: and therefore the 
available assistance from System X t o  Y increases. The area risk curve 
consists of four partial risks which can be determined using the calculated 
risk in the seven different periods. 
It should be noted that the assistance from System X to Y for the Periods 1 
to 5 is calculated based on N, units and for the Periods 6 and 7 based on the 
total number of units in System X with the lead time of t,. DRY becomes zero 
if the two systems have identical lead times. The interconnected healthy and 
marginal state probabilities of System Y are calculated as follows: 
Adding and subtracting the term (P ky +PImy ) x TDy on the right-hand 
side of Equation 6.28 and combining with common coefficients gives: 
where 
p,Yk 
kz c, , PE 
Risk of kh period in the area risk curves of Systems X 
and Y respectively, 
hh capacity state and its associated probability in the tie- 
lie constrained assistance model of System X to Y for the 
kh period of area risk c w e  F? (R), 
Number of capacity states in the tie-line constrained 
assistance model of System X to Y for the kth period of 
area risk c m e  F: (R) , 
Load level in System Y at the kth period, 
Healthy, marginal and risk s tate  probabilities of 
interconnected System Y calculated at lead time of ty, 
Nx units in System X, N,, units in System Y and 
considering no interruptible load in the two systems, 
Healthy, marginal and risk state  probabilities of 
interconnected System Y, 
Once the operating indices of each system in the interconnected mode are 
calculated, the next step is to determine the overall interconnected well-being 
indices [129]. 
where P: P: and P: are the overall interconnected healthy, marginal and 
risk state probabilities respectively. 
6.3 Determination of the Interruptible Load Carrying Capability 
The analytical procedures developed to determine the ILCC in both 
isolated and interconnected generating systems are illustrated in ths section. 
The first step in finding the ILCC of a given generation system is to find the 
firm load carrying capability. The operating criterion could be either a 
specified system risk, an acceptable healthy state probability o r  both. The 
specific healthy and risk state probabilities depend on the desired level of  
system security and are a management decision. 
6.3.1 Determination of the Optimum Interruptible Load Carrying 
Capability in Isolated Systems 
Consider that the number of committed units in System X is N, for a 
system lead time of t,. The generation model can be represented in the form 
of a Capacity Outage Probability Table (COPT) [3] consisting of simple arrays 
of I capacity levels (C) and the associated individual probabilities ( p ) ,  i.e. 
probability of exactly the indicated amount of capacity being in service, and 
cumulative probabilities ( P), i.e. probability of finding a quantity of capacity 
in service equal to o r  less than the indicated amount. 
The initial value of the firm load carrying capability FLCCO can be found 
using the COPT and the specified risk. 
then FLCCo = Ci 
The actual FLCC is then found by starting from the initial value and 
using an iterative method. For the ith iteration: 
If Ph 2 Phs and P, 5 Prs FLCC~ = FLCC'-' + d 
If Ph<Phs  or  Pr>Prs  FLCC' = FLCC'-' - 
Where Prs and Ph, are the specified risk and healthy state probabilities 
respectively. Once the FLCC is determined, the system cannot carry 
additional load without committing more units. The operating criteria, 
however, may be satisfied without committing additional units if the added 
load is curtailed in a time less than the system lead time t,. The algorithm 
described in Figure 6.2 is used to determine the interruption time s. 
uk= kth interruptible load level 
T ~ =  associated kth interruption time 
A t  = incrementd time 
cakdate operating state prob. b 
! caculate EES and ,- T ~ =  r k  
record the results 
Figure 6.2: Algorithm for finding the ILCC and the interruption time. 
The set of interruptible loads is determined using this procedure. An 
iterative method is then used to find the set of corresponding interruption 
times. The interruption time at each load level is used as the initial value for 
the next level. The operating state probabilities are within limits for all 
interruptible load levels in the set. After all the possible interruptible load 
levels and the associated lead times are determined, the next step is to find 
the optimum interruptible load level and the corresponding lead time. This is 
done by calculating the Expected Energy Supplied (EES) at each level. The 
EES associated with the kth level is determined as follows: 
Integer values such that; CmI+I FLCC + Llk < CmI 
and CmZ+I 5 FLCC c C,, - 
Individual probabilities associated with Cjl , Cjz , Cj3, 
and Cjc in the COPT, 
Number of generation capacity states in the COPT. 
kth interruptible load level. 
The interruptible load level which has the maximum EES is designated as 
the Optimum Interruptible Load Carrying Capability (OILCC). 
6.3.2 Determination of the Optixnum Interruptible Load Carrying 
Capability in Interconnected Systems 
System well-being can be considerably improved by interconnection with 
other systems. When two systems are interconnected, both the isolated 
system operating criteria and the interconnected system criteria must be 
satisfied [129]. The isolated system operating criteria are illustrated in the 
previous section. The interconnected operating criterion could be a specified 
interconnected risk SPfn, an acceptable interconnected healthy state 
probability S P ~ ,  or both as illustrated in the following. 
Assume that FLCC, and FLCC,, are the FLCC of isolated systems X and 
Y respectively. Each system can satisfy the isolated operating criterion with a 
designated number of units and an associated FLCC. The number of 
committed units in systems X and Y are Nz and N y  respectively and remain 
the same for both the isolated and interconnected studies. The overall 
interconnected indices are then determined using the calculated isolated 
FLCC as the initial values. The interconnected system operating criterion 
may or may not be satisfied at FLCC, and FLCC,,. If the interconnected 
operating criteria are not satisfied then the FLCC levels are adjusted. An 
iterative method is used t o  find the individual system FLCC at which the 
interconnected operating criterion is satisfied. Given P: > S P ~  then: 
If P T ~ ~  > P ~ J Y  then FLCC, = FLCC, -Al 
~f pYyy , p:~ then FLCCy = FLCC,, - Al 
The adjustments continue until P: 5 SP?. The criterion of satisfying a 
specified interconnected healthy state probability is then checked, if required. 
Given P: < S P ~  then: 
If p P p X  < pin*y h then FLCC, = FLCC, - A2 
If p p . ~  <pi",x 
h then FLCCy = FLCCy - AL 
The final FLCC levels satisfy both the isolated and interconnected 
operating criteria. 
A set of ILCC is then found for each isolated system at the modified 
FLCC using the procedure presented earlier. Consider S,(~,,T,) and 
Sy(BY, T,, ) are the lLCC sets in systems X and Y where J and K are the 
number of ILCC levels in each set respectively. The isolated system 
operating criteria are satisfied at each level of S, and S,,. 
Where 
8 ,  T jth ILCC level and the associated interruption time in System X 
respectively, and 
8$, ~ k y  kth ILCC level and the associated interruption time in System Y 
respectively. 
It  should be noted that the interruption time associated with each 
interruptible load level is the maximum allowable time in which the load 
must be curtailed, if required. Any time less than the calculated interruption 
time is therefore acceptable but results in a lower EES. The operating indices 
for two interconnected systems with interruptible loads can be found using 
the area risk c w e  concept. The evaluation technique is similar to that used 
for an isolated system. Using the two sets S, and Sy, a new set Sry is 
created and considered as the initial interconnected system ILCC set. This 
set consists of J * K levels, defined as follows. 
where for the ith level, 0; and 0; are interruptible loads and < and T; 
are the associated interruption times in systems X and Y respectively. The 
interconnected operating indices are calculated for each level and compared 
with the specified values. The interconnected system operating criterion may 
or may not be satisfied at  the initial values. If the operating criterion is 
satisfied, the load condition is considered as an acceptable interconnected 
system ILCC level. If the operating criterion is not satisfied, the interruption 
time is iteratively modified by discrete time steps At to meet the criterion. 
The modification of < and r i  is done such that the incremental Expected 
Unsupplied Energy ( MUE)  is minimized while satisfying the operating 
criterion. The AEUE is the difference between the total expected energy 
supplied (TEES) in two subsequent iterations. 
If U U E r  <AEUE2 then T~ + T* -A t  
If bEUE2 < S U E l  then ry -f T,,-M 
The TEES for the ith level is given by: 
Equation 6.56 consists of four terms. The first two terms are calculated 
using Equation 6.42, and are the EES in systems X and Y without 
considering the assistance from the other system. The last two terms ( EEA&, 
and E B L )  are the expected energy assistance from one system to its 
neighbor calculated using Equation 6.57. 
nl, 722 
kth capacity available state and its associated probability 
respectively in the tie constrained assistance model of 
System X to System Y for the period (0 to r,), 
jth capacity available state and its associated probability 
respectively in the tie constrained assistance model of 
System X to System Y for the period ( r ,  to t,), 
Number of capacity states in the tie constrained 
assistance models for the period ( 0 to r,) and ( rx to t,) 
respectively, and 
Weighting factors. 
The E E A ~ ~  is calculated in a similar manner to EEAL. The tie 
constrained assistance model utilized in Equation (6.57) is an equivalent 
multi-state generating unit [20]. The tie constrained assistance models for 
the two periods (0 to r,) and (r, to t ,)  are different due to the different load 
levels in System X for the two periods. The two weighting factors a1 and a2 
modify the assistance from one system to another based on their sizes and the 
available capacities. 
This procedure is continued until the interconnected system operating 
criterion is satisfied. The amount of interruptible load for some of the levels 
in S; is such that the interconnected system operating criterion cannot be 
satisfied even after adjusting the interruption time . In these cases the levels 
are ignored. The total expected energy supplied (TEES) is calculated for those 
ILCC levels for which the operating criterion is satisfied within the system 
lead time. 
The t o t a l  number of ILCC levels in the interconnected systems in which 
the interconnected system operating criterion is satisfied will be less than or 
equal t o  J * K . The level which has the maximum TEES is considered as the 
OILCC for the interconnected systems. 
6.4 Application to the IEEE Reliability Test System 
The concepts presented in the previous sections have been applied to the 
EEE-RTS. The generating unit data and the priority loading order for the 
IEEE-RTS are shown in Table 2.1. 
6.4.1 Interruptible Load Carrying Capability in Isolated Systems 
Consider a system lead time of 4 hours and a specified risk of 0.01 as the 
operating criterion. The firm load carrying capabilities (FLCC) associated 
with 8, 13 and 18 committed units in the priority loading order are shown in 
Table 6.1, together with the corresponding system health, margin and risk 
probabilities. The healthy state probabilities are zero as the system cannot 
tolerate single unit outages with the number of committed units and at the 
corresponding FLCC. The FLCC for 8, 13 and 18 committed units decreases 
to 1147, 2006 and 2537 respectively if the system is required to satisfy a 
healthy state probability of 0.9 in addition to a specified risk of 0.01. 
Table 6.1: FLCC and the associated well-being indices. 
The set of ILCC calculated for each FLCC at the corresponding number of 
committed units is shown in Figure 6.3, and ranges from 0 to 350 MW.  Each 
ILCC has an associated interruption time. For example, the system with 18 
committed units and at the FLCC of 2585 MW, can carry an additional 
interruptible load of 200 MW with an interruption time of 16 minutes. 
g loo - 
.CI 
* 
a g 7 5 -  
Q) 
.r 
2 5 0 -  
25 - 
No.of 
units 
Figure 6.3: Variation of intemption time versus ILCC. 
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The EES associated with each ILCC is shown in Figure 6.4. The optimum 
ILCC is the one for which the system has the highest EES. The OILCC and 
the associated interruption times (IT) for the three cases are shown in Table 
6.2. Figures 6.5 and 6.6 show the FLCC, optimum ILCC, interruption time 
and the corresponding EES for the IEEE-RTS when the number of committed 
units varies from 8 to 32. It can be seen that for this system, the OILCC is 
constant for a range of committed units. The associated interruption times, 
however, vary fkom 124 to 185 minutes. 
Table 6.2: Optimum ILCC and the associated interruption time. 
* 
Figure 6.4: Variation of expected energy supplied (EES) versus ILCC. 
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Figure 6.5: Variation of OILCC and interruption time versus number of 
committed units. 
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Figure 6.6: Variation of FLCC and EES versus number of committed units. 
6.4.2 Interruptible Load Carrying Capability in Interconnected 
Systems 
In order to illustrate the effect of interconnection, two IEEE-RTS, 
designated as 1 and 2, are interco~ected by two tie lines each capable of 
transferring 100 MW. Each tie line has a failure rate of one failure per year. 
Each system has a lead time of4 hours, and should satisfy a single system 
risk of 0.01. In addition, the interconnected system operating criterion is an 
interconnected system risk of 0.001 and a healthy state probability of 0.9. 
Table 6.3 shows the results when the number of committed units in IEEE- 
RTSl are 8,13 and 18. The number of committed units in IEEE-RTS2 is fixed 
at  8. Each system satisfies both the isolated and interconnected system 
operating criteria at the corresponding FLCC. The OILCC associated with 
the two systems are determined from the ILCC sets of each system. 
Comparing Table 6.3 with the results shown in Table 6.2, it c a n  be seen that 
the OZLCC are not the same for the two cases. 
Table 6.3: Optimum ILCC and the associated interruption times. 
1 No. of I FLCC IT I Overall interconnected system 11 
Figure 6.7 shows the variation in the TEES versus the ILCCs in the two 
systems. The numbers of committed units in the two systems are 13 and 8. 
The point showing the highest TEES in Figure 6.7 is considered as the 
OILCC. The associated interruption times are not shown in the figure but are 
presented inTable 6.3. Figure 6.8 shows the variation in the OILCC for 
UCC in the IEEE-RTS2 ILCC in the IEEE-RTS 1 
Figure 6.7: Variation of the TEES versus ILCC in Systems 1 and 2. 
IEEE-RTS 1 when interconnected t o  IEEE-RTSZ. The number of committed 
units in System 1 varies fmm 8 t o  32 while in the second system it is fixed at 
8. The OILCC of IEEE-RTS2 is 150 MW and the associated interruption time 
is 185 minutes for all cases. The OILCC in IEEE-RTS 1 varies from 150 MW 
190 
- OILCC 
8 12 16 20 24 28 32 
No. of committed units in the IEEE-RTS 1 
Figure 6.8: Variation of OILCC and TEES. 
to 130 M W .  The corresponding interruption time varies &om 185 to 136 
minutes. I t  is important to note that the OILCC and the associated 
interruption time depends on the FLCC of the two systems, the tie line 
carrying capability and the system operating criteria. Table 6.4 shows the 
OILCC and the corresponding interruption times for the two interconnected 
IEEE-RTS. Each system should satisfy an isolated risk of 0.01 and an 
interconnected risk of 0.001. In addition, an acceptable healthy state 
probability of 0.9 must be satisfied in the interconnected mode. Each system 
has a lead time of 4 hours. System B has a load level of 1195 MW with 8 
units. The number of committed units in System A varies from 8 to 32 units. 
Table 6.4 is an extension of the concepts described in Figure 6.7. Table 6.4 
shows the OILCC for a range of peak loads in System A. 

6.5 Conclusions 
A probabilistic technique is presented in this chapter to evaluate the 
Optimum Interruptible Load Carrying Capability (OILCC) in both isolated 
and interco~ected generating systems. A generating system with a given 
number of committed units can serve a target firm load designated as the 
FLCC. A set of ILCC can be determined for this number of committed units 
and the associated FLCC, which contains the interruptible load levels and the 
corresponding intemption times. The ILCC level which maximizes the 
expected energy supplied is taken from the set and designated as the OILCC 
of the generation system. 
The OILCC for two interconnected systems is determined by combining 
the two sets associated with the isolated systems. The intemption times are 
modified using an energy based approach to satisfg the interconnected system 
operating criteria. The technique is illustrated by application to the IEEE- 
RTS and results are presented and discussed for both isolated and 
interconnected system studies. 
Conventional HLI unit commitment health analysis does not normally 
include transmission facilities and the actual location of the generating units. 
The approach illustrated in the next two chapters is a new technique for 
operating reserve evaluation, which includes the ability of the transmission 
system t o  deliver the generated energy to the major load points. This 
approach provides a more realistic appraisal of system well-being indices 
than a basic HLI evaluation. 
7. BASIC CONCEPTS OF UNIT COMMITMENT HEALTH 
ANALYSIS IN COMPOSITE SYSTEMS 
7.1 Introduction 
One of the most basic elements in power system operation is the 
determination of how much generating capacity should be committed to meet 
the system load while satisfjnng the operating criteria. This capacity should 
contain suflicient reserve to supply the system requirements under conditions 
of generating unit forced outages o r  unforeseen variations in the system load. 
These aspects were covered in the previous chapters a t  HLI. A second but 
equally important element in the operating process is to assess the ability of 
the transmission system to transfer the generated energy to the major load 
points. Complete analysis of this problem involves a detailed treatment on 
an integrated basis of both the generation and transmission facilities [142]. 
The techniques presented in the previous chapters are focused on the 
generating system functional zone designated as HLI. Operating health 
analysis at HLI is based on the concept that the committed units can be 
considered to be connected to a system bus and serve the total system load 
demand at  this bus. Transmission constraints and the actual physical 
location of the generating units are not included in the analysis. In an actual 
power system, the generating units and loads are usually dispersed 
throughout the system and are not concentrated a t  a single bus. In 
hierarchical level I1 (HLII) studies, the simple generatiodoad model used in 
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HLI is extended to include bulk transmission facilities. Reliability analysis at 
this level is usually termed as composite system reliability evaluation. 
Operating reserve assessment, therefore, should include not only the 
generation capacity in the system and the total load demand, but also the 
associated transmission network. In a practical power system, the reliability 
associated with a transmission network depends on many factors and can 
create a wide range of operational restrictions. 
The concepts of HLI unit commitment health analysis is extended in this 
chapter to unit commitment in composite generation and transmission 
systems. The problem of unit commitment is decomposed into two 
subproblems. Generating units are first committed to the system based on 
HLI operating criteria [60] followed by unit commitment evaluation at HLII. 
The committed capacity should satisfy the operating criteria at both HLI and 
HLII. Operating reserve evaluation a t  KLII recognizes the ability of the 
transmission system to deliver the generated energy to the major load points 
and therefore contains additional constraints such as acceptable voltages at 
load buses, transmission line load carrying capabilities and real and reactive 
power considerations. A procedure is introduced to determine the operating 
state probabilities using a contingency enumeration technique. The required 
number of committed units and the associated well-being indices at HLI and 
HLII are determined for a given load level. The results are compared and 
discussed by application to the IEEE-RTS. 
7.2 Network Solution Techniques 
Operating reserve assessment of a bulk power system generally involves 
the solution of the network configuration under selected outage situations. 
Various techniques, depending upon the adequacy and security criteria and 
the intent behind these studies are available for analyzing the system. The 
three basic analytical approaches utilized in power system analysis are the 
network flow, dc load flow and ac load flow techniques. The selection of an 
appropriate technique is of prime importance and is an engineering decision. 
The selected technique, however, should be capable of satisfymg the intent 
behind the studies from a management, planning and operating point of view 
1671. 
It is not realistic to attempt to consider all possible contingencies in an 
operating reserve evaluation study. The main constraint in considering a 
large number of outage events is the computation time required to solve these 
contingencies using an acceptable solution technique. This may dictate fast 
solution techniques using simplified or approximate methods. One of the 
simplest approaches is to treat the system as a transportation model 
[143,144] and to examine it in terms of its ability to ensure the continuity of 
power supply a t  various load centers. This technique, when applied to  
composite power system reliability evaluation, is basically concerned with the 
continuity of the power flow from the generating buses to the major load 
points in order to supply the load demand in the system. The constraints are 
the generating capacity available at the generating buses and the power 
carrying capabilities of the transmission lines. 
The approximate dc load flow technique 11451 applied in contingency 
analysis can be formulated as the following linear model: 
where 
[PI Vector of bus power injection, 
[B] System susceptance matrix and, 
[6] Vector of bus phase angle. 
The vector of bus phase angle [6] can be obtained by solving Equation 7.1 
using [PI and [B]. Optimal ordering and triangular factorization of the 
system susceptance matrix are used to achieve rapid solution time. The bus 
phase angles, computed using forward and backward substitution, are then 
used to determine the individual branch flows as given by: 
where 
pij Real power flow from Bus i to Bus j ,  
5i Phase angle at  Bus i , 
6i Phase angle at Bus j and, 
Xu Reactance of the line between Bus i and Bus j . 
It can be seen from Equation 7.2 that for a fixed set of power infection [ P I ,  
if a line(s) idare) removed from system then both [B] and [ 6 ]  will change 
from their base case values. The changes in angle vector c a n  be computed 
using the Sherman-Momson correction formula [I461 instead of rebuilding 
and factorizing the system susceptance matrix [B]. The new line flows can be 
calculated from Equation 7.2 using the new values o f  [6],,, . 
Approximate load flow techniques such as dc load flow method are 
relatively simple and fast but do not provide any estimate of the bus voltage 
and the reactive power requirements of the generating units. The fast 
decoupled load flow technique is a good compromise between ac and dc load 
flow approaches in regard to storage requirements and solution speed. It can 
also be used to check the voltage quality of a power system thus meeting the 
two important adequacy requirements. A brief description of the fast 
decoupled load flow technique is given below. 
The general equations for the power mismatch at all system buses except 
the swing bus can be obtained using the Newton-Raphson method [147]. The 
fast decoupled load flow approach neglects the weak coupling between the 
changes in real power and voltage magnitude, and the changes in reactive 
power and phase angle. The mismatches of  active and reactive power can 
therefore be expressed by Equations 7.3 and 7.4. 
PI = [ J s l [ ~ ~ 1 9  
[AQ] = [J&v 1 v] 
Active power mismatch at Bus z , 
Reactive power mismatch at Bus i , 
Increment in phase angle of the voltage at Bus i ,  
Increment in magnitude of the voltage at Bus i , 
Submatrixes of the Jacobian matrix, 
Phase angle of the voltage at Bus i and, 
Magnitude of the voltage at Bus i . 
Equations 7.3 and 7.4 can be further simplified by making the following 
assumptions, which are usually valid in a practical power system: 
where 
gu - jbu Series admittance of the line connecting Buses i and j and 
Qi Reactive power at Bus i .  
Considering the above assumptions Equations 7.5 and 7.6 are derived 
from Equations 7.3 and 7.4. 
[M] = [V. B ' . V][A~]  (7.5) 
[AQ] = [V. B".V][AV / V ]  (7.6) 
T h e  final equations used in the fast decoupled load flow technique are 
given in Equations 7.7 and 7.8 after making further physically justifiable 
simplifications. 
Both matrixes [B'] and [ B W J  are real, sparse and contain only network 
admittances. Since [B'] and [B"] are constant, they need to be inverted or 
factorized only once at the beginning of the iterative process. The magnitude 
of the voltage at each load bus and the phase angle at each bus except the 
slack bus are modified as given in equations 7.9 and 7.10. 
Power mismatch [AP] and [AQ] are calculated for these new values of bus 
angle and bus voltage. Equations 7.7 and 7.8 are iterated in some defined 
manner towards an exact solution, i.e. when power mismatches are less than 
the tolerance. In the case of line o r  transformer outages, the Sherman- 
Momson correction technique [I461 can be used to reflect the outages instead 
of rebuilding and refactorizing the system matrixes [B '1 and [B"]. 
7.3 Hierarchical Levels One and Two Security Constraints 
The operating limits which have to be satisfied during the operation of a 
power system are designated as security constraints. There are many 
constraints that govern power system operation. The constraints applied in a 
given situation usually depend on the purpose behind the study. In an HLI 
operating reserve assessment, the basic system model is one in which the 
committed units and loads are connected to a single bus. The applied security 
constraints, therefore, refer to the power generated and the total load 
demand [60,61] as expressed in Equation 7.11 where pr in  and Prat 
represent the minimum and the maximum power generation at Bus k. The 
corresponding region is defined by Rp . 
The effect of transmission lines and the actual physical location of the 
generating units are not considered in an HLI operating reserve assessment. 
Assessment of unit commitment a t  HLII, therefore, includes the ability of the 
transmission system to deliver the generated energy to the major load points. 
The basic HLII security constraints for acceptable power system operation 
can be considered as: 
7.3.1 Line Flow Constraints 
Thermal operating limits of the transmission lines and transformers 
dictate that the current flow through them should be limited. This can be 
expressed as: 
Where k is the branch connecting Buses i and j and the associated region is 
defined as 4. 
7.3.2 Voltage Magnitude Constraints 
The voltage magnitude at all PQ buses should be within specified limits 
which can be expressed by region 4. 
Where Vmin* and V,. are minimum and maximum acceptable voltage 
levels respectively. 
Operating resenre assessment at HLII can be performed considering one 
or  a combination of the above constraints. The required number of committed 
units and the associated well-being indices are very dependent on the 
selected security constraint sets. In the results presented in this chapter, the 
security constraint sets are defined by combining Rp and % or combining all 
the three constraints. 
7.4 Model Implementation 
The system well-being Framework introduced in Chapter 2 can be used for 
unit commitment in a composite generation and transmission system. The 
state definitions, therefore, should consider the security constraints 
associated with a composite system. In the healthy state, all the equipment 
and security constraints are within limits while supplying the total system 
demand. In this state, there is s e c i e n t  margin such that the loss of any 
element in the system covered by the deterministic criteria, e-g. the loss of 
any single element, will not result in a limit being violated. The marginal 
state is similar to that of the healthy state, but there is no longer sufEcient 
margin in the system such that the loss of some elements will result in a limit 
being violated. In the risk state, equipment or system constraints are violated 
and some load may be curtailed. It should be noted that in an HLI operating 
health analysis, the system elements are the committed generating units. 
The system, therefore, in the healthy state can tolerate the outage of any 
single generating unit [60]. In an HLII operating health analysis, the outage 
of any single committed unit, or any single transmission line should be 
tolerated in the healthy state. A risk index designated as the Generating 
System Operating State Risk (GSOSR), which is the probability of the system 
being in the risk state, was utilized in HLI unit commitment assessment [60]. 
A comparable index defined as the Composite System Operating State Risk 
(CSOSR) in the assessment of unit commitment at MII. The probabilities 
associated with the healthy and risk states can be considered as unit 
commitment criteria. 
7.5 Analysis Technique 
The problem of composite system unit commitment is decomposed into two 
subproblems. For a given load level, unit scheduling is first performed at HLI 
in accordance with the specified HLI operating criteria. The basic objective is 
to satisfy Equation 7.16 [60,6l]. 
If the system is required to satisfy multiple criteria at HLI, then Equation 
7.17 must be satisfied in addition to Equation 7.16. 
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where prn, PP and sprnr,' and spfLJ  are the HLI calculated and 
specified system risk and healthy state probabilities respectively. 
Once the required number of committed units at HLI is determined, the 
well-being indices at HLII are calculated for the same number of committed 
units and load level. Even if the number of committed units is such that the 
system is operating in the healthy state at  MI, it may not be in the healthy 
state in HLII, depending on the security constraints considered. The system 
is therefore required to satisfy the HLII unit commitment criterion as 
expressed by Equation 7.18. For multiple criteria, Equation 7.19 must be 
satisfied in addition to  Equation 7.18. 
HLII PP 2 sph 
where pFLII, pIflLI' and S P ~ ?  and spFLJ1 are the HLII cdculated and 
specified system risk and healthy state probabilities respectively. 
The operating state probabilities are calculated using a contingency 
enumeration technique which consists of three basic steps: 
1. Systematic selection and evaluation of contingencies, 
2. Contingency classification according to predetermined 
security constraints, 
3. Identihing the status of each contingency based on the 
operating state definitions. 
The number of cases that have to be evaluated in a composite system risk 
assessment can be very large. In the studies described in this chapter, 
therefore, the contingency classification was carried out using the selection 
technique [I481 in order to  reduce the computation time. 
Figure 7.1 shows the flowchart for detecting the operating states up to 
third level outages. The flowchart can be extended to consider higher level 
outages. In this figure, FLV, SLV and TLV are used to recognize whether 
respectively First, Second or  Third Level outages create a system problem or 
not. Having a value of 1 for FLV, SLV or TLV implies that  the associated 
outage level created a system problem. A value of 0, however, is given to F lV ,  
SLV o r  TLV, if no security constraint is violated due to  single, second o r  third 
level outages respectively. The base case probability is calculated considering 
that all the committed units and transmission facilities are in service. The 
total probability of the enumerated contingencies is less than unity and the 
probabilities not captured in the enumeration approach are considered as 
part of the system risk. The system risk is, therefore, calculated using the 
complementary value of the summation of the healthy and marginal state 
probabilities. In the studies presented in this chapter, contingencies up to 
fourth-level generator outages, third level transmission lines outages and 
third level combined transmission and generating units outages are 
considered. If the security constraints are violated due to a given contingency, 
the system condition belongs t o  the risk state, otherwise it lies in either the 
healthy o r  marginal state depending on the impact of the next level outages 
of this system condition. Operating state designation decisions cannot be 
made for the highest outage order level (here third-level outages for 
transmission lines and fourth-level outages for the generating units) which do 
not violate the security constraint(s) due to not considering the next level. In 
this thesis, contingencies with these extreme conditions are considered to be 
in the marginal state. The obtained results are therefore slightly pessimistic. 
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Figure 7.1 Flowchart for detecting operating state conditions. 
7.6 Application to the IEEE Reliability Test System 
Unit commitment health analyses using the IEEE-RTS are described in 
this chapter. The single line diagram of this system is shown in Figure 2.3. 
The system has 11 generator (PW buses, 13 load (PQ) buses, 33 transmission 
lines and 5 transformers. The acceptable voltage limits for the system buses 
are assumed to be 1.05 and 0.95 p-u.. Failure rates, repair times and other 
load flow data can be found in Appendix C. From the single h e  diagram, it 
can be seen that the outage of Line 11 will isolate Bus 7. This isolation will 
cause the probability of the healthy state to be zero even though there is no 
other system violations. To avoid this situation, the first level outage of Line 
11 and the associated higher level outages with this line are ignored. The 
number of generating units to be committed for a particular load level are 
taken from the priority order list given in Table 2.1. 
Generating units are first committed to the system such that the HLI unit 
commitment criterion are satisfied [60]. The unit commitment criterion could 
be a specified risk, an acceptable healtny state probability or both depending 
on the required degree of reliability. The selection of specified values for the 
risk and the healthy state probabilities depends largely on the experience of 
the system operator and the conditions under which the system is being 
operated. 
It should be noted that in a totally deregulated industry environment, 
there is no single body who can dictate the unit commitment that provides 
the least cost solution. Generator companies provide MW block price lists and 
the control operator, responsible for system security and reliability, commits 
blocks of energy from the published MW-price order list that satisfies the 
minimum spot price and system security. The idea of committing units from a 
MW-price list is more o r  less equivalent to committing units f?om a priority 
order list. In this thesis, therefore, it is assumed that the merit order list is 
the MW-price order list and units are committed until the reliability 
condition(s) are satisfied. 
7.6.1 Hierarchical Level One Unit Commitment Results 
Figure 7.2 shows a typical hourly peak load variation in a 24 hour 
committed period in percent of the annual peak load for the IEEE-RTS . The 
annual peak load of the system is 2850 MClr and the system lead time is 
assumed to be 4 hours. The required number of committed units at each hour 
is shown in Figure 7.3 for two different cases. In the single criterion (SC) 
case, a specified risk of 0.01 must be satisfied. The system is required to  
satisfy an acceptable healthy state probability of 0.9 in addition to a specified 
risk of 0.01 in the multiple criteria (MC) case. The system health and risk 
state probabilities associated with the two cases are shown in Figures 7.4 and 
7.5, where the healthy state probability is zero for the SC case during the 24 
hour period. This is due to insufficient spinning reserve to tolerate single unit 
outages. The system, therefore, must commit more unit(s) in addition to those 
already committed to satisfy the multiple criteria. 
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Figure 7.2: 24 hour load variation for the IEEE-RTS. 
Figure 7.3: Required number of committed units. 
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Figure 7.4: HLI healthy and marginal state probabilities. 
Figure 7.5: HLI risk state probability. 
7.6.2 Hierarchical Level Two Unit Commitment Evaluation 
Once the number of committed units at HLI has been determined, the 
next step is to satisfy the HLII unit commitment criteria, which could be the 
same as those used at HLI or some other desired values. In the studies 
presented in this thesis, the same criteria are considered for unit 
commitment at HLII. The same lead time was also used for calculating the 
HLII system well being indices. The HLII unit commitment risk is evaluated 
using the algorithm shown in Figure 7.1. If the accepted criteria are not 
satisfied, units are committed &om the merit order list until the criteria are 
satisfied. In this analysis, up to fourth-level generator outages, third-level 
line outages and third level Line plus generator outages are considered. The 
analysis covers more than 99.996% of the total sample space at the system 
peak load of 2850 MW with 24 committed units. The remaining probabilities 
the higher level contingencies and are added to the probability of the risk 
state. 
7 m 6 a Z m 1  Hierarchical Level Two Unit Commitment Using a Single 
Criterion 
The HLII well-being indices were calculated considering different security 
constraint sets using the committed units shown in Figure 7.3 for the SC. The 
system has zero healthy state probability at both HLI and HLII levels. Figure 
7.6 shows the variations in the marginal and risk state probabilities. From 
the results it can be seen that  the number of committed units in the HLI 
study provides an acceptable HLIl single criterion, i.e. a specified risk of 0.01. 
The HLII risk is slightly higher than that at M I  for a given load level. The 
selected security constraint set also has an effect on the HLII system well- 
being indices. The number of contingencies which create problems increase 
when both the voltage (SII) and line-flow (SI) constraints are taken into 
account. Table 7.1 shows the HLI and HLII well-being indices for the peak 
load of 2850 MW with 24 committed units. 
Table 7.1: Well-being indices at a load level of 2850 MW with 24 committed 
units. 
I constraint I Health 1 Mar& I Risk 
HLI I I 0.0 1 0.99228090 1 0.00771910 
HLII SII 
SI+SII 
0.0 
0.0 
0.99202285 
0.99202149 
0.00797715 
0.0079785 
- HLn (SI & SII) 
Hour 
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Figure 7.6: Comparison of HLI and HLII well-being indices with a single 
criterion. 
7.6.2.2 Hierarchical Level Two Unit Commitment Using Multiple 
Criteria 
The multiple criteria results shown in Figure 7.3, have HLI healthy state 
probabilities higher than 0.9 at d hours as shown by MC in Figure 7.4. The 
system may or may not satisfy multiple criteria at HLII with these 
committed units. If only line-flow constraints (SI) are considered in the 
analysis, multiple criteria are satisfied at all hours except hours 1, 2, 23 and 
24. The reason for this is that two single level outages violate the constraint 
at these hours. Outage of Line 12 causes Line 13 to be overloaded and vice 
versa. The system is required to commit one o r  two additional units to those 
already committed at these hours in order to satisfy the multiple criteria. The 
number of committed units at  hours 1 and 24 increase from 14 to 15 and 
those of hours 2 and 23 increase from 13 to 15. The HLII healthy state 
probabilities are therefore higher than those for the HLI study at these 
hours. Figures 7.7 and 7.8 show the associated HLI and HLII well-being 
indices for the 24 hour period where multiple criteria are satisfied at  both 
HLI and HLII levels. It can be seen from these figures that for a given load 
level, the HLII healthy state probability is slightly lower than that of the HLI 
study provided that other conditions remain the same. The HLII risk, 
however, is greater than that at HLI. 
The system has a zero HLII healthy state probability during the 24 hours 
when both security constraint sets are taken into account. The reason for this 
is that in addition to those single line outages which create overload problems 
a t  hours 1, 2, 23 and 24, there are single level line outages which create 
voltage problems at all hours. Table 7.2 shows the single level outages which 
I ; 
create system problems at some load levels. The outage of Line 27 creates 
voltage problems at all hours. The results are tabulated in Table 7.3 for the 
system peak load of 2850 MW with 28 committed units. It can be seen £?om 
the results that for this system, the problems are more voltage than overload 
related. 
Table 7.2: Single Line outages which violate security constraints. 
Table 7.3: Well-being indices at a load level of 2850 MW with 28 committed 
units* 
f constraint I Health 1 Mar& I Risk 1 
Single level contingencies hour 
7.6.3 Effect of Lead Time Variation 
Generating units are usually committed to the system for a specified time 
load 
period during which additional generation can be made available after a time 
No* of 
units 
delay known as the system lead time. In the previous studies it was assumed 
that the IEEE-RTS has a lead time of 4 hours. Figures 7.9 and 7.10 show the 
impact on the HLI and HLII well-being indices of lead time variation. The 
HLII well-being indices were calculated using the number of committed units 
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Figure 7.7: Comparison of the HLI and HLII healthy and marginal state 
probabilities for multiple criteria 
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Figure 7.8: Comparison of the HLI and HLII risk state probabilities for 
multiple criteria 
stated in Section 7.6.2.2. The system can satisfy HLI and HLII multiple 
criteria during the 24 hour period when only line overload (SI) is considered 
as a system problem and the system lead time is 4 hours. It can be seen from 
the results, that at  any given hour the healthy state probability decreases as 
the system lead time increases. The risk state probability, however, increases 
as the lead time increases. The IEEE-RTS cannot satisfy the acceptable HLI 
and HLII healthy state probability of 0.9 at  some of the load levels when the 
system lead time is more than 4 hours. The KLI and HLII healthy state 
probabilities decrease from 0.93942112 and 0.93060565 to 0.88231612 and 
0.87351425 respectively a t  a load level of 2565 MW (hour 9 in Figure 7.9) 
with 19 committed units as the system lead time increases from 4 t o  8 hours. 
The system is required to commit 20 units at this load level to satisfy the 
multiple criteria when the system lead time is 8 hours. 
Figure 7.9: Variation of HLI and HLlI system healthy and marginal indices 
versus lead time. 
Figure 7.10: Variation of HLI and MI1 system risk indices versus lead 
time. 
7.7 Conclusions 
This chapter extends the concepts of HLI unit commitment health 
analysis proposed in [60] to unit commitment in composite generation and 
transmission systems. The problem of unit commitment is decomposed into 
two subproblems. Generating units are first committed to the system based 
on the HLI operating criteria followed by unit commitment evaluation at 
HLII. The committed capacity should satisfy the operating criteria at both 
HLI and HLII levels. The required number of committed units and the 
associated well-being indices are very dependent on the selected secur i ty  
constraint sets. An approach is presented in this chapter to  determine the 
operating state probabilities using a contingency enumeration technique. The 
results obtained for this system indicate that the number of committed units 
at  HLI provides acceptable HLII operating state indices if only line-flow 
constraints are considered in the analysis. This, however, is not the case 
when voltage constraints are taken into account, due to the increased number 
of contingencies which create problems. It, therefore, can be concluded that in 
this system the HLII problems are more voltage than overload related. 
Utilization of the well-being framework in unit commitment is a new 
concept, which while complementing the risk evaluation approach, also 
provides important information to system operators on the degree of system 
well-being. Its application at HLII provides interesting opportunities t o  
evaluate the system support required to meet acceptable operating criteria in 
a deregulated utility system. Operating reserve in a system can be in the 
form of spinning reserve or stand-by reserve. Some utilities also consider 
interruptible load as a form of system reserve. In the studies reported in this 
chapter, it was assumed the system contains only spinning reserve. The 
implications of considering stand-by units and interruptible load are 
discussed in the next chapter. 
8. UNIT COMMITMENT IN COMPOSITE GENERATION 
AND TRANSMISSION SYSTEMS CONSIDERING 
STAND-BY UNITS AND INTERRUPTIBLE LOAD 
8.1 Introduction 
The rapid growth of power networks and interconnections between 
utilities has led to the recognition that transmission networks play a critical 
role in determining overall system reliability. A power system operator is 
continuously faced wi th  the problem of making good decisions rapidly. This 
imposes many burdens in order to ensure the system is operated economically 
but with an acceptable level of security. Security is achieved by maintaining 
extra operating capacity at all times. This extra capacity can be in the form of 
spinning reserve or  stand-by capacity [3]. Some utilities also consider 
interruptible load as a part of operating reserve in emergency conditions or to 
reduce operating costs. Interruptible/curtailable load tariffs are one of the 
most frequent load management programs implemented by both U.S. 
investor-owned and publicly owned utilities [149,150]. Reference [I511 
illustrates an interruptible load program activated by the Taiwan Power 
Company in 1987. The term, interruptible load, has also been defined in 11521 
as a recallable commitment as opposed to versus non-recallable firm load. 
Recallable contracts are cut before non-recallable contracts to reestablish 
system security. 
The basic concepts associated with unit commitment health analysis in 
composite generation and transmission systems are discussed in Chapter 7 
where the operating reserve in the system consists of only spinning reserve. 
Stand-by units and intemptibIe load can be incorporated in the operating 
reserve assessment in composite generation and transmission systems using 
the concept of area risk curves [3]. Stand-by units and interruptible load can 
have considerable effect on composite system operating reserve assessment. 
The impact on the composite generation and transmission system well-being 
indices of variations in the size and location of rapid start and hot reserve 
units are examined in this chapter. A procedure has been developed to 
determine the required number of units for a given load level and the 
associated well-being indices. The impact of having generating capacity at 
different locations in a system should be of considerable interest in the new 
competitive environment. 
8.2 Stand-by Units and Interruptible Load Models 
The basic two state model does not contain sufficient detail to adequately 
represent stand-by units. A matter of concern when dealing with rapid start 
and hot reserve units is the possibility of their failure to start. The available 
state space models for such units can take this possibility into account 
1112,1531. This is discussed in Section 4.3 of Chapter 4. Rapid start units 
such as gas turbines can be represented by a four state model as shown in 
Figure 4.2. These units can be made available for service within minutes. Hot 
reserve units can be represented by a five state model as shown in Figure 4.3. 
The transition rates associated with the rapid start and hot reserve units are 
given in Appendix D. The time dependent state probabilities can be 
calculated using the matrix multiplication techniques presented in Section 
Interruptible load can be modeled as an equivalent generating unit with 
zero failure rate [38] or considered as a load variation, as shown in Figures 
8.1 and 8.2 respectively. In this chapter the load variation model is used for 
the purpose of computational analysis. 
total load 
i Y  0 0  1 fkmload 
I 
1 
0 z T time 
Figure 8.1: Load variation approach model for interruptible load. 
spinning capacity 
i 
I 
Figure 8.2: Equivalent unit approach model for interruptible load. 
u 
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8.3 Problem Formulation 
I I 
I 
I total load I 
I 
The problem of unit commitment in a composite generation and 
transmission system (HLII) can be decomposed into two subproblems. 
Generating units are first committed to the system such that the HLI 
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operating criteria are satisfied. The number of committed units at HLI are 
then considered as the initial required number of committed units at HLII 
subsequent evaluation of the HLII well-being indices. 
8.3.1 Inclusion of Stand-by Units 
Consider a system with n, rapid start units and nh hot reserve uni ts  
requiring Nsi units to be committed as spinning units t o  meet a given load 
level while satisfying the HLJ operating criteria. The MI1 well-being indices 
are calculated using area risk concepts. Figure 8.3(a) shows an area risk 
curve in which the reserve in the system is only spinning reserve. A typical 
area risk curve for a system with stand-by units is shown in Figure 8.3W 
Rapid start units become available at time t, and the system risk decreases 
by Dm. The system risk is fbrther decreased by Drh when hot reserve units 
become available at time th.  At time t,, additional units become available 
and the risk is negligible after this time. In this chapter, the number of 
committed units refers to the number of units which are spinning and does 
not include stand-by units. The HLII operating state probabilities based on 
the number of committed units and with the inclusion of stand-by units are 
calculated using the following procedure. 
HLII- HLII R, = ~ ' ~ F ' ~ ( l Z ) d t  = Pr5 
t h pr4 
R a ~ i d  start units in 
/* ~ o t  r e s e ~ e  units in 
0 t 
r th a T 
Figure 8.3: Area risk function without (a) and with (b) stand-by units. 
Adding and subtracting ( p A Y +  p P ) D r  on the right hand side of 
Equation 8.7 gives, 
In addition, the system risk can be defined using Equation 8.9: 
Regrouping the terms in Equation 8.8 and using Equation 8.9 gives: 
where 
F1 ( R ) ,  HLII area risk h c t i o n  with only spinning reserve, 
F2(R), HLII area risk function with the inclusion of stand-by 
units, 
Ra ?Rb 3 4  Partial risks in the area risk cuxve, 
4 Total decrease in risk, 
Drs 7 Orh Decreased risk due to the inclusion of rapid start and 
hot reserve units respectively, 
NLIl 
m I I , ~ r H W I  Calculated HLII healthy, marginal and risk state ph *Pm 
probabilities using area risk Function F2 t RI, 
HLII mII Calculated HLII healthy, marginal and risk state p h ~  P~~ V P r s  
probabilities considering only spinning reserve using 
area risk function Fl(R), 
Lead time of rapid start and hot reserve units 
respectively, 
Lead time of additional generating units, 
Number of rapid start  and hot reserve units 
respectively, 
The operating state probabilities can be calculated using a contingency 
enumeration technique. A hybrid approach is used in this chapter to calculate 
the HLII operating state probabilities. Considering a given set of HLII 
security constraints, the system is either in the risk or not at risk state for a 
given outage level. The not at  risk state reflects the system ability to operate 
with no constraints being violated, i.e. the system is in either the healthy or 
marginal state. As previously noted, the decision on whether the contingency 
belongs to the healthy or marginal state involves an analysis of all possible 
next level outages involving that particular outage. It is, therefore necessary 
to  keep a record of the contingency states and to update these records as the 
enumeration proceeds. This can lead to additional memory requirements and 
computation time particularly when the size of the system and the number of 
units, both spinning and stand-by, are large. 
In order to decrease both the computation time and the memory 
requirement, the partial risks for the different periods shown in Figure 8.3(a) 
are calculated considering the system operating states as being in either the 
risk or not at risk state. It is, therefore, not necessary t o  keep a record of each 
contingency level when calculating the partial risks in different periods. 
Using the above procedure, once the HLII risk state probability is calculated, 
it is compared with the specified value. The basic objective is to satisfy a 
specified HLII risk as expressed in Equation 8.12. 
pHLII SpHLZI 
r r 
where Wrmn is the HLII specified system risk state probability. 
If Equation 8.12 is not satisfied, one more unit must be committed to those 
already committed and the procedure continued until it is satisfied. It should 
be noted that during this procedure, no healthy o r  marginal state 
probabilities need to be calculated to satisfy Equation 8.12. Assume that the 
system needs Nsii committed units to satisfy Equation 8.12. Once the single 
risk criterion (Equation 8.12) is satisfied, the HLII healthy, marginal and 
risk state probabilities are calculated considering only the spinning units 
( Nsii). The final HLII healthy and marginal state probabilities are then 
calculated using Equations 8.10 and 8.11. If only a single risk criterion must 
be satisfied, the procedure is terminated at this point. The procedure must be 
continued until Equation 8.13 is also satisfied in the case of multiple criteria. 
where SPh HL" is the HLII specified system healthy state probability. 
8.3.2 Inclusion of Interruptible Load 
The presence of interruptible loads can affect the composite well-being 
indices. Load curtailment can be considered as a means of reducing system 
risk when necessary and stand-by units are unavailable [38]. A basic 
requirement is a rate structure which provide incentives to both the utility 
and the customer. The customer then agrees to reduce its demand as and 
when requested by the utility. Reduction can be achieved by automatic or 
manual control. No matter what control methods are used, a relatively short 
notice must be issued by the operator prior to the load interruption. This time 
period is designated as the interruptible load lead time. 
Controlled load interruption can be considered as an ability to bring ready 
reserve into the system depending on the allowable time delay of the load 
interruption. As  discussed in Chapter 6, the effect of interruptible loads can 
be incorporated in operating reserve assessment using the concept of area 
risk c w e s .  A typical area risk curve for a system with an interruptible load 
is shown in Figure 8.4 (i.e. lower curve, in which T and t, are the time of load 
interruption and the time required to bring additional units into service 
respectively. 
- interrptible load 
Figure 8.4: Area risk curve for load interruption. 
The total load, which is the summation of the firm load and the 
interruptible load is required to be supplied in the period 0 to r. In the next 
period 7 to ta only the firm load remains. At time r, LI MW of load is 
interrupted and the risk contribution decreases. The composite well-being 
indices for the entire lead time can be evaluated using a similar technique to 
that utilized for rapid start and hot reserve units. 
Unit commitment procedure can be summarized as follows: 
A l .  Specify the HLI operating criteria, 
A2. Determine the required number of committed units in HLI, 
Consider the number of committed units in Step A2 as the initial 
number of committed units for HLLI and define HLII operating 
criteria, 
Calculate the HLII risk state probability using Equation 8.1, 
Vthe specified HLII risk is satisfied, go to Step B5, otherwise go to 
Step B4, 
Add one unit to the already committed units and go to Step B2, 
Calculate HLII healthy and marginal state probabilities using 
Equations 8.10 and 8.11. 
For multiple criteria go to Step B7, otherwise go to Step B8, 
If specified HLII healthy state probability is satisfied go to Step B8, 
otherwise go to Step B4. 
Stop. 
The proposed technique is illustrated by application to the IEEE-RTS in 
the next section. 
8.4 Application to the IEEE Reliability Test System 
The single diagram of the IEEE-RTS is shown in Figure 2.3. As noted in 
Chapter 7, the outage of line 11 will cause complete isolation of Bus 7. The 
probability of the healthy state will therefore be zero using the criterion that 
the loss of any single element will not result in a limit being violated or load 
curtailment. Outage of Line 11, therefore, has been considered as a special 
case, which does not violate the healthy state definition. Four different 
studies have been performed. In each study, HLI indices were evaluated 
followed by HLII assessment. The first study provides a set of basic results 
when the reserve in the system is only in the form of spinning reserve. In the 
second and the third cases, rapid start and hot reserve units are included in 
the analysis. Interruptible load is included in the analysis in the fourth 
study. Unit commitment is done considering both single and multiple criteria. 
The single criterion is a specified risk of 0.01, while in the multiple criteria 
case, an acceptable healthy state probability of 0.9 must be satisfied in 
addition to a specified risk of 0.01. In these analyses, up to fourth level 
generator outages, third level line outages and third level line plus generator 
outages are considered. The system is assumed to be operating in the risk 
state for higher order outages. 
8.4.1 Basic Study Results 
Table 8.1 shows the required amount of spinning capacity for different 
load levels considering the single criterion at HLI where OR represents the 
amount of operating reserve at the given load level and the corresponding 
number of committed units. The healthy state probability is zero for some 
load levels due to insufficient spinning reserve. Table 8.2 shows the results 
when the multiple criteria are applied. 
Table 8.1: HLI unit commitment (single criterion). 
Table 8.2: HLI unit commitment (multiple criteria) 
load 
I 
1425 
1995 
2280 
2850 24 351 0.99228091 0.0071 1909 
units 
10 
13 
15 
I 
load units OR Wedth 
1425 
1995 , 
2280 
2850 
OR 
516 
4 1  1 
381 
10 
13 
16 
28 
Health 
0.97684725 
0.95691649 
0 
516 
411 
481 
415 
Margin 
0.02298005 
0.04272104 
0.99254908 
Risk 
1 
0.000 I7271 
0.00036247 
0.00745092 
0.97684725 
0.95691649 
0.95424218 
0.91916923 
0.02298005 
0.04272104 
0.04536093 
0.08011214 
0.00017271 
0.00036247 I
0.00039689 
0.00071863 
The HLII results are very dependent on the security constraints 
considered. The security constraints associated with composite systems are 
discussed in Chapter 7. Tables 8.3 and 8.4 show the HLII results when line 
flow constraints are included in addition to the KLI security constraint. In 
Table 8.3, the system healthy state probability is zero for almost all the load 
levels. The reason for this is that in addition to the single unit outage 
violations (Units 5, 6) single line outages also create a system problem. The 
committed capacity at HLI, however, is sufficient to satisfy the HLII single 
risk criterion. Comparing the results shown in Tables 8.3 and 8.4 with those 
of Tables 8.1 and 8.2, it can be seen that for a given load level and the 
corresponding number of committed units, the HLII risk is higher than that 
of HLI due to the inclusion of transmission line constraints. The results 
presented in Table 8.4 show that the committed capacity for satisfying the 
multiple criteria at HLI can satisfy the multiple criteria at HLII except at the 
1995 MW load level. The reason for this is that a single outage of either Line 
12 or 13 will result in overload in the other. It can be seen from the system 
topology that this problem can be overcome by committing additional capacity 
at Bus 7. The system, therefore, should commit 15 units, i.e. two units more 
than those required to satisfy multiple criteria at HLI, in order to satisfy the 
multiple criteria at HLII using the priority loading order given in Table 2.1. 
The system could also satisfy the criteria by changing the priority loading 
order and committing Unit 15 (at Bus 7) after committing Unit 13 (at Bus 
23). In this case, the system is required to commit only one more unit to the 
13 already committed units. The results for these two cases are shown in 
Table 8.5. These results can assist the system operator to decide which unit 
should be committed to satisfy the operating criteria at the lowest operating 
cost. The operating costs for the three cases in Table 8.5 are $19381.05, 
$19970.34 and $20065.26/hou.r espectively. 
Table 8.3: HLII unit commitment (single criterion). 
Table 
Table 8.4: HLII unit commitment (multiple criteria). 
8.5: Various options in unit commitment at a load level of 1995 MW. 
The HLII results change significantly when voltage constraints are also 
considered. The committed capacity at HLI shown in Table 8.1 can satisfy the 
single risk criterion at HLII even with the inclusion of voltage constraints. 
The system risk, however, increases compared to that shown in Table 8.3. 
The reason for this is that some of the contingencies which belong to the 
marginal state transfer to the risk state by including voltage constraints in 
Risk 
1 
0.00042332 
0.00030449 
Margin 
0.99957668 
0.05285679 
load 
1995 
1995 
units 
13 
14 
OR 
411  
511 
Health 
0 .O 
0.94683872 
the analysis. h e  system risk at  the load level of 2850 MW with 28 committed 
units increases from 0.00076698 to 0.00103144 when voltage constraints are 
added to the line flow constraints considered. The system also cannot satisfy 
the HLII healthy state probability of 0.9 with the committed capacity shown 
in Table 8.4 when both voltage and line flow constraints are considered. The 
reason for this is that at all load levels there are some single level line 
outages which create voltage problems. The system has zero healthy state 
probability at the load level of 2856 MW with 28 committed units when 
voltage constraints are considered, compared to 0.90866715 when only line 
flow constraints are considered. 
8.4.2 Results with the Inclusion of Rapid Start Units 
It was assumed in the base case studies thaf the reserve in the system is 
only spinning reserve. The IEEE-RTS has a number of gas turbine rapid start 
units which are assumed to be available within 10 minutes [115]. Table 8.6 
shows the required number of committed units at HLI for different load levels 
when the system has two 25 MW gas turbine units in addition to the 
generating units given in Table 2.1. The generating units were committed to 
the system using both the single and multiple criteria [61]. It should be noted 
that spinning reserve is the spinning capacity in excess of the system load 
and operating reserve is the summation of spinning reserve and all other 
types of reserve in the system, such as stand-by reserve and interruptible 
load. The location of rapid start units is not considered in HLI analysis. Ln 
order to conduct HLII unit commitment assessment, it was assumed that the 
gas turbine units are connected at Bus 1. 
Table 8.6: HLI unit commitment including two 25 MW rapid start units. 
SR =Spinning reserve 
OR =Operating reserve 
I 
Table 8.7 shows the HLII results with the single criterion considering the 
number of committed units shown in Table 8.6. The line flow and power 
constraints (SI) are considered as security constraints. Compared to the 
results shown in Table 8.3, it can be seen that at some load levels, the system 
requires less spinning reserve with the inclusion of rapid start units. Table 
8.8 shows the HLII results when the voltage constraint (SII) is added to the 
constraints already considered in Table 8.7. Compared to the results shown 
in Table 8.7, it can be seen that the system risk increases for a given load 
level. The reason for this is that some of the contingencies which previously 
belonged to the marginal state transfer to the risk state due to voltage 
constraint violations. 
Table 8.7: HLII unit commitment (single criterion and SI constraint). 
I 
load 
MW 
1425 
1995 
2280 
2850 
single criterion 
SPC =Spinning capacity 
multiple criteria 
units - ' b i t s  SPC 1 SR I OR 
10 
13 
16 
- 28 
SR SPC 
9 
13 
15 
- 21 - 
OR 
319 
411 
381 
315 
1744 
2406 
2661 
3165. 
369 
461 
431 
- 365 
Table 8.8: HLII unit commitment (single criterion and SI+SII constraints). 
Table 8.9 shows the KLII results when the system is required to satisfy 
multiple criteria. The required number of units increases to that shown in 
Tables 8.4 and 8.5, even with the inclusion of rapid start units. The reason for 
this is that rapid start units cannot transfer the system to the healthy state 
if it is initially operating in the marginal state [61]. Voltage constraints are 
included in the results shown in Table 8.10, where it can be seen that the 
system is not able to satisfy a healthy state probability of 0.9. The HLII 
multiple criteria are not satisfied, even by committing additional units. The 
results show that the system problems are voltage rather than line flow 
related. 
Table 8.9: HLII unit commitment (multiple criteria and SI constraint) 
Table 8.10: HLII unit commitment (multiple criteria and SI +SII constraints) 
load 
1425 
. 
1995 
2280 
2850 
units 
10 
14 
16 
28 
load units OR Health 
1425 
1995 
2280 
2850 
OR 
566 
565 
531 
465 
3 
10 
14 
16 
. 28 
Health 
10.96588526 
0.94573389 
0.93807005 
0.90887663 
hJ> 
566 
565 
531 
. 465 
Margin 
0.03395179 
0.05405328 
0.06159410 
0.09058673 
Risk 
1 
0.000 162% 
0.00021283 
0.00033585 
0.00053664 
0.00000004 
0.00000002 
0.00000012 
~0.00000012 
0.99963819 
0.99970507 
0.99958245 
-0.99908655 
0.00036177 
0.00029491 J 
0.00041743 
0.00091333 
In the results presented in Tables 8.7 to 8.10, it was assumed that the two 
gas turbine units were connected at Bus 1. The system well-being can be 
affected by varying the location and size of the rapid start units. The most 
suitable location to insert a unit can be determined by examining the system 
contingencies, particularly single level contingencies and their consequences. 
Determination of the optimum location of rapid start units was not 
considered in these studies and only the impact of changing the location was 
examined. 
At most load levels, single level outages of Lines 4, 10 and 27 violates the 
voltage limits at  Buses 4, 5 and 3 respectively. At a load level of 1995 MW 
and 13 committed units, single level outages of Lines 12 and 13 violate the 
line flow limits and the single outage of Line 27 creates system voltage 
problems. Consider that the two 25 MW gas turbine units are connected at 
Buses 7 and 3 (one at each). The system has a risk state probability of 
0.000395 at the 1995 MW load leveI, with 13 committed units and the two 25 
MW gas turbine units connected to Buses 7 and 3. The system risk decreases 
compared to the case when the two gas turbine units are connected at Bus I 
with a risk of 0.00045018 (Table 8.8). The system health varies slightly 
because it depends mostly on the amount of spinning reserve in the system or  
the healthy state probability without the stand-by units (Equation 8.10). The 
system cannot transfer to the healthy state by changing the location of the 
rapid start units, if it is initially operating in the marginal state. 
No single level outage creates voltage or line flow problems when the 
system is at  the load level of 1995 MW and commits 13 units assuming that 
the two 25 MW rapid start units are available at the decision time of t=O. The 
system health, margin and risk state probabilities are 0.94975922, 
0.04969407 and 0.00054671 respectively. This, however. cannot be achieved 
by committing additional units based on the priority loading order given in 
Table 2.1. Committing 14 or 15 units can overcome the line flow problem as 
shown in Table 8.5 but the voltage constraint is still violated with the single 
level outage of Line 27. It should be noted that in this case, the two units are 
considered as spinning units. 
8.4.3 Results with the Inclusion of Hot Reserve Unit 
The lead time associated with a conventional thermal unit can be reduced 
by maintaining the boiler in a hot state. Assume that this is the case with one 
of the 100 MW units at Bus 7. The priority loading order shown in Table 2.1 
is therefore modified by removing one of the 100 MW units from Bus 7. The 
number of generating units in the table is now 31. Unit commitment was 
performed for two load levels of 2280 and 2850 MW considering the 100 MW 
h o t  reserve unit with single criterion (SC) and multiple criteria (MC). As 
shown in Table 8.11 the system is now required to commit 14 o r  16 units 
respectively for a load of 2280 MW to satisfy the single o r  multiple HLI 
criteria. 
Table 8.11:HLI unit commitment including one 100 MW hot reserve unit. 
Criterion 
SC 
MC 
The HLII well-being indices were determined using the proposed 
approach. It should be noted that when only hot reserve units are included in 
Risk 
i 
0.00840593 
0.00867590 1 
0.00015730 
0.00027164 
the analysis, the calculations for Periods 1 and 2 of the area risk curve are 
Margin 
0.99156458 
0.99129362 
0.04537180 
0.05358464 
load 
2280 
2850 
2280 
P.. 
2850 
SPC 
2561 
3101 
2761 
. - - 
3305 
u n i t s  
14 
23 
16 
- -. 
3 1 
Health 
"- 0.00002949 
0.00003048 
0.95447090 
0.94614372 
not necessary. Table 8.12 shows HLII results considering the line flow 
constraint set (ST). The system at the load level of 2280 MW with 14 
committed units and without the hot reserve unit has HLII healthy, marginal 
and risk state probabilities of 0.0, 0.98879124 and 0.01120876 respectively. 
In this case not even the single risk criterion is satisfied. There are three 
single generating unit outages and two single Line outages which violate the 
security constraints. The system risk decreases to 0.0085229 when a 100 MW 
hot reserve unit comeded at Bus 7 is included in the andysis. The system 
can satisfy the HLII multiple criteria o n l y  when two more units are 
committed to the system. With 16 committed units at the 2280 MW load 
level, the system has 481 MW of spinning reserve and 581 MW of operating 
reserve. Table 8.13 shows the HLII results when voltage constraints (SII) are 
also added to the security constraint set. The system risk increases with the 
inclusion of more constraints provided that the other parameters remain the 
same. The system cannot sat isfy multiple criteria even by committing 16 
units. The reason for this is that single level outages of Lines 4, 10 and 27 
create voltage problems. 
Table 8.12: HLII unit commitment including one 100 MW hot reserve unit. 
(SI) 
load [units OR 
381 
481 
351 
581 
2280 
2280 
2850 
2280 
14 
15 
23 
16 
Health 
O.OOOO3O 11 
0.00003854 
0.00003094 
0.93820150 
Margin 
0.99144699 
0.99756946 
0.99125131 
0.06160273 
Risk 
0.00852290 
0.00239201 
0.00871775 
0.00019577 
Table 8.13: HLTI unit commitment including one 100 MW hot reserve 
unit. (SI+SE) 
As in the case of rapid start units, varying the location and the size of hot 
load 
2280 
reserve units cannot transfer the system to the healthy state if it is originally 
operating in the marginal state. The system with 16 committed units and no 
units 
14 
stand-by units has healthy, marginal and risk state probabilities of 0.0, 
0.99937988 and 0.00062012 respectively. The inclusion of a 100 LMW hot 
OR 
381 
reserve unit has little effect on the system health as can be seen from Table 
8.13. The system risk decreases by 34% with the inclusion of the hot reserve 
Health 1 Margin 
0.00002983 10.99125934 
unit. 
Risk 
0.00871083 
Assuming that a 76 MW unit at Bus 1 is in the hot state, the system has 
healthy, marginal and risk state probabilities of 0.00002979, 0.99141907 and 
0.00855114 respectively at the 2280 MW load level with 14 committed units. 
Comparing this with the results shown in Table 8.12, it can be seen that 
there is only a slight difference in the two cases. It can be concluded that if 
only a single risk criterion must be satisfied, then the inclusion of stand-by 
units can decrease the required amount of spinning reserve. This, however, is 
not the case if multiple HLII criteria are applied. 
8.4.4 Results with the Inclusion of Interruptible Load 
In order to illustrate the effect of interruptible load on the system 
operating state probabilities, it was assumed that the IEEE-RTS has the 
ability to interrupt 5% of its load within a time delay of 10 minutes. The 
required number of generating units and the system operating state 
probabilities has an HLI study are shown in Tables 8.14 and 8.15 for single 
and multiple criteria respectively using the technique presented in [61]. The 
system lead time is assumed to be 4 hours. Comparing the results shown in 
Table 8.14 with those shown in Table 8.1, it can be seen that the required 
number of committed units decreases with the inclusion of interruptible load 
as a part of operating reserve. The system, however, is required to commit 
more unit(s) to satisfy the multiple criteria as shown in Table 8.15. The 
Table 8.14: HLI unit commitment with interruptible load (single criterion). 
load 
-
Table 8.15: HLI unit commitment with interruptible load (multiple criteria) 
units 
9 
12 
14 
20 
Health I Margin load units I Int. load OR I Risk 
I I I 
2850 ( 28 1 142.5 1 557.5 
Int. = Interruptible load 
Int. Ioad 
71.25 
99.75 
114.0 
142.5 
OR 
397.25 
355.75 
495.0 
493.5 
Health 
0.00003490 
0.00003624 
0.00003915 
0.00004471 
Margin 
0.99248995 
0.99240992 
0.99242778 
0.99231192 
Risk 
O.il0747515 
0.00755384 
0.00753307 
0.00764337 
number of committed units for a given load level in Table 8.15 is identical to 
that in Table 8.2. The reason for this is that the inclusion of interruptible 
load cannot transfer the system to the healthy state if it is initially operating 
in the marginal state [61]. 
Table 8.16 shows the HLII results when the system is required to satisfy a 
single criterion. The required number of units is identical to those shown in 
Table 8.14. Only line flow constraints are considered in the results presented 
in Table 8.16. This table shows the number of committed units at the 
corresponding load levels required to satisfy the single risk criterion when 
interruptible load is included in the analysis. It should be noted that these 
committed units cannot satisfy the single criterion without considering 
interruptible load. The system with 9 and 20 committed units at the 1425 and 
2850 MW load levels has risk state probabilities of 0.01077763 and 
0.01159134 respectively when the system has no interruptible load. The 
system well-being is affected by including voltage constraints in the analysis. 
The system risk at the load level of 2850 MW with 20 units increases from 
0.00770106 to 0.00792252 when voltage constraints are added to the line flow 
constraints already considered. 
Table 8.16: HLII unit commitment with interruptible load (single criteric 
OR Health load units Int. Margin Risk 
1 
1425 9 71.25 397.25 0.00003513 0.99244762 0.00751725 
1995 12 99.75 355.75 0.00003659 0.99233391 0.00762950 
2280 14 114.0 495.0 0.00003971 0.99228780 0.00767249 --- -
2850 20 142.5 493.5 0.00004509 0.99225385 0.00770106 
Table 8.17 shows the HLII results when the system is required to satisfy 
multiple criteria. The system with 13 committed units a t  the load Ievel of 
1995 MW cannot satisfy the multiple criteria even with the inclusion of 
interruptible load. The reason for this is that single level outages of Lines 12 
and 13 violate the line flow constraints. These violations cannot be overcome 
by increasing the amount of interruptible load o r  by decreasing the 
interruption time and can only be eliminated by committing additional 
unit(s). It can be concluded that similar to the case of stand-by units, the 
system cannot transfer to the healthy state by including interruptible load, if 
it is initially operating in the marginal state. 
Table 8.17: HLII unit commitment with interruptible had (multiple criteria) 
8.5 Conclusions 
a 
A security constrained reliability evaluation approach is presented in this 
chapter to assess overall generating unit operating reserve in a composite 
generation and transmission system using a well-being framework. 
Operating reserve in the system consists of spinning and stand-by reserves 
and interruptible load. The HLII well-being indices are calculated using a 
hybrid approach to save computation time and to decrease the memory 
requirement. The results presented indicate that composite generation and 
transmission system well-being indices and the required number of 
b 2850 1 28 1 142.5 1 557.5 1 0.90918328 1 0.09061882 1 O.OOOl9785 1 
load 
1425 
1995 
2280 
units 
10 
13 
16 
Int. 
71.25 
99.75 
114.0 
OR 
587.25 
5 10.75 
595.0 
Health 
0.96589198 
0.00000004 
0.93820435 
Margin 
0.03395202 
0.99967647 
0.06160290 
Risk 
I 
0.00015600 
0.00032349 
0.00019274 
committed units are affected by the desired operating criteria, security 
constraint sets, size and location of stand-by units and interruptible load. 
Inclusion of stand-by capacity and interruptible load can decrease the 
required amount of spinning resenre when only  a single risk criterion is 
utilized. This is not the case when multiple HLII unit commitment criteria 
are applied. The most suitable location for stand-by units can be determined 
by examining the system contingencies and their consequences. Varying the 
size and location of stand-by units, increasing the amount of interruptible 
load and decreasing the interruption time change the HLII well-being indices, 
but cannot transfer the system to the healthy state, if it is initially operating 
in the marginal state. 
9. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Operating reserve provides an electric power system with the ability to 
respond to unforeseen load changes and sudden generation outages and a 
wide range of techniques have been used to determine operating reserve 
requirements. Both deterministic and probabilistic techniques can be utilized 
to determine the required level of operating reserve to be maintained by a 
system. Deterministic approaches do not specifically recognize the probability 
of component failures in the assessment of operating reserve. Probabilistic 
techniques can be used to take into account the random outages of system 
components and other stochastic component behavior. Probabilistic 
approaches generally base the design and operating constraints on  the 
criterion that the risk of certain events must not exceed a preselected limit. 
Many utilities still prefer to use a deterministic technique due to the 
difficulty in interpreting a numerical risk index and also the lack of sufficient 
information provided by a single index. There is also a considerable interest 
in utilities to embed deterministic considerations into the evaluation of 
probabilistic indices. A practical way to overcome these difficulties is to 
monitor the system well-being. The system well-being is described by a set of 
operating states designated as healthy, marginal and a t  risk. The events 
leading to each operating state can be identified and the probabilities 
associated with these operating states evaluated. The probabilities associated 
with the healthy and risk states can be considered as operating criteria. A 
probabilistic technique has been developed for unit commitment and 
assessment of generating system operating health, margin and risk in 1541 
and is briefly discussed in Chapter 2. The technique overcomes some of the 
difficulties in interpreting the risk index and also provides the system 
operator wi th  important information on the degree of system well-being 
compared to that available from the basic probabilistic techniques. This 
technique has been extended in this research work to cover the overall area of 
operating reserve assessment. 
Operating reserve evaluation involves two distinctly different aspects. 
The first is unit commitment, in which the system operator decides which 
units should be committed to satisfy the operating criteria presented in 
Chapter 2. The second aspect is associated with unit dispatch decisions and 
the evaluation of the response capability of the committed units. Both aspects 
are necessary to obtain a complete appraisal of the operating reserve 
requirement, i.e. these activities complement rather than substitute for each 
other. In the assessment of unit commitment, the operating state 
probabilities are calculated based on the total amount of spinning reserve in a 
system, where spinning reserve i s  d e h e d  as the difference between the total 
operating capacity and the system load. An assigned amount of spinning 
reserve must be available within a given period of time in the event of a 
sudden loss of generating capacity, unforeseen changes in the system load o r  
any other contingency which results in a loss of capacity. The concepts of unit 
commitment health, margin and risk are extended in Chapter 3 to include the 
response capability of the committed units. A risk index designated as the 
GSRSR is defined as the load dispatch criterion. Once the number of 
committed units are determined, the spinning reserve should be allocated 
among the committed units to satisfy the response criterion. This criterion 
could be a specified GSRSR, an acceptable response health probability o r  
both. The operating cost, however, varies with different response criteria. An 
algorithm is presented in this chapter to determine the required number of 
units and the optimal load dispatch of the committed units based on the unit 
commitment and response criteria. The results show that if a system has a 
high unit commitment healthy state probability it also has the potential to 
have a high response healthy state probability. This, however, depends upon 
the margin time, the response rate of the units and how the spinning reserve 
is allocated among the committed units. 
The ability of a system to respond to sudden changes and to pick up load 
depends on its unit types. Thermal units can pick up 1-38 of their full output 
capacity in one minute. Rapid start units can pick up load in a relatively 
short period of time. These units, therefore, can participate in the response 
health, margin and risk constrained load dispatch if their lead time is less 
than the specified margin time. Interruptible load can also be considered as 
part of the response reserve. The effects on the response health, margin and 
risk probabilities of factors such as rapid start units, interruptible loads and 
postponable outages are illustrated and presented in Chapter 4. An 
important aspect of rapid start units and interruptible loads is that a system 
which is in the marginal response state because of insufficient response 
reserve can transfer to the healthy state when these elements are present. 
The results also show that for a given load dispatch, the response risk 
decreases by increasing the degree of postponability. The relationships 
between the unit commitment and the response health, margin and risk are 
pictorially illustrated in this chapter in order to make these concepts more 
understandable. 
The reliability of a power system is, in general, greatly improved by 
interconnection with other power systems. Assessment of operating reserve 
requirements in an interconnected generating system should include not only 
the generation and load models of the participating systems, but also the tie- 
line model and the agreement between the interconnected systems. 
Assessment of unit commitment in two interconnected systems is illustrated 
in Chapter 5. The problem of interconnected system unit commitment is 
decomposed into two subproblems. Unit scheduling is first performed in each 
isolated system in accordance with the specified operating criterion. Once the 
required number of committed units in each area is determined, the next step 
is to satisfy the operating criterion associated with the overall interconnected 
system. The criterion could be a specified interconnected system risk, an 
acceptable interconnected healthy state probability o r  both. A procedure is 
illustrated in this chapter to determine the operating state probabilities for 
the overall interconnected system. The results presented show that system 
well-being can be considerably improved by interconnection with another 
system. Each system can operate at either the same or at a higher level of 
reliability with a lower reserve than would be required without 
interconnection. A number of studies are illustrated in Chapter 5 to evaluate 
the impact on the interconnected system well-being of factors such as peak 
load, lead time, tie-line carrying capabilities, load forecast uncertainty, 
degree of postponability and derated states. 
A generation system with a given number of committed units can serve a 
target firm load level designated as the FLCC. Under normal operating 
conditions, the generating capacity in operation is greater than the firm load 
and with this number of committed units, the system may also be able to 
carry a limited amount of interruptible load on top of the firm load without 
violating the operating criterion. Under these conditions, a larger system load 
can be served without committing additional units other than those required 
to car ry  the firm load. This additional load must be capable of interruption at 
short notice, if required. The capability of a system to serve the additional 
interruptible load is designated as the system interruptible load carrying 
capability (ILCC). Chapter 6 presents a probabilistic technique to evaluate 
the ILCC in both isolated and interconnected generating systems. A set of 
ILCC is determined for a given number of committed units and the associated 
FLCC, which consists of different amounts of interruptible load and the 
associated lead times. The condition is then formulated as an optimization 
problem. The ILCC level which maximizes the expected energy supplied is 
taken fi-om the set and designated as the OILCC of the generation system. 
The OILCC for two interconnected systems is determined by combining the 
two sets associated with the isolated systems. The interruption times are 
modified using an energy based approach to satisfy the interconnected system 
operating criteria defined in Chapter 5. 
The techniques and the procedures presented in Chapters 2 to 6 are 
associated with conventional HLI operating health analysis, whlch is based 
on the major assumption that the committed units are connected to  a single 
bus and serve the total system load demand at this bus. Transmission 
constraints and the actual physical location of the generating units are not 
included in the analysis. In an actual power system, the generating capacities 
and loads are usually dispersed throughout the system and are not 
concentrated at a single bus. In composite system studies (HL 111, the simple 
generat iodoad model used in HLI is extended to include the bulk 
transmission facilities. The approach illustrated in Chapter 7 is a new 
technique for operating reserve evaluation which includes the ability of the 
transmission system to deliver the generated energy to the major load points. 
This approach provides a more realistic appraisal of well-being indices than a 
basic HLI evaluation. The problem of unit commitment is decomposed into 
two subproblems. Generating units are first committed to the system based 
on the HLI operating criteria followed by unit commitment evaluation at 
HLII. The committed capacity should satisfy the operating criteria at both 
HLI and HLII. The required number of committed units and the associated 
well-being indices are very dependent on the selected security constraint sets. 
An approach is presented in this chapter to determine the operating state 
probabilities using contingency enumeration techniques. The results obtained 
for the IEEE-RTS indicate that the number of committed units a t  HLI 
provides acceptable HLII operating state indices if only line-flow constraints 
are considered in the analysis. This, however, is not the case when the 
voltage constraints are included, due to the increased number of 
contingencies which create problems. This, however, is not a general system 
conclusion and each system must be evaluated on its own merits. 
Operating reserve in a system can be in the form of spinning reserve or 
stand-by reserve. Some utilities also consider interruptible load as part of the 
system reserve. In the studies reported in Chapter 7, it was assumed that the 
system reserve is only spinning reserve. Recognition of stand-by units and 
interruptible load is discussed in Chapter 8. The HLII well-being indices are 
calculated using a hybrid approach to save computation time and decrease 
the memory requirement. The results presented indicate that composite 
generation and transmission system well-being indices and the required 
number of committed units are affected by the desired operating criteria, 
security constraint sets, size and location of stand-by units and interruptible 
load. Inclusion of stand-by capacity and interruptible load can decrease the 
required amount of spinning reserve only in those cases in which a single risk 
criterion is utilized. This, however, is not the case when multiple HLII unit 
commitment criteria are applied. The most suitable location for stand-by 
units can be determined by examining the system contingencies and their 
consequences. Varying the size and location of stand-by units, increasing the 
amount of interruptible load and decreasing the interruption time change the 
HLII well-being indices, but cannot transfer the system to the healthy state if 
it is initially operating in the marginal state. 
The developed methods and techniques presented in this thesis have been 
applied to the two reliability test systems, the IEEE-Reliability Test System 
(IEEE-RTS) and the Roy Billinton Test System (RBTS). The results obtained 
by utilizing the IEEE-RTS are illustrated in Chapters 2,3,4,5,6,7 and 8. 
Appendix A presents the results obtained utilizing the RBTS. 
In conclusion, utilization of the well being framework in operating reserve 
assessment is a new concept, which while complementing the risk evaluation 
approach, also provides important information to system operators on the 
degree of system well-being. It is expected that the well-being framework and 
the concepts developed in this research work will prove extremely useful in 
the new competitive utility environment. 
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A. APPLICATION TO THE ROY BILLINTON 
TEST SYSTEM 
A1 Introduction 
Many techniques have been developed for conducting power system 
reliability analysis[13-171. The literature also contains reference or "test" 
systems to provide a basis for testing and comparing the results obtained 
from alternate methods. Two basic reliability test systems, the Institute of 
Electrical and Electronic Engineering Reliability Test System (ZEEE-RTS) 
1891 and the Roy Billinton Test System (RBTS) [154,155], have been 
published. The IEEE-RTS is a relatively Iarge power system in which 
sufficient complexity and detail have been included to make the test system 
representative of an actual utility system. The system was described in 
Section 2.7 of Chapter 2. The application of the system well-being concepts in 
operating reserve assessment are illustrated in this thesis using the BEE- 
RTS. The RBTS is a small power system developed by Professor Roy 
Billinton, which is utilized extensively in reliability research work at the 
University of Saskatchewan. All the initial concept developments described in 
this thesis were done using the RBTS. These studies provide a useful 
framework for further development and educational activities in system well- 
being analysis. 
k2. Description of the Roy ~illintdn Test System ( RBTS) 
The Roy Billinton Test System is an educational test system developed at 
the University of Saskatchewan. The basic objective in designing the RBTS 
was to  make it sufficiently small to permit a large number of reliability 
studies with reasonable solution time but sufficiently detailed to  reflect the 
actual complexities involved in practical reliability analysis. 
The single Line diagram of this system is shown in Figure A.1. The system 
has 6 buses, 9 transmission Lines and 11 generating units, ranging fkom 5 
MW to 40 MW. The annual system peak load is 185 M W  and the total 
installed generating capacity is 240 MW. The generation data for the RBTS 
are given in Table A.1. Additional data are given in Appendix B. The results 
presented utilize the main concepts developed and illustrated in the previous 
chapters. 
Table kl: Generating Unit Data of the RBTS. 
Bus 
Failure 
rate 
[ V , ~ r l  
Priority 
loading 
order 
RR 
Unit 
size 
[MWI 
RR= Response Rate in MW/min. 
1 
2-3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8-9 
10-11 
3 
2.4 
6 
6 
5 
4 
2.4 
a 
3 
8 
4 - 
2 
2 
1 
1 
4 
I 
40 
20 
40 
40 
20 
10 
20 
5 
Cost parameters 
9 
2 
1 
1 
1 
I 
2 
2 
C A 
0 
0 
0.0 1 
0.01 
0.02 
0.02 
0 
0 
B 
0 
0 
26 
28 
16 
14 
0 
0 
0.5 
0.5 
12 
12 
12.25 
12.5 
0.5 
0.5 
2x40 MW 
1x20 M w  
lXl0 M w  
BUS 1 
BUS 2 
T 
20 M w  
7 
BUS 4 
Figure kl: Single line diagram of the RBTS. 
A3 Hierarchical Level I Unit Commitment Health Analysis 
Once a unit commitment criterion is adopted, the goal is to satisfy the 
criterion throughout the various stages of system operation. A unit 
commitment schedule has been developed using a seven step load model of 
the RBTS assuming that the system lead time is four hours. Table A.2 shows 
the required number of committed units and the corresponding probabilities 
of the different operating states when a specified risk of 0.01 is selected as 
the unit commitment criterion. It can be seen from Table A.1, that the 
probability of the healthy state is zero for all load levels. The reason for this 
is '&at the system with the designated number of committed units and at the 
corresponding load level does not have sufficient spinning reserve to tolerate 
any single unit outage [156,157]. 
Table A.3 shows the number of committed units and system operating 
state probabilities when the system is required to satisfy an acceptable 
healthy state probability of 0.9 in addition t o  satisfying a specified risk of 
0.01. It can be seen from Table A.3, that the system must commit  one or two 
units, in addition to  the previously committed units, to  satisfy the multiple 
mi teria. 
Table k2: Unit commitment in the RBTS for a single criterion. 
Table k3: Unit commitment in the RBTS for multiple criteria. 
h load I soinninel no. of I Probabilitv of 
In the results presented in Tables A.2 and A.3, it was assumed that the 
reserve in the system is only spinning reserve. Rapid start units can also be 
considered as part of the operating reserve in order to decrease the required 
spinning reserve. The RBTS has a number of gas turbine units with a 
capacity of 10 MW [154]. The rapid start units are assumed to be available 
within a lead time of 10 minutes. Tables A.4 and A.5 shows the required 
number of committed units and the system well-being indices considering 
that the system has two 10 MW rapid start units in addition to the on  line 
committed units. Comparing the results shown in Table A.4 with those shown 
in Table A.2, it can be seen that the required number of committed units 
decreases with the inclusion of rapid start units. The number of committed 
units shown in Table A.5 are identical to those in Table A.3 even with the 
inclusion of rapid start units. The reason for this is that rapid start units 
cannot transfer the system to the healthy state if it is initially operating in 
the marginal state [61]. 
Some utilities consider interruptible load as a part of the operating 
reserve. Tables A.6 and A.7 show the results assuming that 10% of the 
system load can be interrupted within an interruption time of 5 minutes. The 
Table k4: Unit commitment in the RBTS including rapid start 
(single criterion). 
units 
Table k 5 :  Unit commitment in the RBTS including rapid start units 
(mu1 tiple criteria). 
Table A.6: Unit commitment in the RBTS including interruptible load - -- 
(single criterion). 
load 
CMW] 
L 
74 
r 
92 
111 
129 
148 
166 
185 
no. of 
units 
4 
5 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Probability of 
I 
Risk 
I 
0.0000078 
I 
0.00000677 
0.00002172 
0.00001710 
0.00002960 
0.00003298 
0.00003636 
Health I Margin 
0.99371747 
0.99317266 
0.99099820 
0.98875557 
0.98694954 
0.98587196 
0.98479555 
0.00627473 
0.00682056 
0.00898008 
0.01122733 
0.01302086 
0.01409506 
0.01516809 
Table k 7 :  Unit commitment in the RBTS including interruptible load 
(multiple criteria). 
load - no. of ht. load frobability of 
[MW] units IMW] Health I Margin I Risk 
, . 
single and multiple operating criteria are identical to those for Tables A.2 
and A.3. 
A4 Response Health Analysis 
Assessment of unit commitment does not consider how the system 
spinning reserve must be allocated among the committed units in order to 
provide the minimum operating cost at  an acceptable level of response 
reliability. Consider that unit commitment is done for the RBTS at a load 
level of 60% of the peak load of 185 MW, i.e. 111 MW, to satisfy the multiple 
criteria. The number of committed units is 5 and the total system spinning 
reserve is 49 MW. The system with this number of committed units has a 
high healthy state probability based on a unit commitment point of view as 
shown in Table A.3. It may o r  may not be in the healthy state in terms of 
system responding capability as this is extremely dependent on how the 
spinning reserve is distributed among the committed units. Only 20 MW of 
the total 49 MW of spinning resewe is available within a margin time of 5 
minutes based on the economic load dispatch, which has the lowest operating 
cost of $470.8. The generating units are reloaded to provide more response 
capability using the procedure described in Chapter 3. The variation in power 
outputs of the committed units and the total operating cost versus the system 
response are shown in Figure A.2. A discrete load change of 1 MW was used 
to obtain the loading schedules. The response capability, therefore, changes 
with each 1 MW step. 
Figure A.2 has been divided into three different ranges assuming that the 
required regulating margin (RRM) is 5046 of the spinning reserve (SR), i.e. 24 
MW. Starting from an economic load dispatch, the unit loadings are adjusted 
by moving in the direction required to satisfy the response criterion. The 
response criterion could be a specified response risk, a specified response 
healthy state probability or both as described in Chapter 3. The lower range 
of unit power outputs represents the results where the response output varies 
from 20 to 24 MW and the system is in the risk state from response point of 
view. If a specified response risk of 0.001 is selected as the operating 
criterion, then the system should have at least 25 MW of response output to 
satisfy this criterion. A vertical line at a response output of 25 MW in Figure 
A.2 shows the optimum load dispatch for this condition .In this case, the 
operating cost increases from $470.8 to $529.98 and the response risk 
probability decreases from 1.0 to 0.00018834. All different load dispatches on 
the right hand side of this line meet the response criterion but this point has 
the cheapest cost. The second vertical line is the optimum load dispatch if the 
system is required to satisfy a specified response healthy state probability of 
0.9 in addition to satisfying an acceptable response risk of 0.001. At this load 
dispatch, the totai response output is 41 MW and the system operating cost is 
$721. The response health probability is 0.99981166 uiith this response 
output. 
Risk 1 I I Health 
10 ! I I I I I I I 
20 25 30 35 40 45 
Response output [Mm 
Figure k 2 .  Unit power outputs and operating costs versus response. 
Table A.8 shows the economic load dispatch for a seven step load model of 
the RBTS. The number of committed units are such that the system can 
satisfy multiple unit commitment criteria as shown in Table A.3. The 
response health, margin and risk probabilities are calculated assuming that 
the required regulating margin is 50% of the spinning reserve at each load 
level and the margin time is 5 minutes. The response risk is unity for some 
load levels, because of insufficient response capability. Table A.9 shows the 
results when a specified response risk of 0.001 is selected as the response 
criterion. The results show that the response healthy state probability is zero 
for all load Levels. The reason for this is that the system with the available 
response output within the margin time of 5 minutes and at the 
corresponding load level cannot respond to a specific single unit outage. Table 
A.10 shows the results when the system is required to satisfy an acceptable 
response healthy state probability of 0.95 in addition to satisfying a specitied 
response risk of 0.00 1. 
Table k g :  System response health, margin and risk probabilities for a single response criterion. 
Table k8; System response health, margin and risk probabilities for economic load dispatch. 
Table A.10: System response health, margin and risk probabilities for multiple response criteria. 
oad SR RRM Cost generating unit outputs Response RM 
vlW MW MW $ U1 U2 U3 U4 U5 U6 U7 U8 U9 , Health Margin Risk MW 
20 20 25 0.9998687 0 0,0001313 41 
20 20 17 16 10.9998117 0 0.0001883 41 
oad 
MW 
74 
92 
111 
129 
148 
166 
185 
Response Generating unit outputs 
oad 
vlW 
74 
92 
111 
129 
148 
166 
185 
Response 
Risk 
0.0001313 
1 .O 
1 .O 
1 .O 
0.0002359 
0.0002968 
0.0003196 
Health 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Cost 
$ 
179 
414.15 
529.98 
721.38 
961.21 
946.09 
&943.54 
Cost 
$ 
179 
332 
470.81 
709.43 
961.21 
946.09 
943.54 
SR 
MW 
46 
68 
49 
51 
42 
44 
45 
Margin 
0.9998687 
0 
0 
0 
0.9997641 
0.9997032 
0.9996804 
U1 
24 
32 
40 
40 
40 
40 
40 
SR 
MW 
46 
68 
49 
51 
42 
44 
45 
Health 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
XRM 
MW 
23 
34 
24 
25 
21 
22 
22 
U6 
5 
8 
7 
7 
BRM 
MW 
23 
34 
24 
25 
21 
22 
22 
Margin 
0.9998687 
0.9998117 
0.9998117 
0,9997641 
0.9997641 
0.9997032 
0.9996804 
Generating unit outputs 
0.0001313 
0.0001883 
0.0001883 
0.0002369 
0,0002359 
0.0002968 
0.0003196 
26 
36 
25 
26 
30 
30 
30 
U7 
3 
3 
3 
U2 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
U4 
10 
10 
15 
22 
28 
28 
27 
U3 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
U6 
5 
8 
7 
7 
U1 
24 
25 
35 
39 
40 
40 
40 
U8 
20 
20 
U5 
10 
16 
22 
29 
28 
28 
U3 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
U2 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
U9 
20 
U7 
3 
3 
3 
U4 
10 
14 
18 
23 
28 
28 
27 
U8 
20 
20 
-U5 
13 
18 
22 
29 
28 
28 
U9 
20 
The variation in the system operating cost of the three load dispatches is 
shown in Figure A.3. It can be seen that the system operating cost increases 
as the system is required to satisfy single or  multiple response 
compared to that of the economic load dispatch. 
l#U) 1 Economic load dispatch 
Single criterion 
Multiple criteria 
criteria 
A W  
40 50 80 70 80 90 100 
Load [%I 
Figure k3: Variation in system operating cost for different load dispatches. 
The margin time is an important factor which influences the system well- 
being. The spinning reserve has been allocated among the on-line units such 
that multiple response criteria must be satisfied. The results are presented in 
Figure A.4 for three different margin times (MT). The system load of 185 MW 
is designated as the 100% load level. It can be seen from the results that for a 
given load level, the response healthy state probability decreases as the 
margin time increases . 
Figure A S  shows the variation in the system operating cost wi th  system 
peak load. It can be seen that the operating cost increases as the peak load 
- 
Risk state probability Healthy state probability 
increases. In comparison with the results shown in Figure A.4, it can be seen 
that for a given load level the operating cost increases as the response health 
probability increases. 
40 50 80 70 80 90 1W 
Load [%] 
Figure k5: Operating cost for various margin times. 
Rapid start gas turbine units can pick up load in a relatively short period 
of time. These units, therefore, can participate in the response health, margin 
and risk constrained economic load dispatch provided that their lead time is 
less than the margin time. Table A.11 shows the economic load dispatch of 
the seven step load model using the number of committed units presented in 
Table A.4. The margin time in this study is considered to be 10 minutes. The 
results show that the system at  the economic load dispatch can also satisfy a 
specified response risk of 0.001. This, however, is not the case without 
considering rapid start units. Table A.11 shows that this system can satisfy 
multiple response criteria only at the 129 MW load level. Table A.12 shows 
the economic load dispatch when the number of committed units are identical 
Table A.11:System response health, margin and risk probabilities for economic load dispatch and a single 
res~onse criterion considering rapid start units. 
1 
RRM 
Mw 
3 
14 
4 
15 
6 
7 
2 
Response Cost 
$ 
37 
21 1.44 
447.61 
694.01 
933.12 
1175.26 
Generating unit outc 
Risk Health 
0 
0 
0 
0.96097618 
0 
0 
0 
Table k 1 2 :  System response health, margin and risk probabilities for economic load dispatch, single and 
multiple response criteria considering rapid start units. 
- 
oad 
VIW 
- 
74 
92 
111 
129 
148 
166 
185 
-
Cost 
$ 
179 
332 
470.81 
709.43 
961 -21 
946.09 
943.54 
Generatine r unit out~uts  
Risk 
0.00010109 
0.00014158 
0.00021524 
0.00010124 
0,00028890 
0.00029067 
0.00029244 
Health 
to those shown in Table A.5. It  can be seen that the system at the economic 
load dispatch can satisfy both single and multiple response criteria if 
required. 
In addition to the generating capacity, some utilities consider 
interruptible load as a part of the operating reserve. Interruptible load can 
increase the response capability of the system if the interruption time is less 
than or  equal to the margin time. Table A.13 shows the economic load 
dispatch and the associated response well-being indices of the seven step load 
model of the RBTS considering that the system has the ability to interrupt 
10% of the load a t  an interruption time of 5 minutes. The number of 
committed units are identical to those shown in Table A.6. It can be seen 
from the results that the system at the economic load dispatch can also 
satisfy a specified response risk of 0.001 if required. The system will have 
more response reserve if the 5 units a t  the 129 MW load level are reloaded to 
satisfy multiple criteria. In this case, the system operating cost increases 
from $694.01 to $790.25. Table A.14 shows the economic load dispatch when 
the number of committed units are identical to those shown in Table A.7. The 
system at  the economic load dispatch can satisfy the single response risk 
criterion at  all load levels. I t  can be seen by comparing Table A.8 with Table 
A.14, that the system can transfer to  the healthy state by inclusion of 
interruptible load for the last three load levels and with the same operating 
cost. 
Table A.15 shows the results in which multiple response criteria are 
satisfied at all load levels. Compared to the results shown in Table A.14 it can 
be seen that the system operating cost increases for some load levels with the 
provision of more response reserve. 
Int. load 
MW 
Cost 
$ 
37 
211.44 
447.61 
694.01 
933.12 
1175.26 
r unit outputs 
number of committed units shown in ~ n b k  A.7. 
Table A.13: System response health, margin and risk probabilities for economic load dispatch using the 
number of committed units shown in Table A.6. 
to Table k14: System response health, margin and risk probabilities for economic load dispatch using the 
t\3 
CD 
load 
MW 
74 
92 
111 
129 
148 
166 
185 
RM 
MW 
13.4 
19.5 
20.1 
33 
27 
27.6 
23.5 
-. 
[ 1. 
- r - .  
40 1 16 
Generating unit outputs 
Response 
Health 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
RM Int*HRM Cost load 
U9 
20 
Margin 
0.99992580 
0.99986873 
0.99986873 
0.99981166 
0.99985731 
0.99985731 
0.99985731 
Response 
Risk 
0.00007420 
0.00013127 
0,00013127 
0.00018834 
0.00014269 
0.00014269 
0,00014269 
Health 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.99972606 
0.99970323 
0.99971845 
Margin 
0.99986873 
0,99981 166 
0.99981166 
0.99981 166 
0,00013125 
0.00015407 
0.00013885 

A5 Unit Commitment in the Two Interconnected Roy Billinton Test 
Systems 
Unit commitment in the two interconnected RBTS has been done using 
the technique presented in Chapter 5. The two systems are interconnected 
through a tie line of capacity of 30 M W  with a failure rate of one failure per 
year. The lead time associated with the two systems is assumed to be 4 hours. 
Table A.16 shows the required number of committed units and the overall 
interconnected system indices when two identical RBTS are interconnected. 
Compared to the results shown in Tables A.2 and A.3, it can be seen that the 
two systems can operate in the healthy state with lower spinning reserve by 
virtue of interconnection. Table A.17 shows the results when System X has a 
constant load of 111 MW and the load in System Y varies &om 40% to 100% 
of the system peak load of 185 MW. From the results it can be seen that 
System Y should commit more units at some load levels compared to those 
shown in Table A.16. The reason for this is that at  these load levels the 
assistance provided by System X to Y is less than that provided in the case 
shown in Table A.16. 
Table k16: Unit commitment and operating state probabilities of the two 
identical interconnected RBTS. 
Peak load No. of units Spin. res. Overall interconnected system 
indices 
Health I Margin I Risk 
Table A.17: h p a d  of load variation on the unit commitment and operating 
state probabilities in the two interconnected RBTS. 
A6 Composite System Health Analysis 
The results presented in Sections A.3 to A.4 deal with operating reserve 
evaluation at  HLI. Unit commitment health analysis in an interconnected 
generating system was presented in Section A.5 as the first step in the 
application of composite system evaluation in which the tie-line constraints 
are taken into account. Unit commitment health analysis in composite 
generation and transmission systems is presented in this section using the 
technique proposed in Chapter 7. The 6-bus RBTS [I541 has been modified to 
a 5 bus system having 8 lines by connecting the load of Bus 6 plus the base 
case power flow loss of line 9 a t  Bus 5 as shown in Figure A.6. This 
modification was done to remove the radial line between Buses 5 and 6, as 
the probability of the healthy state will be always zero because the outage of 
Line 9 (single level contingency) will isolate Bus 6 and result in the 
curtailment of 20 MW of load at Bus 6. 
BUS 
Table A S 8  shows the composite system well-being indices using the 
number of committed units in Table A.2. It can be seen that the system can 
satisfy the single risk criterion a t  both HLI and HLII. Compared to the 
results shown in Table A.2, it can be seen that the HLII system risk 
increases. The reason for this is that the line flow and voltage constraints are 
added to the already considered active power constraint at HLI. Table A.19 
shows the results when the system is required to satisfy multiple criteria a t  
HLII. The number of committed units are identical to those shown in Table 
A.3 where multiple criteria are satisfied at HLI. Comparing Tables A.3 and 
A.19, it can be seen that the system healthy state probability decreases at 
HLII compared to that of HLI. 
Table A18: HLII unit commitment in the MRBTS for a single criterion. 
' load spinning no. of ProbabiliQ of . 
[MW] reserve uriits Health I Margin I Esk I I 
1 I 
Table k19: HLII unit commitment in the MRBTS for multiple criteria. 
System lead time is an important factor influencing the system well-being 
indices. The required amount of spinning reserve usually increases as the 
system lead time is increased. In order to illustrate the impact of system lead 
time on the well-being indices, a study was conducted in which the number of 
committed units was fixed at 5 for a load of 60% (111 MW) of the peak load of 
185 MW in the RBTS . The total spinning capacity is 160 MW and the system 
lead time varies from 1 to 15 hours. The results are presented in Figures A.7 
and A.8. It can be seen from these figures that as the lead time increases, the 
probability of the healthy state decreases. The probability of the healthy state 
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 
Lead time [br3 
- 
- 
# 
4 
4 
- rn 
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 
Lead time [hr] 
Figure k7: Variation of system healthy and marginal state probabilities 
versus lead time - MRBTS. 
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 
Lead time [hrl 
Figure k8: Variation of system risk versus lead time - MRBTS. 
decreases from 0.99417694 to 0.96299462 when the system lead time is 
increased from 1 hour to 15 hours. The probabilities of the marginal and risk 
states increase as the lead time is increased. 
A7 Conclusions 
Reliability test systems provide useful references for testing and 
comparing alternate techniques for power system reliability evaluation. The 
techniques based on utilizing the system well-being framework in operating 
reserve assessment are illustrated in this appendix by application to  the 
RBTS. Most of the studies conducted are similar to those performed on the 
IEEE-RTS and described in the previous chapters. Utilization of the RBTS 
provides the opportunity to conduct a large number of studies with low 
computation time. Unit commitment in this system was conducted 
considering stand-by units and interruptible load. The effects of these factors 
on the response well-being and the operating cost are illustrated. Unit 
- 
commitment in composite generation and transmission system was also 
conducted using the modified RBTS. The impact on the HLII system well- 
being indices of variations in the system lead time is also illustrated by 
application to the RBTS. The studies conducted on the RBTS proved 
invaluable in the development of a physical appreciation of the factors that 
affect system well-being. 
B. DATA OF THE 6 BUS RBTS 
Table B.1: Bus data. 
Table B.2: Line data. 
Line 
No. Time 
N 
Tap 
1 , I 
Bus 
1 1  J 
Rating 
[P.UI 
Rate 
rocc/yr~ 
B'2 R 
I 
* 
Table B.3: Generator data. 
Unit Bus Rating Failure Rate Repair Time 
C. DATA OF THE IEEE-RTS 
Table C.1: Bus data. 
Table C.2: Line data. 

D: W I D  START AND HOT RESERVE UNIT DATA 
Table D.1:Transition rates (occ/hr) of the rapid start unit. 
Table D.2: Transition rates (ocdhr) of the hot reserve unit. 
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